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Introduction
The book presented here belongs to the series documenting different 
topics discussed during the seminary that was held in The Institute of 
Cultural Studies (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań) in the period 
2011–2013. The seminary itself was dedicated to the study of the theoret-
ical consequences of the different methodologies and approaches engaged 
by historians in the particular field of the theory of cultural change. The 
seminary consisted of young scholars belonging to various intellectual 
traditions, working within different specialities and different, sometimes 
mutually exclusive, methodologies. Not the common point of view, but 
a shared interest in the problem of change and its possible theoretical 
solutions united the seminary.
Two texts presented here deal with separate but still deeply connect-
ed issues. Firstly, Magdalena Kamińska concentrates her study on the 
relationship between innovation and change, particularly researching 
the conditions under which the innovation may or may not provoke so-
ciocultural change. Being a media specialist, Kamińska chose the history 
of media technology and its social consequences as her primary research 
material. Secondly, Olga Urban, being mainly interested in the threshold 
of broad, superindividual structures, like language or culture generally 
and the individual participation in these structures, follows her scholarly 
interest strictly. She has dedicated her study to the place of the individual 
within the social processes of change, involving the conceptual apparatus 
of the theory of participation in culture.
The link between two study areas may seem obscure at first glance, but 
it is deep and important. The studies follow, one can say, opposite trajecto-
ries: one going from individual creativity to the change of superindividual 
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structures, the second – from the regulatory functioning of such structures 
to the conditions and variety of individual participation. Although follow-
ing slightly different but not contradictory methodological approaches, 
both studies emphasise different aspects of the very same process.
Krzysztof Moraczewski 
Chapter I
Technological Innovation  
and Worldview Shift  
in the Perspective of Culture History
1. Culture, nature, technology, the supernatural
Education in the area of culture studies, broadly construed, traditionally 
begins with the operationalisation of Wilhelm Dilthey’s culture-nature 
dyad and the attendant division into Naturwissenchaften-Geisteswissen-
chaften. The dyad, while still holding true for the social and humanistic 
sciences as the framework of their research fields, is currently being modi-
fied by media studies, which split it by means of a third notion, technology, 
which has previously been generally nonexistent in the field of interest of 
the humanities and social sciences.1 Among these, aesthetics has so far 
the most to say about this and has repeatedly articulated and analysed 
the difference between techne and ars – and in consequence between the 
culture of technology and its application, and artistic culture.2 Of prime 
interest in the optics of the socio-regulatory concept of culture was the 
1 See M. Lister, J. Dovey, S. Giddings, I. Grant, K. Kelly, Nowe media. Wprowadzenie, 
transl. Marta Lorek, Agata Sadza, Katarzyna Sawicka, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 
Cracow 2009.
2 See e.g. Władysław Tatarkiewicz’s classical Dzieje sześciu pojęć, PWN, Warsaw 1975, 
or David Roochnik, Of Art and Wisdom: Plato’s Understanding of Techne, Pennsylvania 
State University Press, University Park 1996, which discusses in detail one of the stages of 
the process.
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history of the emancipation of the culture of technology and its applica-
tion in connection with the determinant cultural and social changes and 
its worldview context, determined by the evolution of the understanding 
of the role, obligations and status of science.3 The legacy of the followers 
of Constructivism, especially those researchers who focused on the social 
determinants of knowledge-generation processes, as well as the history 
of the ongoing dispute about the rational in science, part of the philos-
ophy of science,4 demonstrate that the very fact of emancipation can be 
questioned, as can the location and operation of a constitutive borderline 
between the realms of ars and techne. Today, as a direct consequence of 
the widespread reconciliation with the global popularity of computer-me-
diated communication (CMC), the relations between culture, nature and 
technology are being revisited. Often, however, they are described in both 
universalistic and presentation terms. 
Media studies (especially those dedicated to the so-called “new media”) 
describe the dynamism of the invariantly-construed culture-science-tech-
nology triad in terms of an invasion of “new” technology into the “old” 
culture and nature.5 They likewise try to diagnose the effects of this in-
vasion, announcing and analysing the innovations supposed to emerge 
and spread within culture and nature under the impact of the “assault” 
of such technology. They lose sight of the fact, however, that technology 
and its practices are by no means “new” and, more importantly, the di-
versification between the three notions is not universal. In the history of 
Western culture they have been treated not only as antinomies but also as 
mutual components, extensions and models or have even been identified 
with one another. The history of the notion of things mechanical provides 
numerous examples to this effect. Of special importance here is the ex-
tension of the idea of the automaton and the debate about the anthropic 
3 Under this approach, culture is composed of two zones: the technological and usable 
one (here directives determine in normative and directive pairs the efficient conditions 
for subjective and rational actions, irrespective of the common observance of these direc-
tives), and the symbolic one (here directives determine efficient conditions for subjective 
and rational actions only when the directives are observed). After: J. Kmita, T. Kostyrko, 
Elementy teorii kultury, Wyd. Naukowe UAM, Poznan 1983.
4 See e.g. K. Jodkowski, Wspólnoty uczonych, paradygmaty, rewolucje naukowe, vol. 22, 
series “Realizm. Racjonalność. Relatywizm,” Wyd. Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodow-
skiej, Lublin 1990; W. Sady, Spór o racjonalność naukową. Od Poincarégo do Laudana, Fun-
dacja na Rzecz Nauki Polskiej, Wroclaw 2000.
5 See M. Lister, J. Dovey, S. Giddings, I. Grant, K. Kelly, Nowe media..., pp. 465–611.
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principle, revisited in the second half of the 20th century in the form of 
philosophical and other disputes on the question of the so-called AI (ar-
tificial intelligence). During the Scientific Revolution of the Middle Ages 
the idea of the automaton was expressed by two influential determinist 
concepts: of the mechanical universe, which identified the revolutions of 
the heavenly bodies with clockwork (this analogy was supported e.g. by 
Gottfried W. Leibniz, 1646–1716 and Christian Wolff, 1679–1754), and 
of the animal automaton, identifying the functions of animals’ bodies 
with the operation of automatons and the act of creation with the work 
of a craftsman (influential adherents of this idea included René Descartes, 
1596–1650 and Julien O. de La Mettrie, 1709–1751, the author of Machine 
Man, 1747, a flagship work of mechanism).6
Seeking examples of such identifications in the history of optical devices 
in particular, which will be used as a source of exemplifications in this 
text, we may notice the importance of the famous model of the human 
eye sketched by Leonardo da Vinci in 1508.7 The sketch represents a di-
agram of one of the oldest known optical devices – the camera obscura 
(an optical dark room) inscribed into the anatomical sketch of the human 
sight apparatus. Such an approach to the subject indicates that da Vinci 
did not treat the camera obscura as a metaphor, analogous to the model 
of the human eye or an imitation of the eye, but rather as an actual eye, 
no different from an organic eye, although made of a different material.8 
However, this sketch can easily be interpreted as an analogon or metaphor 
if the contemporary interpreter knows nothing of the cultural context 
of Leonardo’s model coming into being. Of special significance for this 
was the concept of natural magic, whose development helped to save 
the practices of the Renaissance representatives of “proto-science” and 
of magic from the impasse of heresy. The concept was a crucial element 
of a certain worldview which they represented. (I will come back to this 
question further on in the text.) 
The above network of relations is additionally complicated if we add 
a fourth notion into this context, which has in the past quite often struck 
6 See Encyclopedia of the Scientific Revolution. From Copernicus to Newton, ed. by 
W. Appelbaum, Taylor & Francis Group, New York – London 2000, p. 99.
7 The sketch is part of the so-called Parisian Manuscript D dedicated to the theories 
of vision, from the Bibliothèque de l’Institut de France in Paris. 
8 See N. J. Wade, S. Finger, The Eye as an Optical Instrument: from Camera Obscura to 
Helmholtz’s Perspective, “Perception” 30 (10)/2001, pp. 1157–1177.
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alliances with technology, nature and culture. The notion in question is 
that of the supernatural, something that cannot be caused or created by 
man or nature. I introduce this term here trying to avoid references to the 
self-imposing (in particular in the context of the preceding paragraph) 
notions of magic and religion. Their use triggers a host of problems with 
theory and definition, mainly caused by the fact that in the tradition of 
the social sciences their convergence and divergence have been widely 
discussed. Interestingly, technology and science are yet further notions 
whose relations to magic and religion have been analysed and accounted 
for at length by, firstly, philosophers – and then also by anthropologists.
The relation between magic and religion in the context of science and 
technology is one of the oldest and at the same time the most controversial 
topics addressed by the social sciences; with the controversies over them 
arising in the course of their development.9 For example, today’s definition 
of magic reads as follows: “Magic is a kind of social awareness, a set of 
beliefs, convictions, practices and ways of conduct making up a system 
based on the belief that thanks to strictly defined actions and measures it 
is possible to harness supernatural forces or gain their favours, to take over 
control over the course of events, fate, destiny, nature as well as over the 
actions and emotions of others.”10 Religion, in turn, is a “systematised set 
of beliefs, convictions and practices concerning the supra-natural reality 
and its impact on the world, human race and the human being and his 
or her social organisation.”11 As one can easily notice, these definitions 
share an analogous structure and, moreover, partly coincide (both magic 
and religion are systematised sets of beliefs, convictions and practices 
concerning the supernatural), but nevertheless they remain substantially 
non-complementary. The definition of religion is less precise than that of 
magic and besides does not contain the much-telling term “technology,” 
whose use indicates that the authors of the definition attach special im-
portance to the aspect of the manipulation of the magic practices. The 
conspicuous difficulty and a strong need to demarcate a borderline between 
the two notions stems from the political and ideological entanglements of 
the social sciences, in particular from the colonial past of anthropology.
As Michał Buchowski observes, the antonimy of the notions of magic 
and religion stems directly from the concept, today obsolete yet invariably 
 9 M. Buchowski, W obronie racjonalności a przeciw schizofrenii umysłu, “Kultura 
Współczesna” 1/1993, p. 67.
10 K. Olechnicki, P. Załęcki, Słownik socjologiczny, Graffitti BC, Torun 1997, p. 118.
11 Ibidem, p. 117.
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influential, put forth by James G. Frazer (1854–1941), which “in large 
measure perpetuates the beliefs of the medieval and Renaissance magi, 
according to whom one could have an impact on the natural world by 
taking action based on Hermetic knowledge. Furthermore, their belief cor-
responded to the positivist vision of science. This is precisely the source of 
Frazer’s location of magic ‘on the side of science rather than in opposition 
to science’. ”12 According to Buchowski, Frazer’s approach is instrumental 
behind the adoption by the social sciences until today of two erroneous 
approaches to magic: a theological one (“symbolist deriving from the 
Christian axiom that ‘magic is sin’ ”) and the post-Renaissance one (“in-
tellectual,” born of Frazer’s opinion that magic is immature science). Of 
special significance under the latter approach is the attribution to magic 
of the function of subordinating the world, which makes possible its in-
terpretation as a kind of proto-science. Practices and beliefs are therefore 
seen as heuristic conceptual tools and the imagery of the supernatural 
serves here as “units of theoretical explanation patterned after abstract 
scientific notions.”13 However, it was Bronisław Malinowski (1884–1942) 
who questioned the existence of both the genetic and functional isolation 
of magic and religion. According to Malinowski, the magical and religious 
systems share one feature: they are both instrumentally-oriented. The dif-
ference is that in traditional societies the drive to subordinate and explicate 
the world are inseparable from many other drives, while in secularised 
societies this drive is isolated. Therefore, the magical or religious ritual is 
dramatically different from the technological process, which has developed 
only in secularised communities.14 Magic differs from science only, or 
significantly, because of its reliance on emotions rather than experience, 
the use of associations instead of logic in the construction of theories and, 
finally, its affiliation to the sacred rather than secular tradition.15 
The current state of anthropological knowledge inclines one to believe 
that the contradictions inherent in the works which are fundamental 
from the point of view of the social sciences concerning the scope of the 
“magical,” “religious” and “scientific and technological” ways of thinking 
12 M. Buchowski, W obronie racjonalności..., p. 68.
13 M. Buchowski, Racjonalność, translacja, interpretacja. O badaniu myślenia magicz-
nego w antropologii i filozofii brytyjskiej, Wyd. Naukowe UAM, Poznan 1990, p. 57.
14 After: A. A. Szafrański, Nowa antropologia wobec dawniejszych koncepcji religii i ma-
gii, Nomos, Cracow 2000, p. 24.
15 After: M. Buchowski, Magia, jej funkcja i struktura, Wyd. Naukowe UAM, Poznan 
1986, p. 37.
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and acting are caused by their being treated – the way media studies does 
it with the notions of nature, culture and technology – in a way that strips 
them of their cultural and historical context. Add to this the multiple forms 
of religious life; in Western culture alone there were at least a few radically 
divergent forms of magic regulated by all kinds of awareness. Buchowski 
recommended the following categories of magic:
1) proto-primordial magic (forgotten and incapable of being recon-
structed);
2) syncretic magic (implicit, classic, primordial). In this case it would 
be hard to talk separately about magical practice and awareness since their 
elements are “dispersed in a stream” of action and awareness concerning 
everyday life, while their rituals are “chaotic and dispersed.”16 Syncretic 
magic should be further subdivided into:
a) monolithic (primary). Today we no longer have communities where 
social practice would be exclusively one-sided. This type of magic may 
therefore be part of anthropological discourse only as a hypothetical state 
that indicates the moment of transition between the “state of nature” and 
culture;17
b) dualist, proto-professional. Here we can find the first symptom of 
creating a new type of social practice, i.e. the emergence of specialisation, 
also in the field of production actions (since a professional diviner has to 
be at least partly exempt from them). Here magic acquires a new cultural, 
self-regulatory function. This means that the magical worldview begins to 
valorise and sanction itself through the systematisation of mythology;18
3) degraded magic (subordinated and dethroned). It is professional-
ised, but no longer the only dominant worldview and no longer regulates 
the only existing kind of practice of inducing a worldview. We see the 
appearance of a clearly separate field of the sacred, which has created and 
maintains the natural order of things and interferes with it sometimes 
through miracles; its opposite, or anti-sacrum, tries to violate this order. 
According to Buchowski, we can distinguish here the following subtypes:
a) ancient magic;19
16 Ibidem, p. 70.
17 M. Buchowski, Racjonalność, translacja, interpretacja..., p. 81.
18 M. Buchowski, Magia, jej funkcje..., p. 74.
19 When in the 1920s Karl Preisendanz published a corpus of so-called Papyri Grae-
cae Magicae (the content harks back to the period from the 2nd century BC until the 5th 
century AD), it turned out that, being the most significant source of knowledge about 
ancient magic practices, the papyri convey a clear religious message. First of all, this is 
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b) medieval and Renaissance magic with astrological practices at 
their centre. Astrology, exploring the supernatural senses of natural phe-
nomena, was during the Renaissance the most important field of culture 
wars that according to Eugenio Garin brought about an evident crisis of 
the values of monotheist religious faith. At the close of the 15th century 
and in early 16th century. Pietro Pomponazzi put forth a belief, pregnant 
in consequences for discourse, that magic cannot use any supernatural 
powers or phenomena since this would infringe on the competences of the 
One God. Magic is, therefore, no sin but a completely permissible manip-
ulation of nature.20 The dispute about the norms and interpretations of 
magical practices held during the Renaissance, no doubt stimulated a long 
process of gradual sublimation of the technological realm,21 although it 
does not mean that it determined it or was identical to it. I will return to 
this question further on in this text;
c) forbidden magic;
4) magic of choice (contemporary, deliberate).22 
The above list would imply that by applying the term “magic,” today 
we unjustifiably generalise one of the practices enumerated by Buchowski. 
In truth such a general and thus erroneous notion should be eliminated 
from the realm of the social sciences, which however seems unrealistic 
also because this would undermine their entire tradition. The introduction 
into these reflections of the notion of the supernatural does not undermine 
this tradition and will help avoid an impasse, which would be inevitable 
the magical practice of systasis, or creating a mystical and at the same time personal and 
intimate unity between the believer and deity. It was indicative not only of so-called mag-
ical thinking but also of the ancient religion of the individual, juxtaposed with the drab 
routine of obligatory public worship. The discovery of systasis questioned the earlier be-
liefs of the ancient approach to the supernatural and the existence of an inherent sep-
arateness of religion and magic. Furthermore, Papyri Graecae Magicae revealed that in 
Mediterranean antiquity not only polytheists but also Jews and Christians were involved 
in magical practices. This means that it was also these communities, which developed an 
institutionalised religion, inclusive of forms of monotheism expressly banning magical 
practices, and engaged in them, which would greatly complicate Buchowski’s division. 
See H. D. Betz (ed.), The Greek Magical Papyri in Translation, Including the Demotic Spells, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1996; A. Wypustek, Magia antyczna, Ossolineum, 
Wroclaw 2001, pp. 13, 20, 23, 97.
20 After: E. Garin, Zodiak życia. Astrologia w okresie Renesansu, transl. Wojciech Je-
kiel, Wyd. IFIS PAN, Warsaw 1997, p. 84.
21 M. Buchowski, Magia, jej funkcja..., p. 91.
22 M. Buchowski, Magia i rytuał, Instytutu Kultury, Warsaw 1993, p. 56.
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in the event of the entanglement of the theoretical issues sketched above 
regarding the delineation of the limits of the notions of religion and magic. 
This will allow a better explanation of the ways of operation of the net-
work of notions discussed in this part of the text within the framework 
of worldviews that are the foundations, context and background of the 
development of practices linked to the optical devices invented prior to 
the 20th century, which are what interest me in particular here. 
Later I will explain in more detail why in these reflections on the his-
tory of the media I have extended the traditional triad of culture, nature 
and technology by a fourth element, which I have taken the liberty of 
calling the supernatural. Its presence has been particularly conspicuous 
in the history of optical devices, used in certain periods as projectors of 
the (super)natural. The changes illustrate shifts in the worldview which 
centuries later exerted an impact on today’s audiovisual culture.
2. The development of the concept of natural magic
As was indicated before, Leonardo da Vinci’s model of the human eye 
identifying it with a type of an early optical device, i.e. the camera ob-
scura, articulates a conviction characteristic of a certain worldview, of 
the existence of a unique relation of the identity between nature and the 
supernatural. This conviction is defined in the language of Hermeticism 
as Prisca Theologia or natural magic. A lot has been written about them. 
Perhaps, as Paola Zambelli has it, too much has been written about the 
similarities and differences between their component convictions.23 In 
this text I will for the sake of simplicity use mainly the term natural magic 
since it highlights the semantic anchorage of this conviction within the 
spectrum of notions discussed in the preceding section of this text. During 
the Renaissance a belief in the existence of this relation of identity not only 
stimulated work on the construction of ever new optical devices (camera 
obscura, magic lantern, so-called Pepper’s ghost), but also determined the 
kind of practices they were used for. Attempts at dividing them into mag-
ical, scientific, technological, bogus, and entertainment practices – while 
frequent in the history of culture – are artificial, and made from a time 
perspective. In order to clarify why I believe in the key importance of 
23 P. Zambelli, White Magic, Black Magic in the European Renaissance, Brill, Leiden – 
Boston 2007, pp. 4–5.
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the Renaissance practices with optical devices as one-sided, I will briefly 
discuss the development of the concept of natural magic. 
Richard Kieckhefer indicates that the difference between the concepts 
of natural magic and other kinds of magic began to surface as early as the 
writings of Wilhelm of Auvergne (1181?–1249), Albert the Great (1193?–
1280) and Thomas Aquinas (1225?–1274) – who believed in the existence of 
“mysterious phenomena” taking place without demonic powers, and besides 
used the term virtutes occultae in reference to yet unrecognised natural 
powers – and Roger Bacon (1214?–1292), who used the term “magic” in 
reference to practices which he deemed as humbug.24 In the following cen-
turies more and more phenomena that could be interpreted as supernatural 
were naturalised and animistic. To be more precise: the symbolic features 
of elements of the natural could be, and often were, treated as evidence of 
their supernatural power. Kieckhefer implies that in disputable cases me-
dieval elites would more often apply naturalist than semiotic explanations, 
which might indicate the then division into high and low magic, a reflection 
of the social divisions of the time. We should, therefore, assume that the 
late medieval and Renaissance theory and practice of Christian magic in 
Europe perpetuated, not always completely clearly, antinomous divisions 
into natural and demonic magic, as well as into high and low ones. These 
divisions gave rise to the notions of magic and religion as they are used 
in contemporary societies. The direct sources of the latter can be sought 
only in the religious disputes of the 16th century. Their questions were 
taken over by the 19th-century founding fathers of the social sciences, who 
introduced categories of practices related to the supernatural on account 
of their expected efficacy of application rather than because of the type of 
the powers summoned. They permanently linked volitional entreaties with 
religion and mechanistic manipulations with magic.25
We should bear in mind that medieval intellectuals owed their knowl-
edge of magic to texts by pagan authors. In these sources Galen ridiculed 
faith in the miraculous power of stones, but ordered that herbs should 
be picked with the left hand; Seneca used the term “superstition,” but 
professed faith in divining; Aristotle simultaneously put forth the theory 
of quinta essentia and recognised the impact of stars on the course of 
human life; Sextus Empiricus tried to differentiate the impact of destiny 
24 R. Kieckhefer, Magia w średniowieczu, transl. Ireneusz Kania, Universitas, Cracow 
2001, s. 32.
25 Ibidem, pp. 34–35.
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on will and chance; Plotinus naturalised magic and prayer as “the strum-
ming of the strings” that help achieve desirable natural effects; while the 
other Neo-Platonians wrote about theurgy as a practice oppositional to 
goetia. The influence of poetry cannot be overestimated. For instance, the 
presence of magic in The Odyssey called for a Christian reinterpretation 
which included reflection on whether a Christian should understand 
the transformation of Odysseus’ companions into hogs as a metaphor, 
illusion or fact.26 It is, then, in order at this point too to recall that early 
Christians themselves were considered as sorcerers, since they ascribed to 
the crucified one the highest supernatural powers, which for the ancients 
came disconcertingly close to the scary practices of necromancers; it was 
common knowledge that these practices were the most efficacious when 
the bodies of executed convicts were used.27
Pagans fully approved of supernatural practices which we could dub 
magical today as long as they were performed openly; they believed in their 
positive social impact and saw as negative only those that were carried 
out in hiding. They thus created a division into white and black magic, 
often updated in successive centuries and operating in Western culture 
until today, as witnessed by contemporary wiccan “theology.”28 During the 
reign of pagan emperors only deadly magic, or simple poisoning, was seen 
as a crime; whilst as of the reign of Constantine all practices defined as 
magical were officially penalised with the somewhat surprising exception 
of the traditional Roman mantic rituals.29 Because of the above incon-
sistencies, which furnish proof of the ongoing negotiations between two 
incompatible world-view systems, the Christians of the first few centuries 
had a substantial practical and theological problem with the practices of 
popular folk magic. Christians would not try and treat themselves via 
open idolatry, but weren’t in general aware that folk medicinal magic, from 
a theological point of view, also had a demoniacal nature and therefore 
practiced it/didn’t practice it en masse.30
26 Ibidem, pp. 39–49.
27 See D. Ogden, Greek and Roman Necromancy, Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton – Oxford 2001.
28 See R. Furman, Wicca i wiccanie. Od tradycji do wirtualnej wspólnoty, Nomos, Cra-
cow 2006.
29 See R. MacMullen, Christianizing The Roman Empire A.D. 100–400, Yale Universi-
ty Press, New Haven 1984.
30 See A. Wypustek, Magia antyczna.
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To sum up, early Christians interpreted all supernatural practices 
apart from their own as idolatrous, sinful and diabolical. Still, on a daily 
basis some practices of “christened” (i.e. referring to Christian mythology 
and symbolism) magic were tolerated and thus the earlier division into 
beneficial and destructive magic perpetrated, even if the division was 
underpinned by a different world view. This division had a lot to do with 
the ancient antinomy of theurgy and goetia, and later on influenced the 
emergence of the terms of natural and demonic magic.31 Such distinctions 
were nonexistent in the pre-Christian cultures of barbarian Europe. For 
a number of centuries, Christian clergymen equipped with penitentials 
worked zealously to instil in the faithful the expected attitude towards 
the supernatural by destroying the unified aspect of supernatural pagan 
practices. Therefore, by the time of the complete Christianisation of Eu-
rope they penalised faith in the power of magic (applying to it the notion 
of superstitio) rather than active participation in magical practices whose 
efficacy they themselves doubted – as conversant with the classics, who 
were sceptical about superstitions.32 This surprising, liberal approach was 
reflected in the texts of the time. For instance, this approach does not 
demonise but rather negates the actuality of “the illusions of the women” 
who believe that they accompany the pagan goddess Diana in her trips 
across the sky at night, which image established the pattern of Sabbath 
flights and came to occupy such an important position in the anti-witch 
myths of a later date.33 
For want of clarity and oftentimes because of evident discrepancies 
between diverse medieval interpretations, beliefs and images of the super-
natural, the magus at that time was, as indicated by Richard Kieckhefer, 
a kind of person rather than a profession. It is hard to ascribe to him 
a  specific worldview. Magic (as medicine, which was a significant field 
of its impact) was practiced at that time by representatives of all social 
strata: monks, parish priests,34 physicians, surgeon-barbers, midwives, 
31 J. Durrant, M. D. Bailey, Introduction, in eidem, Historical Dictionary of Witchcraft, 
Scarecrow, Lanham 2003, pp. XXIX–XXXI.
32 R. Kieckhefer, Magia w średniowieczu..., s. 77.
33 See R. Bugaj, Nauki tajemne w dawnej Polsce – Mistrz Twardowski, Ossolineum, 
Wroclaw 1986, p. 45.
34 Their practices are documented the most extensively, which justifies a claim that 
demonic magic was practiced first of all by the clergy, who officially combated it. See 
R. Kieckhefer, Magic in the Middle Ages, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000, 
p. 56.
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folk healers, and diviners and people of any other profession and walk of 
life, with no formal training, practicing it in everyday life without the aid 
of sophisticated theoretical systems. This situation started to change only 
in the 12th century, when a more precise definition of forbidden magic 
came to be used, which resulted in a reduction of practices underrated as 
inefficient, fraudulent or superstitious. Kieckhefer indicates that this fact 
was linked to the emergence of the cathedral school out of a university. This 
institution began to systematically educate eminent erudite theoreticians 
who knew how to engage in scholarly debates and negotiate worldviews. 
They could focus, for instance, on the question of predestination, seeking 
a solution to the following dilemma: if God rules the stars and the arrange-
ment of the constellations makes man at the moment of birth a murderer 
and thief, does it mean that God marks man in this way?35 At that time 
there was no doubt that demonic magic must be criminal. Disputes were 
held rather about which supernatural practices should be qualified as 
such. For instance, prayers that looked innocuous on the face of them but 
contained any incomprehensible words or signs, were suspect since the 
words and signs in question may have been the names of demons. The 
focus in the late Middle Ages was, then, on the creation of categories of 
supernatural practices, the identification of forbidden practices and on 
providing theoretical explanations of how demonic magic may be efficient 
in a world governed by the omnipotent God.36 In short, the thing was 
to ascribe a certain power to supernatural beings other than God; this 
power could not be excessive as this would undermine the supremacy 
of the Only One. As a result, The Hammer of Witches (1487) was able to 
authoritatively observe that demons are incapable of miracles, but can in 
fact freely manipulate natural phenomena. Thanks to them, magi “can 
show to others occult things and some future events, by the information 
of devils, though this may sometimes have a natural cause. Things that 
are not as well as those that are can be shown.”37 The concept of natural 
magic was being born under precisely such circumstances.
This notion is seen as of key importance for the Renaissance period. 
Naturalisation became the principal strategy of the defence of all kinds 
of non-orthodox concepts of the supernatural and many practices were 
35 Ibidem, p. 172.
36 Ibidem, p. 259.
37 After: J. Sprenger, H. Kraemer, The Hammer of Witches, transl. Christopher S. Mack-
ay, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009, p. 94.
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penalised as demonic magic. These last included also the manufacture and 
application of optical devices. Optics was at risk of demonic influences 
and their consequences primarily because it was mainly used in both the 
Middle Ages and in the Renaissance for the production of illusion, and 
the devices themselves were not transparent. This was due to the then 
strongly elitist style of knowledge distribution and also because with the 
then state of knowledge distribution, the operation of the devices was 
incomprehensible to the operators themselves. The interest in optics was 
to link the Renaissance magi with later-day representatives of the so-called 
Scientific Revolution.38 The latter, however, used optical devices primarily 
for cognitive purposes, devoting themselves primarily to work on micro-
scopes and telescopes. The work brought about a significant change of the 
worldview since it meant to prove that the world of human life is far more 
extensive than its fragment directly accessible to the human senses. The 
contrast between the two types of practices with the use of optical devices 
exemplifies the fact that the effect of a projection depends to a large extent 
on the awareness of the presence of the device in the audience and of the 
principles of its operation in the operator. It is the overt presence of the 
device that determines the most crucial difference between a representative 
of the Scientific Revolution interested in optics and a Renaissance magus, 
who was equally interested in it. The latter was first of all a prestidigitator 
who hid the workings of his projections from his public and sometimes 
also a craftsman who used optical devices as the simple tools of astrolo-
gists or painters. Because of the worldview adopted (faith in the unique 
relation of the identity between nature and the supernatural), and also 
on account of the dominance of a specific system of the distribution of 
knowledge and its then state (an exclusive, occult model of magic philos-
ophy), optical devices could be used by the magus not as an alternative 
but simultaneously as projectors of natural and supernatural phenomena. 
This determined, in turn, the kind of practices they were used for. In the 
case of representatives of the Scientific Revolution, this question was far 
more complicated. I will return to this issue at the end of this subchapter.
The Renaissance concept of magic developed in the 15th century. From 
the very start it was contingent on the division – of earlier eras, well estab-
lished in the Western tradition – into white/natural/theurgic and black/
38 Its arbitrary borderlines stretch from the second half of the 16th century until the 
early 18th century. See: Encyclopedia of the Scientific Revolution..., p. III.
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demonic/goetian magic. The texts and practices of the Renaissance magi 
reflected, however, first of all the powerful “crisis in culture, initially lim-
ited to small avant-garde groups, which rocked not only the entire order 
of knowledge, starting with language, but also the entire civilised society, 
with serious ramifications for religion.”39 Attempts to subdue the crisis 
were made, such as the “questioning of its existence, by incorporating it 
into the realm of institutions it questions and culture areas it rejected.”40 
The principal problem was that the type of magic practiced then – among 
others by strong ties with astrology41 – was a threat to the belief in the 
divine omnipotence. However, the practices were so popular that they 
could not be eradicated, which was equivalent to a more generalised 
change of the worldview.
In principle, natural magic during the Renaissance – although this 
was not always the purpose of the magi – opposed institutional religion. 
However, we should not forget the ties of this magic with the concept of 
the Hermetic Prisca Theologia, which assumed that there is only one true 
theology, whose elements are shared by all religions, and which was offered 
to the human beings by God in ancient pagan times (and already then 
it must have included prophetically Christian elements).42 The concept 
was pioneered by Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499) and Giovanni Pico della 
Mirandola (1463–1494), who came up with plans of reforming Christi-
anity by creating a pan-denomination. This was to appease the religious 
conflicts in the West and usher in a kind of “hermetic Reformation.”43 As 
E. Garin observes, the secret of the success of Ficino’s idea, which was later 
written off by the entire 16th century, was to lie “lies in the demonstration 
of less travelled roads, such as the world of the imaginary, the charm of 
mystery and magic in a telling combination of poetry and philosophy.”44 
It was mainly thanks to the impact of Ficino’s writings that the Hermetic 
version of humanism became the motto of the period. Ficino was the 
39 E. Garin, Filozof i mag, in idem (ed.), Człowiek renesansu, transl. Anna Osmólska-
-Mętrak, Volumen, Warsaw 2001, p. 188.
40 Ibidem.
41 Frances Yates, one of the best known if controversial scholars of Renaissance Her-
metic tradition, uses here a cover term “astral magic.”
42 Encyclopedia of the Scientific Revolution..., p. 817.
43 J. D. Heiser, Prisci Theologi and the Hermetic Reformation in the Fifteenth Century, 
Repristination Press, Bynum 2011. 
44 E. Garin, Filozof..., s. 195.
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first to bolster the status of the human being as “god Anthropos,” later 
identified by Mirandola with the “grand miracle” allegedly announced 
in Antiquity by Hermes Trismegistos. We often lose sight of the fact that 
this bold, pioneer and emphatic statement of the conviction that human 
dignity is the highest value actually originated precisely in the affirmation 
of the unbridled powers of the magus, whose knowledge of the (super)
natural allows him to control his own destiny, first of all via practicing 
astrology and astral magic.45 This worldview statement taken out of its 
historical and cultural context seems understandable enough today so that 
it appears in school textbooks as an emblem of Renaissance humanism; 
however, because of the elimination of the supernatural elements, it is 
seen at present in a totally different sense.
Ficino is directly responsible for the “Unitarian root” of the Prisca 
Theologia religion, or for the idea that the promotion of Hermeticism 
may eradicate religious conflict.46 Other authors followed suit. In his 1591 
treatise Nova de universis philosophia dedicated to Pope Gregory XIV “and 
to all his successors,” Francesco Patrici called directly for the elimination 
from philosophy of the pagan Aristotle and his replacement by – the 
allegedly proto-Christian – Plato, Plotinus, Zoroaster, and Hermes Tris-
megistos.47 Pico stressed that, despite appearances to the contrary, similar 
concepts are not exclusive: theology is but a “higher” magic and magic 
is the “lower” theology and a form of philosophy, while the spirits that 
magi conjure fall into two divergent groups: demonic spirits (dangerous), 
better to be avoided, and natural (neutral) ones, that can be contacted. 
While Christianity was supposed to be the ultimate achievement and the 
overriding sense of Prisca Theologia, attempts at reconciling it with so 
many diverse non-orthodox ideas profoundly changed all of its elements. 
This syncretic collage of beliefs laid the foundations of the worldview 
of the Renaissance magi, adherents of Hermetic philosophy.48 Here the 
relation between the supernatural and nature took on an erotic twist in 
the Platonic sense: the magus was first of all to adore nature and “merge 
with its in a passionate embrace,” which was to exemplify the divine love 
45 F. A. Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, Routledge and Kegan, Lon-
don 1964, p. 116.
46 E. Garin, Filozof..., s. 196.
47 See R. Bugaj, Nauki tajemne w dawnej Polsce..., p. 76.
48 Ibidem, p. 52.
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to all creation.49 The above assumptions allowed Pico to state that magic 
is “a perfect knowledge of nature,” while Cornelius Agrippa (1486–1535) 
could write about “occult philosophy” (philosophia occulta), and Giam-
battista Della Porta (1535?–1615) could state in his monumental Magiae 
Naturalis (1584) of the principles of priestly and philosophic magic, at the 
same time discussing exorcisms and observing in an empiricist manner: 
“I believe my eyes more than Aristotle’s books [...]. We know something 
when we know its causes and principles.”50 As Frances Yates commented on 
the worldview shift, the moment the Neo-Platonic philosophers managed 
to christen Hermes, making him resemble Christ’s prophet, who foresaw 
the collapse of paganism, a unique kind of magic religion was born.51 This 
was contingent on the articulation of the relation of the identity between 
nature and the supernatural and its principal worldview, the foundation 
of a historically unique worldview system.
“In 1489 Ficino claimed authoritatively that the philosopher is a magus 
since he deals with the natural sciences and acts on the level of the natural, 
supporting Pico’s theory, condemned by that time, about »natural magic« 
as the practical part of the science of nature.”52 Pico fought against the as-
trology of diviners and necromantic magic, but was very much in favour of 
other kinds of magic, mathematical and natural, where the magus “bridged 
the world,” using the natural links between its phenomena to create new 
things. He was to a lesser degree than Ficino – who extolled the mystical 
betrothal of earth and heaven – lenient to the logical discrepancies inherent 
in this image of the world, which made him try and delineate a precise 
borderline between the natural and the supernatural.53 Since he had what 
was then respected and later ridiculed (e.g. by Umberto Eco), i.e. a talent 
of compiling elegant, coherent and symmetric systems, he went further 
than Ficino in his concepts. This applied primarily to the bold approval 
of the particularly theologically suspect kind of magia naturalis: cabba-
listic magic, which was supposed to be in line, and go hand in hand, with 
the “natural” spiritus mundi. He, thus, reformed magic substantially, as 
the Kabbalah cannot be practiced in isolation from its religious context, 
which was possible in the case of folk magic practices. The Kabbalah is 
49 F. A. Yates, Giordano Bruno..., p. 126.
50 Ibidem, p. 54.
51 Ibidem, p. 83.
52 E. Garin, Filozof..., s. 197.
53 Ibidem, p. 198.
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a practice that requires not only a substantial knowledge, but also a specific 
worldview.54 In turn, the magia moderna of Pico’s time, which did not 
require this knowledge, was seen by him as demonic, and supernatural in 
a pejorative sense of the term, i.e. incompatible with nature, and as such 
rightly forbidden.55 The fact of the existence of such divisions is in stark 
contrast to the contemporary thinking of the magical worldview, once 
again arguing that the Renaissance theory and practice of natural magic, so 
powerful in its impact on the history of optical devices, should be treated 
as dependent on the historical context rather than invariant and universal.
Jacques Le Goff observed that medieval philosophers should be seen as 
intellectuals, since only during the Renaissance was the notion of a philos-
opher ultimately clarified and reformulated. The philosopher was spared 
the role of a school teacher and thus became independent of orthodoxy 
and of the direct impact of authority, which made him a “critical and often 
rebellious” “restless searcher,”56 a physical and intellectual wanderer in 
pursuit of “covert truths.”57 He no longer was solely a commentator, mainly 
of Aristotle, and he decisively opposed medieval ways of knowledge dis-
tribution, being neither anti-Aristotelian nor anti-Averroist.58 He despised 
school as a place “where boys are taught,” preferring contacts with an elite 
group of philosophers who grappled with fundamental questions. If he 
taught at all, he was not connected with academia, but often contributed 
to the emergence of an academia, or an independent society of scholars 
dedicated to an exchange of ideas rather than to teaching. Not being too 
much of a lecturer, he preferred to express his ideas in letters, written in 
the 15th century increasingly in the vernacular languages. In general he 
attached great importance to the clarity, succinctness and literary quality of 
his texts. This stemmed from the fact that unlimited access to knowledge 
should be had by people in power and business as well as women, who 
need not bother to learn Latin or Greek. However, he should not be seen 
as believing that education should be obligatory for all; on the contrary, 
he was certain that only very few could become the initiated.59 
54 F. A. Yates, Giordano Bruno..., p. 84.
55 Ibidem, p. 87.
56 E. Garin, Filozof..., s. 179.
57 Ibidem, p. 181.
58 Ibidem, p. 185.
59 Ibidem, p. 199.
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Historians rightly point to the links between such ideas espoused by 
the Renaissance magi-philosophers due to the (ongoing) cultural and 
social shift.60 They do not always wish to note the importance of beliefs 
concerning the (super)natural, which are the foundation of their world-
view, let alone to define them in detail. This is so because the worldview 
that emerges from those beliefs seems today at best hard to understand, 
and at worst ludicrous, ridiculing its followers, who are seen as pioneers 
of the scientific way of thinking and thus as the spiritual fathers of con-
temporary times. In this situation it is more convenient to ignore the 
fact that because of the above contexts of the notion of natural magic 
there were situations where “high” magi such as e.g. Johannes Trithemius 
(1462–1516), whose texts were studies by Agrippa and Paracelsus, fully 
supported witchcraft trials; this reached its apogee between the 15th and 
the 17th centuries.61 The 16th century in particular came down in history as 
a period of witchcraft trials and the flourishing of the magical and divining 
practices of a goetian and deliberately demonic nature, which sometimes 
actually savoured of Satanism. Necromancy may be a case in point; this 
practice is recorded in a diary of Benvenuto Cellini (1500–1571), who 
described a séance in the Colosseum which he personally attended. As he 
observes, he treated seriously the prophesy that was revealed to him but 
he did not feel that he had participated in a transgressive or dangerous 
ritual that is forbidden for Christians. Today, it is completely impossible 
to reconstruct the pattern of the optical illusion he was subjected to, but 
according to his own account he did not fear the devils appearing before 
him since he believed them to be beings not actually present but merely 
their reproductions, mirror reflections of demonic beings, which at the 
time of the séance stayed in hell (most probably that is why he did not 
consider conjuring them a sin).62 This ambivalent attitude proves that at 
that time worldview negotiations took place about the supernatural, not 
only about the demarcation line between theurgy and goetia but also 
about the relativity and danger of practices of openly demonic magic. This, 
moreover, illustrates why optical practices may have been an especially 
significant field where these negotiations took place. 
60 Ibidem, p. 200.
61 See B. Ankarloo, S. Clark, W. Monter (eds.), Witchcraft and Magic in Europe, vol. 4: 
The Period of the Witch Trials, Bloomsbury, London 2002.
62 B. Cellini, Benvenuta Celliniego żywot własny spisany przez niego samego, transl. 
Leopold Staff, PIW, Warsaw 1984. 
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Furthermore, at that time the first advocates of witches such as Johannes 
Wier (1515?–1588) spoke up. They began to return to the medieval strategy 
of downplaying folk magic and goetian practices not as demonical but as 
inefficient. Ridicule and disregard of first folk and then learned sorcery 
were initially an alternative and then the dominant form of their criticism. 
However, after this strategy was installed on the background of the con-
cept of natural magic, it led to ambiguous conclusions and resulted in an 
ennoblement of “low” magic. A case in point is the approach of Paracelsus, 
who on the one hand stressed that the persecuted witches disseminated 
the most efficient of the then available medical traditions, and on the 
other hand believed that its efficacy derives solely from its elements of 
universal natural magic. A return to the notion of a superstition could 
also have been underpinned by the assumption that all human “miracles,” 
irrespective of whether carried out with or without the aid of demons, 
can only be illusory. An example here is a concept of a Jesuit theologian 
Martin Del Rio (1551–1608), who juxtaposed two kinds of magic seen as 
an art of working miracles: the supra-natural, linked with an act of God, 
and supernatural, related to human activity, but also angelic and devilish, 
capable of performing short-lived miracles by means of manipulating 
nature or deceiving the senses. Based on a similar assumption, Wier in 
De praestigiis daemonum (1563) significantly reinterpreted the fact that so 
many witches sealed their own fate by swearing during the trial that they 
had consciously entered into a pact with the devil. He deemed them as 
insane or suffering from self-delusion, the first victims of the illusion they 
themselves concocted. In both cases he demanded that they be exempt 
from persecution.63
In the 16th century the impact of goetia was more and more conspicuous 
in the concepts and practices of representatives of natural magic. A case 
in point is the activity of Cornelius Agrippa (1486–1535), “a restless ad-
venturer who traversed Europe” meeting with numerous contemporary 
philosophers, setting up all kinds of more or less clandestine brotherhoods 
and assimilating Pico’s magic, Ficino’s Hermeticisim and the Christian 
Kabbalah of Johann Reuchlin (1455–1522). By today’s standards, Agrippa 
could no doubt be called a sorcerer, just as he was so called by his con-
temporaries. His writings openly contested the institutions of power and 
63 After: S. Dupré, Images in the Air: Optical Games, Magic and Imagination, in 
Ch. Göttler, W. Neuber (eds.), Spirits Unseen. The Representation of Subtle Bodies in Early 
Modern European Culture, Brill, Leiden – Boston 2008, pp. 85–86.
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insulted theologians, who persecuted and isolated him.64 Like Paracelsus, 
he provided a typology of all kinds of magic, differentiating between ele-
mentary magic (composed of the natural sciences and medicine), celestial 
(comprising philosophy and mathematics) and the ceremonial one. His 
great compendium De occulta philosophia libri tres (1533), later used 
as a grimoire, provided a definition of natural magic. According to him 
this was a science thanks to which a magus can manipulate the heavenly 
bodies to effect physical changes in the world: “Natural Magicke then is 
that, whiche having intentively behelde the forces of all natural thinges, 
and celestiall, and with curious search sought out their order, doth in such 
sorte pushing abroade the hidden and secret powers of nature: coupling 
the inferiour things with the qualities of the superiour as it were certaine 
enticements by a naturall joyning of them together, that therof oftentimes 
doe arise marvelous miracles: not so much by Arte as nature whereunto 
this Arte dothe proffer herselfe a servaunte, when shee worketh these 
things.”65 In the same book he wrote side by side about the manufacture 
of poisons, filters and perfumes linked to individual planets and about 
the nature of light. Light originated in the Holy Trinity, then in angels, 
the heavenly bodies, fire, and finally in an individual with an enlightened 
mind, who possessed knowledge of things divine. All earthly phenomena 
were to reflect the overriding system of the universe, ordered according to 
the principles of the magic of numbers and planets. To Agrippa, the magic 
of numbers was far superior to natural magic which, apart from affinities 
with Pythagoras, would indicate a pre-Cartesian conviction about the 
precedence of the abstract over the empirical.66 Moreover, Agrippa was, 
quite surprisingly, perhaps, one of the first relativists, merging the occult 
with scepticism in a way which could be incomprehensible today.67 I will 
return to this question at the end of this subchapter.
Paracelsus (1493?–1541) was a similar, if somewhat more restless per-
son. Today he is most often remembered as a rebellious innovator-physi-
cian who contested all theoretical schools, ostensibly using in his writing 
a German dialect instead of Latin and condemning the entire tradition 
of Galen, Avicenna and Aristotle. In a truly apologetic zest he prophesied 
64 E. Garin, Filozof..., s. 205.
65 After: S. F. Williams, ‘Singe the Enchantment for Sleepe’: Music and Bewitched Sleep 
in Early Modern English Drama, in Ch. Göttler, W. Neuber (eds.), Spirits Unseen..., p. 182.
66 F. A. Yates, Giordano Bruno..., pp. 131–133.
67 Encyclopedia of the Scientific Revolution..., p. 34.
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that Galen and Avicenna would be “covered by stones” and that “Heaven 
shall give birth to new physicians, who will learn four elements as well as 
the art of magic and cabbala, which are the cataracts of your eyes. These 
will be the geomantici, adepti, archei, spagiri, who will possess the quantum 
esse, who will possess the arcana, who will possess the mysterie, and who 
will possess the tinctura. Where will your vomit-inducing mixes end up 
after this revolution?”68 He believed that philosophy is “invisible nature” 
which, apart from astronomy and alchemy, which also boil down to the 
notion of nature, should be the basis of medicine. Paracelsus was, then, 
a  par excellence natural philosopher and at the same time a mystic in 
theory and materialist in practice, who deemed all forms of creation as an 
alchemical process.69 Many more similar examples could be provided here. 
Perhaps the most troublesome case is John Dee (1527–1608?), who must 
not be left out in the history of the Scientific Revolution but who also, as 
a true sorcerer, cannot be unquestioningly attributed to it.70 Inspired by 
Trithemius, Dee came to regard alchemy as an offshoot of natural mag-
ic – astronomia inferior (external, or earthly astronomy).71 According to 
Dee, the Kabbalah was the discipline that ordered the entire visible and 
invisible world. It was a hieroglyphic, a “new and holy art of writing and 
language” inspired also by Pythagoras, originating in the first principle 
of reality (monad) and being a literal record of the divine act of creation, 
an aid for the “writing of things.” The knowledge of the Kabbalah was to 
reform the entire body of knowledge possessed by humans.72 
Dee repeatedly described the illusionary effects of “images appearing 
in the air,” conjured up by means of “miraculous mirrors.” We have no 
way of knowing if in this case he meant an optical (catoptric) projection 
or a purely magical séance since his description is too scanty and focuses 
on the effects without any mention of the workings and the details of the 
devices used.73 This example demonstrates that the most crucial difference 
between accounts of the state of the art knowledge from different histor-
68 Ibidem, pp. 207–208.
69 Ibidem, p. 34.
70 Ibidem, p. 284.
71 N. H. Clulee, Astronomia Inferior. Legacies of Johannes Trithemius and John Dee, in 
W. R. Newman, A. Grafton (ed.), Secrets of Nature. Astrology and Alchemy in Early Modern 
Europe, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. – London 2001, p. 173.
72 Ibidem, pp. 176–179.
73 Ibidem, pp. 71–72.
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ical periods lies precisely in the form of description adopted in a given 
era. Before the 17th century recording knowledge consisted mainly in the 
“re-writing of tradition,” classifying the existent material and creating its 
comprehensive compilations. In this form knowledge was distributed, 
which perpetuated certain thinking patterns and contributed to a far 
higher opinion of erudition as opposed to innovativeness, a potential 
threat to the integrity of the worldview status quo.74 The intensifying “fact 
worship” radically changed this state of affairs as it contributed to a grad-
ual emergence of the expert figure and of ways of compiling collective 
knowledge known today. The recognition of a specific relation between 
experiment and knowledge expressed in a highly precise account is key 
for the concept of science in the 16th and 17th centuries and played the 
fundamental role in the transformations of natural philosophy into the 
Scientific Revolution.75
3. Scientific Revolution
The role of magic for the initiation of the Scientific Revolution has been 
repeatedly downplayed and instead the role of natural philosophy has 
been stressed, interpreted in hindsight as proto-science. However, the 
Renaissance concepts of philosophy and theurgy accounted for phenom-
ena in terms of causes without testing explanations since they concerned 
things and phenomena accessible to the senses and commonly known. 
In turn, the goetian and folk branches of magic, on the contrary, were 
disinterested in causality as a matter of course. Possible explanations of 
phenomena were for them an optional addition unworthy of attention. 
Unlike an intellectual philosopher, a professional sorcerer was only after 
practical accomplishments (sometimes real, other times virtual, illusionist 
and simulation-like).76 Therefore, the role of “lower” magical practices 
proved decisive for the discovery of the experimental method and so-
called mechanical philosophies seen as characteristic of the Scientific 
Revolution. Magic assumed facts “bottom-up,” not through theory, which 
would inevitably result in the rejection of facts incompatible with theory. 
74 B. W. Ogilvie, The Science of Describing. Natural History in Renaissance Europe, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago – London 2006, pp. 2–3.
75 Ibidem, pp. 6–15.
76 Encyclopedia of the Scientific Revolution...., p. 591.
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Moreover, it was not surprised by anything but instead pragmatically took 
advantage of all in a bricolage fashion.77 Thus, it cleared the field of studies 
for a “new epistemology” of the Scientific Revolution.78 The practices of 
opticians were again of crucial significancerole in this respect.
In fact, all Renaissance philosophers demonstrate some kind of fasci-
nation with the practice of projecting “images in the air.” This interest was 
linked with Euclid (Optica and Pseudo-Euclid’s Catoptrica), Alhazen and 
Witelo (Perspectiva).79 In the late 16th century the “images in the air” and 
optical devices that projected them became the major field of negotiations 
of the borderlines between natural and demonic magic. In principle they 
were grouped together with the unnatural, virtual, unreal and thus nega-
tive. The predominantly scary content of the projections aroused further 
suspicions that they may result from diabolical interventions, although 
some authors included optics into natural magic. Such authors included 
e.g. Giambattista Della Porta and Jean Pena (1528–1558), who included 
optics into the zone of “natural miracles,” which only charlatans deemed 
as supernatural.80 Other uses of optics were less popular then and boiled 
down, as observed by Petrus Ramus (1515–1572), to the art of improving 
eyesight (ars bene videndi). Pena, a disciple of Ramus, substantially extend-
ed the meaning of optics into the skill of a “careful and cautious assessment 
of whether the visible things are true or false” and a knowledge of methods 
of deceiving the eye during optical games and thus a skill of an efficient 
defence against them. To this end he described optical effects in De usu 
optices (1557) and observed that they are but illusionists’ tricks to scare 
the public with projections of spirits and devils (e.g. the art of projecting 
“images in the air” by means of a mirror located in a camera obscura).81 
The medieval projections accounted for by Witelo (1230?–1280?) were 
meant to be watched in magic mirrors (most often convex and cylindrical), 
while 16th-century projections were based on projecting images in the air, 
which enhanced the reality effect and at the same time intensified their 
uncanny aspect and were a step towards a mass spectacle.82 Other uses of 
optical devices were sought yet they remained a speculation, oftentimes 
77 Ibidem, p. 592.
78 Ibidem, p. 598.
79 Ibidem, pp. 71–72.
80 After: S. Dupré, Images in the Air..., p. 84.
81 Ibidem, pp. 71–72.
82 Ibidem, pp. 74–75.
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totally imaginary. For instance, in the Bellicorum instrumentorum liber 
Giovanni Fontana (1395?–1455?) described a hypothetical strategy of 
psychological warfare with the use of projections from a magic lantern, 
which at that time was unfeasible from a technical point of view.83 In the 
16th and 17th centuries, optical games became popular entertainment at 
courts and the Kunstkammera, where optical instruments were gathered, 
and thanks to them the Spielkammera, or playrooms for adults84 came into 
existence. Partly due to the intense and long-lasting popularity of Della 
Porta’s Magiae Naturalis these were not only games for aristocracy. City 
dwellers also had their “mirror cabinets” not only for projections but also 
for deformations, anamorphous.85 By the 17th century this had become 
bona fide collective entertainment, with no division into the element of 
ludus (social entertainment) and lusus (the intellectual one). Especially in 
Jesuit writings ludere was inextricably linked semantically with illudere.86
One of the most influential Jesuit intellectuals of the time was Atha-
nasius Kircher (1601?–1680), called the “last Renaissance man,” no doubt 
the last to believe in the collection of all universal knowledge into one 
compendium. An author of Ars Magna Lucis et Umbrae (1646), which was 
fundamental for the development of optics, he was one of the most prolific 
encyclopédistes of his time. He wrote numerous letters and ran a museum 
of curios in the Collegio Romano, which converted this venue into one 
of the most important intellectual centres of Rome, and contributed to 
his being the most renowned polymath of his era. Throughout his life he 
searched for “ancient truths,” believed that the hieroglyphs were one of 
the major conveyors of them and treated them as symbols of universal 
pan-knowledge (pansophia). An eclectic who joined excerpts with observa-
tions and an avid experimenter making use of the newest inventions which 
83 Similar ideas were often taken up later, as late as the 20th century, even if in refer-
ence to film screenings. During the First World War Paul Leni, who was to become an 
eminent German film director, was stationed as a soldier in a Polish family, where he was 
intrigued by the religious practices of Catholicism, somewhat exotic for a Prussian Jew. 
He then hit on an idea to project a figure of St. Mary in the sky in order to finish the war 
by means of this fake miracle. This idea was seriously considered by the German ministry 
for the propaganda, but eventually was never implemented. After: J. Maśnicki, Niemy kraj. 
Polskie motywy w europejskim kinie niemym (1896–1930), słowo/obraz terytoria, Gdansk 
2006, p. 94.
84 Ibidem, p. 78.
85 Ibidem, p. 80.
86 Ibidem, p. 83.
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he connected with Neo-Platonic intuitions, he stressed the importance of 
a system of covert correspondences in nature. Already during his lifetime 
the ambiguous reputation of a sorcerer-clergymen reflects perfectly well 
the transitional nature of science in this period.87
While the syncretic worldviews of Paracelsus, Dee and Kircher may 
be treated as transitional forms, science historians do not easily reconcile 
with the fact that actually all the renowned representatives of the Scientific 
Revolution were practicing occultists, most often alchemists. The most 
eminent among them were: Johannes Baptista van Helinont (1579–1644), 
Johannes Kepler (1571–1630), Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655), William Gil-
bert (1544–1603), Francis Bacon (1561–1626), Robert Boyle (1627–1691), 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), and Isaac Newton (1642–1727).88 
Early science historians followed the pioneer of this discipline George 
Sarton (1884–1956) and tried to differentiate very sharply between 
17th-century science and such “pseudo-sciences” as magic and alchemy, 
which directly preceded it in time. Today, however, they more and more 
often yield to the fact that for many of the early modern nature philoso-
phers, including Bacon and Newton, these were not pseudo-sciences but 
components of the more profound lore of Prisca Theologia.89 Symbolic 
of this shift may be the fact that in the contemporary Encyclopedia of the 
Scientific Revolution one of the two first dates discussed is the publication 
of the Corpus Hermeticum (1469).90 Tara Nummedal directly observes 
that “if Newton took alchemy seriously, we should, too.” He admits at the 
same time that there were many alchemists and alchemies (medica, trans-
mutatoria, technica, mystica), but he generally considered all alchemists 
as “early modern types.”
In the 16th and 17th centuries alchemy was a tempting career path not 
only for intellectuals but also for all those inclined to transgress social 
and geographic limits.91 Importantly, unlike the philosopher, the alche-
mist had to do more than just private practices and as a result his activity 
should be treated as social practice. For this purpose it proved necessary 
to develop a cultural identity of an alchemist, or, as Nummedal defines 
87 Encyclopedia of the Scientific Revolution..., p. 544.
88 Ibidem, p. 593.
89 Ibidem, p. 818.
90 Ibidem, p. XXII.
91 T. Nummedal, Alchemy and Authority in the Holy Roman Empire, The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago 2007, p. 10.
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it, a mediating persona between the individual and his or her biography, 
and the social institution, society and culture where the individual lived 
and worked. The persona influenced the minds and bodies of individuals 
and at the same time developed a collective consciousness since it was 
shared and identified by a community. Being a “hybrid of individuals and 
communities composed of symbols, senses and values,” it evolved in time 
although, importantly, the discourse which had an impact on it was never 
institutionalised. The medieval alchemic tradition offered here only one 
set of possibilities: an alchemist was then a scholar, artist or prophet, and 
oftentimes all the three combined. In the 16th century, literary sources 
begin to reveal an alternative set of possibilities: an alchemist is portrayed 
as a caricature, as a fool, criminal, corrupt charlatan, or con-man. In the 
Middle Ages they were vilified within the framework of a general critique 
of knowledge and skills, while in the early modern era in the context of 
permanently warped morality. Defending themselves against similar alle-
gations, alchemists, on their part, came up with the figure of an expert92: 
though a satirically exaggerated persona of a fake alchemist, an anti-expert, 
fool, and con-man driven by greed and addiction still persisted. The impact 
of this dual imagery is observable e.g. in the adventurous biography of 
John Dee, full of trials and tribulations, especially in the tragicomic history 
of his relationship with Edward Kelley, his medium.93 The repertory of 
bona fide and bogus alchemists included all kinds of practices with the 
use of optical devices.
Frances Yates once observed that paganism and magic were the quin-
tessence of Renaissance humanism. They were to restore human dignity by 
changing human relations with the supernatural into a partnership based 
on – humble – imitation.94 Yates stressed that the concept was almost suc-
cessful since at the close of the 16th century “new philosophers,” followers 
of Hermeticism, used their best endeavours to persuade the popes that 
Hermeticism might be the doctrine which would reunite Catholics and 
Protestants. Acording to Yates, Giordano Bruno (1548–1600) was such an 
agent,95 who openly adored Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543) as the one 
who opened the eyes of the human race to truly occult knowledge.96 That is 
92 Ibidem, p. 42.
93 Ibidem, p. 48.
94 F. A. Yates, Giordano Bruno..., pp. 161–162.
95 Ibidem, pp. 182–185.
96 Ibidem, p. 236.
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why Bruno was not sentenced to death as a free-thinking scholar or a phi-
losopher supporting the heliocentric system; but this is a far later legend. 
He was burned as a heretic and for a reason. Yates believes that only Gal-
ileo (1564–1642) could be burnt for a stand that resembled a 20th-century 
ideal of the scientific, as he transferred the dispute between Ptolemy and 
Copernicus into the realm of the purely rational. However, even Galileo 
exhibits influences of Hermeticism, which illustrates the variety of contexts 
in which heliocentrism could be located at that time.97 It was at that time 
too that we should seek the (inevitably arbitrary) caesura between the 
Renaissance and the Scientific Revolution. Bruno’s worldview “cleansed 
of animism and equipped with the laws of inertia and gravity replacing 
beliefs of the mental life of nature as the overriding principle of movement, 
understood objectively rather than subjectively” started to transform into 
Newton’s mechanical universe, governed by its own principles created by 
God, who was no longer to be an archimagus but a mechanic and a math-
ematician. Therefore, we can say that the “retrograde” “magicisation” of 
religion in the 16th century actually contributed to the birth of scientific 
rationality in the 17th century.98 A reservation is in order, however; natural 
philosophy cannot be identified with science as this would be an obvious 
anachronism. Neither can we assume that the Scientific Revolution meant 
the end of natural philosophy and the onset of modern science; it was too 
flexible, pliable and internally conflicted for that. Nor can it be interpreted 
as a rebellion against scholastic Aristotelianism, since it swallowed it, too. 
Rather than that, it was a zone of conflict, cooperation and shifts between 
the diverse branches of natural philosophy within the same worldview.99 
After the 17th century the organisation of optics as a science did not 
fundamentally change. Theoretically it originated directly in the philosophy 
of nature and, as to its methodology, from mathematics and experiment. 
An important caesura of its development was the fact that in the early 17th 
century. Johannes Kepler (1571–1630) came up with a new concept of an 
image. iIn his Ad Vitellionem paralipomena (1604) he drew a significant 
distinction between “images in the air” and the projections onto a paper 
screen which Della Porta described. On this basis he differentiated between 
97 Ibidem, pp. 355–359.
98 Ibidem, p. 451.
99 P. R. Anstey, J. A. Schuster, Introduction, in eidem (eds.), The Science of Nature in 
the Seventeenth Century. Patterns of Change in Early Modern Natural Philosophy, Springer, 
Dordrecht 2005, p. 2.
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imago and pictura, or virtual and real image.100 In earlier texts on optics, 
the existence of a one-to-one correspondence between an image and its 
reflection was accounted for by observing that the refraction within the eye 
debilitated all sunrays apart from one, which precisely generates this image. 
Kepler countered this by a hypothesis that an image must be generated by 
means of a beam of rays emitted by an object. A crisp image is a result of 
rays emitted by one light source focusing in the centre.101 This concept 
intensified the development of astronomical and microscope observations, 
which focused on an avoidance of distortions of images generated by the 
then optical devices (these were dealt with by Isaac Newton, Robert Hooke, 
1635–1703, and Christiaan Huygens, 1629–1695). The interest in projection 
devices decreased and soon they were treated as no more than toys.102 The 
solution of the problem of physical theology, or the proof that the practice 
of physics deriving from natural philosophy is not harmful for faith, proved 
dogmatically easy at this stage. As a result, physics soon lost its controversial 
nature and its practices lost the air of danger and mystery.103 
As can be surmised on the basis of the above sketchy evolution of the 
concept of natural magic and its links with the Scientific Revolution, the 
demarcation lines accepted at a given time between nature, technology, 
culture and the supernatural as areas of human activity in the surround-
ing world depend in large measure on the current level of understanding 
of the role of the human subject, its function and conditions. A radical 
change in this respect was determined by the Renaissance humanism of 
followers of Hermeticism, which attributed to the magus-philosopher 
a unique scope of agency and control of the (super)natural reality. Of spe-
cial importance was the clearly optimistic interpretation of the cognitive 
and causative capabilities of an individual and a community in line with 
the accepted causes, course and consequences of decision-making pro-
cesses, the understanding of the role and sources of knowledge used and 
created in the social context, and the recognised and approved possible 
motives for one’s activity. 
Here we may encounter an obvious temptation to simply extend the 
nature-culture dyad mentioned at the beginning of this text, funda-
mental for the theory of the social sciences, into the semiotic square of 
100 S. Dupré, Images in the Air..., p. 77.
101 Encyclopedia of the Scientific Revolution..., p. 730.
102 Ibidem, p. 731.
103 Ibidem, p. 775.
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nature-culture-supernatural-technology, ordered differently in different 
eras. However, the creation of such a construct would require a universal 
differentiation between them and, as I indicated in this and the preceding 
subchapter, it cannot be justified in any way. It is easy, however, to make this 
mistake if we analyse the ways pre-modern optical devices were used out-
side the perspective of the history of culture, without taking into account 
the worldview context of their invention. This mistake is committed even 
by such renowned representatives of media studies as Hans Belting104 and 
Siegfried Zielinski,105 who tied in the history of optical devices with the 
contemporary understanding of the scope of art, science and technology, 
but who shunned the reflection characteristic of culture studies. This leads 
to presentism, which seems the most conspicuous in the elimination from 
the archaeology of the media of today’s incomprehensible notion of the 
supernatural, which can lead to a progressivist treatment of magi-opticians 
as counterparts of contemporary artists or proto-scientists. 
This was the adopted approach also outside media studies when writing 
about the history of science, technology and philosophy. For example, Józef 
Dobrowolski in the only Polish biography of Giambattista Della Porta, the 
author of the first account of an illusionist optical effect called in the 19th 
century the Pepper’s ghost effect (1558),106 introduced Albert the Great as 
a “natural empiricist,” Raymond Lull as a chemist, and Girolamo Cardano 
as a physician. Since in the case of Cornelius Agrippa the author could 
not come up with a convincing analogy for his alleged “proto-scientific” 
activity in any contemporary branch of science, no noun was applied 
to him.107 In situations when we cannot avoid discussing practices and 
statements which are evidently non-scientific by today’s standards as they 
refer expressis verbis to the supernatural, science historians sometimes 
take the liberty to arbitrarily divide these “irrationalities” into superior 
and inferior ones. For instance, Dobrowolski interpreted Della Porta’s 
104 See H. Belting, An Anthropology of Images: Picture, Medium, Body, transl. Thomas 
Dunlap, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2014.
105 See S. Zielinski, Deep Time of the Media. Toward an Archaeology of Hearing and 
Seeing by Technical Means, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 2006.
106 G. Della Porta, Magia naturalna, vol. XVII: O Niezwykłych Zwierciadłach, chapter 
XII: Jak ujrzeć w Komnacie rzeczy, które nie istnieją [transl. of titles – M. K.], http://www.
mindserpent.com/American_History/books/Porta/jportac17.html [19.04.2014].
107 J. A. Dobrowolski, Droga przez labirynty magii. Giambattista Della Porta (1535–
1615), PWN, Warsaw 1990, p. 15.
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interest in physiognomics as a token of a materialistic approach since the 
followers of this mantic and diagnostic practice believed that the root 
cause of a crime can be found in criminals’ physiology and (hypothet-
ically) genetics rather than in the stars, as the allegedly “more magical” 
astrologers did.108 Dobrowolski ignored the fact that the assumptions of 
both these practices are contingent in equal measure on the faith in the 
agency of factors that are seen as supernatural today, while astrological 
practice contributed far more to present-day scientific astronomy than 
physiognomics to anatomy. Similarly, the fact that Della Porta ridicules 
the faith in the irreversibility of destiny can easily lead to an unjustifiable 
conclusion that he was generally sceptical toward all kinds of practices 
seen as magical today since he believed that a fatalistic approach is inad-
missible as it is based on irrational grounds, and therefore his preferred 
approach was akin to contemporary rationalism, i.e. volitionalism and 
humanism.109 This is no doubt an over-interpretation.
Unlike his Polish biographer, Della Porta himself was well aware of the 
ambiguity of the notion of “magic” and of the potential risks involved in 
a reference to it. Therefore, precisely the magus-philosopher idealised by 
Porta should, to his mind, study only those relations between phenomena 
and objects which allow “natural miracles” to occur. However, his terms 
scientia naturalis and philosophia naturalis should be read in the context 
of the period and we should not tear them out of it on the pretext of fa-
cilitating their better understanding, as was done by Dobrowolski, who 
incidentally in the very last paragraph of the aforementioned monograph 
undermined his own “materialistic” and “rationalistic” image of Porta 
when he wrote: “Even if he believed in astrology and magic, this faith by 
no means compromises him.”110 In the example of Porta’s works and of 
contemporary interpretations of the worldview these works demonstrate, 
we can clearly see that references to the context-based notion of the su-
pernatural must prove of key importance for the explanation of the his-
tory of optical devices, evident during not only the reconstruction of the 
intellectual biographies of magi-opticians and their prototypical devices, 
but also of their practices when using these devices. 
It should be stressed here that the technology of optics and optical 
devices is, like the technology of writing and the practice of reading an-
108 Ibidem, p. 29.
109 Ibidem, p. 31.
110 Ibidem, p. 139.
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alysed by Roger Chartier,111 a special case. For example, the invention of 
the device known as the Pepper’s ghost described by Porta, to be further 
discussed in this text, boils down in fact to the observation of a natural 
effect which generates practices of its use and the implementation of the 
conditions that are conducive to these practices. Throughout the centuries 
this device was often re-discovered and perfected, its effect amplified, and 
yet the underlying pattern of its operation was as unknown in the 16th 
century as it is today since the role of the brain in the process of vision 
has not been fully understood to date.112 At present, we are no doubt 
cognisant of more laws of physics, know more about anatomy and have 
at our disposal a larger number of more sophisticated optical devices 
than Giambattista Della Porta in the 16th century. Can we really make 
use of them more efficiently than Porta did? It depends on the practice 
we have in mind. 
4. Technology vs. history  
in Fernand Braudel’s approach
Technology is treated by both historians and laymen, whose perspectives 
are linked in different genres of popular texts, including school textbooks 
and encyclopaedia, as the prime distinctive feature of civilisation. The 
Chinese civilisation is most often defined in these texts by means of 
“powder, paper and fireworks,” the Roman one by the “aqueduct, opus 
caementicium and hypocaustum,” the Inca one by the “absence of a wheel,” 
etc. Naturally, in more profound historical analyses such as Arnold J. 
Toynbee’s (1889–1975) monumental work,113 civilisations have beenwere 
identified and defined not only via characteristic products of technology 
(or their absence), but also via forms of social organisation, religious life, 
111 See R. Chartier, Forms and Meanings. Texts, Performances, and Audiences from 
Codex to Computer, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1995; R. Chartier, In-
scription and Erasure Literature and Written Culture from the Eleventh to the Eighteenth 
Century, transl. Arthur Goldhammer, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 
2007; R. Chartier, The Order of Books: Readers, Authors, and Libraries in Europe Between 
the Fourteenth and Eighteenth Centuries, transl. Lydia G. Cochrane, Stanford University 
Press, Stanford 1994.
112 See e.g. R. L. Gregory, Eye and Brain: The Psychology of Seeing, Michigan Univer-
sity Press, Ann Arbor 1968. 
113 A. J. Toynbee, A Study of History, vol. 1–12, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1934–
1961.
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art, science, geography, languages, politics, especially the military one, 
identity, history, etc. However, this kind of approach is also inclusive of 
an archaeological element: a civilisation is identified and defined via an 
enumeration of its surviving artefacts, such as its inventions/discoveries 
and its characteristic innovations, created and disseminated within it and 
then also possibly spread outside of it. This manner of writing history can 
be called modern since it functions as another incarnation of the organic 
metaphor: it illustrates a gradual increase of the global knowledge poten-
tial – with technical knowledge occupying the pride of place – and thus 
of the permanent progress of humanity. On the other hand, it implies the 
existence of profound and stable borderlines between culture systems and 
contributes to Ernest Gellner’s The Big Ditch.
The understanding of the role of technology for the post-modern and 
post-annalistic (i.e. strongly impacted by the social sciences, as Roger 
Chartier observes114) historiography, has been corrected on account of 
the increasing awareness of problems which the acceptance of the above 
manner of writing history triggers (generated first of all by the question 
about the limits of systems). The Annalists saw technology as a major 
determinant of human life, which, however, was not long-lasting and 
therefore conditioned human life to a lesser extent than e.g. climate or nat-
ural resources.115 Fernand Braudel observed unequivocally: “Technology 
is the queen: it is she who changes the world,”116 even though he noted at 
the same time that it should be described not only in terms of innovation 
but also as an “efficient traditional act” since “the routine movements” of 
e.g. a blacksmith, farmer or sailor are culturally learned, a result of “ac-
cumulated knowledge.”117 He, moreover, explained that: “Everything is 
technology: a sudden effort as well as a patient and monotonous pressure 
of people onto the external world, abrupt transformations which we rush 
to call revolutions [...], but also slow ways of improving modes of work 
114 R. Chartier, Introduction, in idem, On the Edge of the Cliff. History, Language and 
Practices, transl. Lydia G. Cochrane, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore  – 
London 1997, pp. 3–4.
115 For Fernand Braudel geographical time is the longest (longue durée), “human” 
time is short and the time of technology of medium duration. In his work he did not 
address, however, the period from the latter half of the 19th c. onwards, when the duration 
of technology was curtailed.
116 After: F. Braudel, Kultura materialna, gospodarka i kapitalizm XV–XVIII wiek, vol. I: 
Struktury codzienności, transl. Maria Ochab and Piotr Graff, PIW, Warsaw 1992, p. 356.
117 Ibidem, p. 277.
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and tools.”118 He repeatedly stressed that the appearance of an invention 
as a technological prototype does not bring about a breakthrough since it 
does not generate a sustainable change. It happens that inventions (often) 
need to wait whole centuries to shift from the stage of inventio (Braudel 
defines this stage as “pro-revolutionary” or “evolutionary”) to that of 
usurpatio (mass practical use). They are implemented only when “socie-
ty attains an adequate level of readiness” rather than, as it is commonly 
believed, when “specific branches of technology or science are ready for 
it.”119 The Nestor of the Annales school fittingly points out that e.g. prior 
to the invention of the steam engine, many of its component elements had 
been invented, such as the clogged wheel or the transmission shaft, and 
they were gradually perfected but, contrary to expectations, work on them 
did not result in any technological breakthrough. Only the appearance of 
the steam engine ushered in an abrupt change that profoundly affected 
all fields of human life.120 
And so “In the history of technology acceleration is as frequent as 
slowdown, often consecutively,” as a result of which progress is “marked by 
abrupt development leaps interspersed with long periods of stagnation.”121 
It should be stressed at the same time that especially “basic technologies 
are [...] extremely sluggish. The thread of innovation meanders among 
them very slowly,”122 while all the regulations of copyrights and ludist 
movements may additionally slow down the implementation process.123 
Moreover, in history we deal with numerous “failed revolutions” which 
needed a mere “component or two to be successful” as well as with “isolated 
and useless inventions as purely a game of the mind.” Many 19th-century 
optical devices are just such a case in point since they either remained 
at the prototype stage as cautiously guarded illusionist sorcerers’ tools or 
never stopped being playthings only. Braudel did not suggest any simple 
explanation why the future of technological innovation cannot be foreseen. 
He seems, however, to put it down first of all to the systems of knowledge 
distribution. It can be easily demonstrated that unless there are efficient 
networks of knowledge distribution within and between communities 
118 Ibidem, p. 278.
119 Ibidem.
120 Ibidem, p. 306.
121 Ibidem, p. 354.
122 Ibidem, p. 317.
123 Ibidem, p. 356.
42 Chapter I
(in Europe their efficacy increased significantly only in the 17th century), 
technological progress is slow and uneven (e.g. military technologies 
develop intensively while transportation ones lag behind).124
Braudel highlighted the fact that neither the industrial revolution nor 
“any other endeavour of production and exchange” can be interpreted 
only in terms of an economic process since the economy is not a separate 
and autonomous zone.125 The sustainable growth potential is invariable 
the question of undisturbed long-term processes, or more exactly of the 
superimposition of a short time, which generates unbalanced develop-
ment in leaps and a long-term one. Growth is a “relay race that cannot be 
interrupted; one invention needs to take over the baton from the another 
one.” Each process of growth has its historically determined “limits of the 
possible” (e.g. constraints on the available sources of energy), while the 
present day can be, according to Braudel, defined first of all by the fact that 
the limits are constantly being pushed back. Therefore, in his opinion, all 
revolutionary technical breakthroughs are in effect only a historiographic 
rhetorical figure.126 
Braudel, therefore, assumed the autonomy of technology in that, no-
ticing the inevitable intermeshing of technology and culture, he did not 
naturalise technology as an element of the human ecosystem and thus 
did not interpret technology as ecology, as it is increasingly understood 
today. After all, not only in recent decades has technology has radically 
modified the conditions of human life, transforming, moreover, geogra-
phy and climate. At the peak of Braudel’s research, this is what happened 
across the globe and triggered changes unforeseen at that time, whose 
long-range consequences continue to be felt, and are accumulated, and 
their final effects remain unknown. When Braudel published The Medi-
terranean, the Aswan Dam was being designed, and as a consequence of 
this technological project the order of the Mediterranean world treated 
by the author as having long-term effects, expressed already by Herodotus 
(“Egypt is the gift of the Nile”), was deconstructed. No text by the French 
scholar implies that he took such a possibility into account and considered 
its potential consequences. 
That we should accept Braudel’s approach to the relation between tech-
nology-culture-nature (culture and nature determine technology, while 
124 Ibidem, p. 317.
125 Ibidem, p. 508.
126 Ibidem, p. 552.
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technology has in turn an impact on culture, but does not impact nature in 
a way that the historian cares to mention) is helped by the ease with which 
we can indicate that technology is more than any other sphere vulnera-
ble to the impact by human beings taken collectively and as individuals, 
naturally formed by the culture they live in. Of special significance in this 
contest are the notions of invention and inventor, at present additionally 
backed up by the concept of copyrights. Their popularity gives a mistaken 
impression of constant “revolution,” “breakthrough,” “novelty,” or “in-
novativeness” of the history of technology, and the striking quantitative 
supremacy of innovations never implemented triggers a perception that 
the products and practices of technology are ephemeral, temporary and 
elusive. This conviction is rarely shared by scientists with laymen, while 
Braudel’s concept illustrating the slow pace of the rhythm of human history 
stems among others from an opposition to him. Despite the awareness of 
the justifiable nature of these reservations, the histories of technology are 
invariably written in a manner to punctuate their course with inventions 
or inventors’ names and therefore erroneously seem to the reader as nev-
er-ending chains of radical innovations, instantaneously and inevitably 
implemented and effecting fundamental shifts in human life, without any 
element of a stagnant status quo, whose consideration was recommended 
by Braudel. This is evident also in the many histories of optical devices, 
for instance in attributing to Della Porta the role of an inventor-innovator 
of an optical device, which was called in the 19th century. Pepper’s ghost, 
only because he was most likely the first to provide its description, obscure 
and cursory at that. 
5. Innovation and change
Braudel’s interaction model between subjectivity and the history of tech-
nology in large measure depends on the general approach to the subject 
of change. Therefore, at this point we should consider the significant theo-
retical distinction between innovation and change, proposed by sociology 
and historical sociology. 
Sociology is the social science that has the most to say about change 
as it was called upon to analyse it and “change” remains its principal 
subject of interest. It is at the same time particularly focused on the so-
cial dimension of change, as well as on the present and future (whereas 
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anthropology, akin to it in many respects, concentrates on the past and 
continuation). Therefore, the principal theoretical problem for sociology is 
the contradiction between the observation of parallel trends of change and 
stagnation. Oftentimes the process of change is described by sociologists in 
the teleological perspective as an innovation factor seeping through inertia 
(anthropologists in turn exhibit the effects of the “assault” of change on 
the immutable, stressing the fragility of tradition). Sociology, incessantly 
grappling with this issue – incidentally increasingly seen with a “historical 
coefficient” – proposed the most precise definitions of innovation and 
change. Naturally, these definitions concern first of all innovation and 
social change, but can also be applied to technology and culture.
Piotr Sztompka observes that change is a non-periodical transforma-
tion of institutions, norms, culture, and social structure, determined by 
the difference between their initial state and their state upon an elapse of 
a certain time. For sociology, change most often applies to the composition 
of the social system, social structure, social functions, system limits, and 
relations between social subsystems and the system environment. Contem-
porary sociology rejects the concept of the dominant change factor, but 
recognises the subjective factor as key, post-progressivistically assuming 
the constructivist nature of the “generative force.” We should at the same 
time notice that this science uniquely interprets the notion of the subject. 
It is determined by the following: 
a) individual features of acting individuals, first of all their motivation 
and potential for creating innovation and adopting it, 
b) structural features (e.g. offering an individual a lot or a few options 
to choose from), 
c) environmental features (e.g. rich or poor in resources),
d) the role of tradition in a given community – objective (e.g. when it 
is internally coherent or contradictory) and subjective (e.g. it is respected 
or disregarded), 
e) expectations of the future of a given culture (e.g. optimistic or 
catastrophic). 
In the early years of sociology, subjectivity was dehumanised; later, 
however, there was a return to the intuitive conviction of the leading so-
cial role of outstanding individuals whose features are to embody group 
objectives. The present-day sociological approach to subjectivity rules out 
the impact of individuals on change induction. This impact is exerted by 
social roles, especially those implemented in the contexts of the institutions 
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of power. It is very generally accepted that the individual, as such, cannot 
be a trigger of change, but change is invariably effected by a group of in-
dividuals, or by a collective entity, which is deliberate or not (as a result 
of the disordered daily activity of individuals) or planned (with a special 
role of communities who wield power and all kinds of pressure groups). 
In turn, innovation is seen by sociology as a simultaneous approval of 
the goals determined by the values of a given social group or society and 
the rejection of those ways of their implementation which have the status 
of traditional ones in a given axiological system. To use the language of 
the regulation of the social culture concept, the emergence of innovation 
would mean a public expression of the suggestion of introducing a new 
directive into the norm and directive dyad. 
Inspired by texts by Robert K. Merton, who defined innovation as 
a kind of social deviation,127 contemporary sociologists like to study the 
trajectories of innovations diffusion, seeking in them recurrent patterns. 
They assume that in order for innovation to take hold, its initiation is by 
no means sufficient. Efforts to disseminate it by raising the social awareness 
of the knowledge about an alternative manner of implementing a given 
value may not suffice to implement it, either, although naturally without 
athe widespread dissemination this is impossible. Filtering is the decisive 
stage of the innovation implementation. Here members of a community 
select a manner of implementing a given value. This selection results in 
a collective rejection and/or approval of some of the possible ways. If 
a given proposal is approved, a further distribution of innovation takes 
place. This stage, however, by no means concludes the implementation 
process. Following the stage of filtration we may deal with:
– compensation – when the innovation is so controversial that it 
induces a strong reaction of rejection and protest and is extinguished or 
– amplification (augmentation), when the innovation is favourably 
received.
If the innovation is amplified:
– we can deal with over-compensation – when the new proposal be-
comes excessively popular very quickly and as a result it is later rejected; 
– insulation (freeze) – the innovation becomes popular only in a given 
area and does not spread further, 
127 See R. K. Merton, Teoria socjologiczna i struktura społeczna, transl. Ewa Morawska, 
Jerzy Wertenstein-Żuławski, Wyd. Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2002, pp. 197–224. 
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– dispersal – the innovation effects a complex change in different areas 
but the status quo is intact,
– legitimacy, or the final authorisation of change. Only in this last case 
can we say that a given innovation has been accepted.128
Therefore, not all innovation results in permanent change. The above 
chain may be interrupted at any stage; there can be also the reversals, 
repetitions and omissions of some stages. We should remember at the 
same time that although innovation may be proposed by an individual, 
no subject is capable of controlling the entire process of innovation dif-
fusion, and most innovations of them will never receive approval. Florian 
Znaniecki observed that an innovation will not get past the filtering process 
if it is not linked with something recognised previously as important and 
clearly expressed in a given culture. Approaches inspired by Znaniecki 
pay special attention to the individual decision-making process, which is 
connected with the aforementioned broad study subject, i.e. the individual 
and his role for the generation of change. The most important problems 
of change generation can be summarised as follows: 
– An individual participating in the process of generating innovation 
may belong to a group in a particular way predisposed to implement this 
task, e.g. to the elite of a given community, which identifies the major 
problems and comes up with their solutions. This situation begs further 
questions about the role of those who select change. Who is the first to 
notice the problem? Why do these particular individuals get involved in 
the solution process? Do they solely play the role of transmitters or are they 
capable of modifying the formulation of the problem and propose its solu-
tion? Finally, what makes them choose change rather than conservatism?
– We must not forget that innovators may have their own personal 
motivation and this may stem from the compensation of their individual 
ill-adaptation. This observations also provokes a number of questions. 
Why do some individuals blame themselves for their inability to adapt 
while others put the blame on the system and try and reform it? Why do 
some individuals adapt to their conditions while others actively work for 
the sake of reform, and still others can only fantasise about it (utopians)? 
Why do some individuals endeavour to reform precisely the area where 
they personally have failed before, while others choose another field? Why, 
128 P. Sztompka, Socjologia zmian społecznych, Znak, Cracow 2005, p. 234.
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finally, is innovation sometimes introduced by individuals who are the 
best prepared while others are happy to conform?
– Why do imitation lines sometimes intersect and, e.g. an individual 
is innovative not only in the field connected with his or her experience 
but in other fields as well, while other individuals of the same society try 
to carefully isolate their lines of imitation, e.g. religion and science?129
Znaniecki definitively maintained that replies to all the above ques-
tions must be found first of all in the local and historically-determined 
cultural conditions.130 Today, too, the observation that cultural criteria are 
an important reason for (not) implementing innovation – both social and 
technological ones – does not arouse serious doubts. However, the history 
of technology often leaves out this fact since it lacks the perspective of 
culture studies. The location of the history of optics, especially inten-
sively explored and addressed during the Renaissance and the Scientific 
Revolution, in the context of the then shifts of the Western worldview, 
helps explain why a major part of its practices related to projection 
devices, no doubt innovative, and stagnated then in the Kunstkammera 
and salons. During the Renaissance, the filtering of innovation was more 
difficult because of the form of description, typical of the then system 
of knowledge distribution. The fact that the most frequent innovation 
was the practice of illusionist projections (magical, charlatan, and later 
entertainment), where the complete effect relied on hiding the projector 
and keeping secret the way of its operation, contributed to the situation 
that individual optical devices often remained but prototypes that disin-
tegrated after the death of their authors, who were the only ones to have 
the wherewithal to operate them and tried not to reveal them despite the 
risk involved in a suspicion of performing demonic magic. This led to 
the insulation of this innovation. Thus, the adoption of the perspective 
of the history of culture helps explain that until the time of inventing 
chronophotography in the second half of the 19th century, technologi-
cal innovations in the area of projection optical devices were unable to 
generate a lasting change.
129 F. Znaniecki, Badania nad twórcami kultury, in K. Łukasiewicz (ed.), Wokół koncep-
cji kultury Floriana Znanieckiego, Oficyna Wydawnicza Arboretum, Wroclaw 2008, p. 12.
130 Ibidem, p. 24.
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6. Technology as culture131
Polish translations of English texts on media studies repeatedly make 
a certain translation error, copied later in the Polish texts. The English term 
technology means, or can be translated into the Polish word, “technika,” 
but is often mistakenly translated as “technologia.” In Polish the word 
“technologia” means: 1) a certain process of producing or processing an 
object; 2) a method of preparing and carrying out this process; 3) knowl-
edge of the course of processes of producing or processing with the use 
of specific technical means. “Technika,” in turn, is the sphere of human 
activity consisting in the creation of phenomena and objects that do not 
occur in nature.132 The term “technika” refers then to tangible practices 
and their effects, while “technologia” means a quantum of knowledge about 
the construction of the latter, their operation and possible uses. 
The ideational approach to the social sciences culture, too, can be 
defined as a certain quantity of socially-shared knowledge – not only 
a knowledge that is consciously accepted and explicitly approved (knowl-
edge that), but also tacitly respected (knowledge how).133 In the approach 
of Jerzy Kmita’s social and regulatory concept of culture, this knowledge 
is composed of normative beliefs (establishing the values that are the 
sought-after objectives) and directive-related (indicating the activities to 
be carried out to achieve the objectives). These beliefs are the context of 
each broadly-construed activity of an individual participating in culture. 
The above concept is inclusive of the belief of the anthropologist Ward 
H. Goodenough, who notices that “the culture of a given community is 
composed of all that needs to be known or believed in to act in a manner 
acceptable for its members [...]. If culture is what people are to learn, 
unlike what they inherit biologically, it ultimately is the result of learn-
131 This subchapter is partly based on the text: M. Kamińska, Kategoria kontekstu w na-
ukach społecznych a fenomen zapisu wiedzy potocznej w Internecie, in A. Dytman-Stasień-
ko, J. Stasieńko (eds.), Język@multimedia3. Dialog – konflikt, Wyd. Naukowe Dolnośląskiej 
Szkoły Wyższej, Wroclaw 2012, pp. 117–128.
132 See Słownik wyrazów obcych i zwrotów obcojęzycznych Władysława Kopalińskie-
go, http://www.slownik-online.pl/kopalinski/D4A541E44CEBB6E1C125659D000AB1C5.
php [19.04.2014]; Encyklopedia PWN, http://encyklopedia.pwn.pl/haslo/3985964/techno-
logia.html; http://encyklopedia.pwn.pl/haslo/3985955/technika.html [19.04.2014].
133 J. Kmita, Późny wnuk filozofii. Wprowadzenie do kulturoznawstwa, Bogucki Wy-
dawnictwo Naukowe, Poznan 2007, p. 14. 
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ing: it is knowledge in a most general and relative sense of the term.”134 
Depending on the research objectives sought in the operationalisation of 
the notions of culture and knowledge, they can be – as in the case of the 
above concept – identified or – for the purpose of making more detailed 
analyses – differentiated, at least on the theoretical level. The latter scenario 
is exemplified by the concept of the anthropology of knowledge put forth 
by Fredrik Barth.135 In his opinion, knowledge is all that an individual uses 
to interpret the world, impact it and anticipate future events. Knowledge 
derives first of all from the individual’s personal experience, and secondly 
from the individual’s inferences based on the data collected. It gains ad-
equacy only during social interactions (of particular importance here is 
the institutionalised process of learning from others). 
To be more precise, Barth observes that we should distinguish three 
aspects of such knowledge, interconnected and present during each and 
every process of its exchange. Firstly, the mental aspect: each tradition of 
knowledge is made up of a certain number of statements and concepts 
that are subsumed in a worldview and serve the description of the world. 
Secondly, the media aspect: knowledge must be expressed and commu-
nicated through a medium or media as a series of partial representations 
in the form of words, symbols, gestures and actions. Thirdly, the social 
aspect: knowledge is never a closed and abstract system but is meant to 
be distributed, communicated, used, and transmitted within the inter-
connected and institutionalised social relations. These three aspects of 
knowledge are, according to Barth, inseparable and co-determinant. For 
the sake of methodology they can be interpreted as its development stages, 
which becomes especially important ifs a researcher intends to analyse 
the trajectory of its change. The state of knowledge changes dramatically 
not only in the course of history but also – or first of all – in the context 
of social relations, or in the course of its transmission between, both in-
dividuals and populations. 
The author of Ethnic Groups and Boundaries most probably refers 
here to – no doubt easier to grasp in the anthropological field research – 
a knowledge which Kmita defines as a knowledge that. In light of Barth’s 
observations we cannot, then, equate the notions of knowledge and culture; 
the latter turns out to be a broader term. The difference between them 
134 Ibidem, p. 55.
135 I summarise this concept on the basis of: F. Barth, An Anthropology of Knowledge, 
“Current Anthropology” vol. 43, Number 1, February 2002, pp. 1–17.
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can be summarised as follows: culture “is,” while knowledge “becomes.” 
For instance, for a piece of information to become an item of knowledge 
construed in a certain way, it must be transmitted, read, understood, used, 
and incorporated into the existing, socially-constructed structures of 
the worldview, or images of the world which later make up permanently 
updated contexts of concrete cultural and social actions. Therefore, the 
knowledge lost – no longer mediated and not transmitted and thus not 
socially updated – ceases to exist as such, while a “dead” culture, with no 
living participants, such as the culture of ancient Rome, can still be called 
culture. We may have no knowledge on a given subject or have inadequate 
knowledge, but there is no individual human being who has participated 
in no culture and in none of its fields, who would him or herself be “erro-
neous” or “inadequate.” Knowledge offers individuals food for reflection 
and premises to take action, while the notion of culture comprises both 
the premises and reflections and actions of the participants as well as the 
tangible effects of their actions. Knowledge is socially-distributed and thus 
deliberately transmitted from someone to someone else; in turn, culture 
is internalised in the course of social contacts and disseminated through 
diffusion. In addition, in order to communicate successfully, actors must 
share a certain quantity of knowledge which is the context of any act of 
communication. At the same time they must – at least as an initial as-
sumption – not share a certain quantum of it since otherwise communi-
cation between them would not be necessary (and would not take place). 
Considering this question on the macro level, we may conclude that if 
all the actors of the interaction had an identical quantum of knowledge, 
the society where such interaction takes place would not be structured 
in the way we are familiar with, i.e. it would be impossible to distinguish 
within it non-identical positions, statuses, roles, groups, and social norms.
The field of cultural and social knowledge may also be ordered accord-
ing to a key characteristic of sociological approaches. Under this approach, 
knowledge is a “set of interconnected messages concerning the entirety or 
a fragment of reality, which at the social level produces uniform, consol-
idated and objective products of social consciousness, developing thanks 
to its cumulative nature and being a platform of social differences.”136 
Sociology, which has primarily studied Western societies over the past 
150 years, distinguishes two types of knowledge. The oldest type occur-
136 K. Olechnicki, P. Załęcki, Słownik socjologiczny, p. 243.
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ring in all cultures and societies is so-called commonsensical knowledge, 
otherwise known as common knowledge, pre-scientific or doxal. Its scope 
is analysed relatively rarely. It is most often defined as a “total amount of 
knowledge necessary for an efficient, everyday operation, shared by all or 
most of the members of a society; [...] it comprises insight into the basic 
reality, phenomena and social processes.”137 
In the wake of changes in occidental culture, most notably during the 
Scientific Revolution, a unique and separate kind of knowledge emerged. 
This was scientific knowledge: a global product of social scientific practice, 
constantly systematised, uniform and accumulated thanks to scientific 
reflection, studies and discoveries.138 According to Kmita, this area of 
culture produces knowledge that functions as a means of technologically 
efficient actions. Characteristic of this knowledge type is the overriding 
value of “truth” or at least the “approximation of truth.”139 Concurring 
with the last statement, we should at the same time make a reservation 
that this is a category of truth meant very uniquely, originating in the 
local philosophical tradition. As the anthropologists and philosophers 
inclined to relativism have observed, an image of what is the truth of 
a given community is developed on an individual basis through the social 
context of a wide, culturally-conditioned and transmitted worldview. If 
the appearing innovative element of knowledge about the worldview fits 
earlier conviction and beliefs, it will be accepted by culture participants 
and if not, it will be rejected by them. 
The approximation of the accomplishment of the value defined as 
truth is first of all meant to instil coherence through the implementation 
of cohesion (a monistic worldview) or balance (a binary perception of the 
world), which offers a sense of comfort and frees one from uncertainty.140 
What is deemed as true in a given society and in a given culture is, then, 
established on an ongoing basis via the recognition of a new element as 
a familiar one, its adjustment to the social knowledge context.141 Never-
theless, in the everyday life of contemporary occidental cultures and in 
traditional societies, the commonly acceptable method of arriving at the 
137 Ibidem.
138 Ibidem.
139 J. Kmita, Późny wnuk filozofii..., p. 80.
140 F. Fernandez-Armesto, Historia prawdy, transl. Janusz Ruszkowski, Zysk i S-ka, 
Poznan 1999, p. 46.
141 Ibidem, p. 47.
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truth does not consist in reasoning or the acquisition of knowledge via 
participation in a system of institutionalised education, but first of all ale 
via the acquisition of personal experience. In turn, in the model of scien-
tific knowledge, reliance on the argument of personal experience is – at 
least at present – seen as discrediting.142
In the 20th century representatives of science indicated that apart from 
the zone of the human senses there is an infinite micro- and macrocosm, 
which has caused an even greater departure of episteme from the common-
sensical perception of the category of truth, which – it seems – irreversibly 
ceased to be identical with the notion of experienced reality.143 We can say, 
then, that Western scientific knowledge in the course of development and 
as it grew more and more institutionalised, was increasingly antagonised 
to its source, i.e. the pre-scientific, pertaining to the entire society, histor-
ically changeable and one-sided commonsensical knowledge. Sometimes 
it treated its as inspiration but more often as an inimical and reprehensible 
type of social awareness (superstition, myth, deception), a false knowledge 
that obscures the image of “truth” which was an – at least a declared – 
objective of the reflection of scientific knowledge. This latter belief was 
especially evident in the second half of the 19th century within the different 
offshoots of positivism, especially scientism and empirio-criticism, which 
made their indelible imprint on the emerging individual social sciences. 
The generally construed episteme developed a general and unique meth-
odology, which was to allow it to come maximally close to the realisation 
of the above value. This strategy was formulated as radically different or 
antithetic to the way of conduct used in the course of the acquisition, usage 
and distribution of elements of one-sided commonsensical knowledge, 
known to all participants of culture and members of society. 
The characteristic features of the two patterns of knowledge acquisi-
tion, indicative of two antagonist approaches – of everyday life, “natural” 
and scientific in the sociological sense – were in the second half of the 
20th century complied by Harold Garfinkel. As a sociologist with an et-
no-methodological bend, he was mainly interested in observing actions 
indicating the context of the knowledge how, which by definition was in-
expressible. Garfinkel indicated a total of fourteen “rational behaviours,” 
the first ten of which were seen as characteristic of the “natural approach” 
connected with common knowledge, and the last four as typical solely of 
142 Ibidem, p. 110.
143 Ibidem, p. 234.
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the scientifically rational (so-called “excluded rational”). The last are to be 
permanent features and sanctioned ideals only in disciplines governed by 
“an approach of scientific theoretising.” Garfinkel’s “rational behaviour” is: 
1) categorisation and comparison, 2) efforts to minimise mistakes, 3) pur-
suit of practical solutions, 4) analysis of alternatives and consequences, 
5) foresight and strategic planning, 6) interest in the sequence of events, 
7) reduction of unforeseen events, 8) social behaviour and locally binding 
procedural rules, 9) choice, 10) motivation of choice, 11) alignment of 
the means-objectives relation with the principles of formal logic, 12) se-
mantic clarity and precision, 13) clarity and precision as an objective in 
themselves, 14) alignment of the definition of a situation with scientific 
knowledge.144 
The above differences of approaches to knowledge consist first of all in 
divergent initial assumptions, as many as five of them according to Gar-
finkel: 1) the natural approach is primarily characterised by empiricism: 
a “practical theoretician” assumes that the objects he or she encounters in 
the world are what they seem to be. The expectation is that there is a cor-
respondence between the appearance of the object and the imagined object 
that appears in a particular way. In turn, an individual with a theoretical 
and scientific bend should doubt such a correspondence. 2) an individual 
with a doxal bend – unlike the one with an epistemic approach – gathers 
knowledge that, when ordered, makes up a worldview, only for practical 
reasons. Therefore the events and relations between them and the structure 
of causal relations are not an object of theoretical interest. As long as the 
individual making use of them is capable of effectively functioning in the 
world, he or she does not verify the appropriateness of the model at his 
or her disposal. 3) In his or her everyday activity an individual address-
es a “stream of experiences, splits it into bits and pieces” and orders it 
chronologically. The individual tries to coordinate personal “inner time” 
with “social time.” at present measurable “standard” time is used for this 
purpose. 4) An individual with a doxal bend assumes that all particular 
partners of the interaction use the same communication pattern. In turn, 
the one with an epistemic approach invokes a “universalised everyone.” 
5) A “practical theoretician” believes in “hidden knowledge” which accord-
ing to him or her helps control the communication process, defining the 
144 H. Garfinkel, Racjonalne cechy działalności naukowej i potocznej, transl. Danuta 
Lachowska, in E. Mokrzycki (ed.), Kryzys i schizma. Antyscjentystyczne tendencje w socjo-
logii współczesnej, vol. 1, PIW, Warsaw 1984, pp. 894–908.
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actors’ interests. A “scientist-theoretician” in turn follows the conditional 
imperative urging him or her not to distinguish in their statements between 
private, or covert beliefs, and public, or overt ones. 
The two divergent sets of assumptions and behaviours as well as the 
attendant two approaches give rise to two logically exclusive sets of events. 
According to Garfinkel, “where actions and social structures are subject 
to the assumptions of everyday life, each attempt at consolidating [...] the 
features of the scientifically rational or at the coercion to respect them 
by a systematic use of awards and punishment, causes an increase of the 
anomic features of interaction.”145 Following in one’s everyday life of the 
pattern characteristic of the scientific rational would effect a sea change 
in the way of structuring events and their interrelations, and as a conse-
quence – a disturbance of this activity and its inefficacy. This is caused 
by the fact that the interests (objectives) of (“practical”) life and scientific 
theoretising are divergent. Nevertheless, the model of the scientifically ra-
tional was for a long time in the development of the social sciences treated 
as universally binding. It was designated by episteme, which developed 
its system as the dominant thinking pattern compared to any culture and 
any of its spheres, using it as the basic tool of constructing categories for 
the description of behaviours (and led to the differentiation of rational, 
irrational, non-rational, and a-rational behaviour). Individual human 
actions, and as a consequence also the entire culture that generates these 
actions, were classified according to how they facilitate the realisation of 
this model.146 In the global endeavour of examining societies and cultures, 
which are the object of studies of the social sciences, the application of the 
above model hampers analysis since it prevents reaching the key senses 
and – through them – the understanding of the social and cultural knowl-
edge whose character differs form today’s scientific knowledge. This applies 
also to studies of the cultural history of optical devices. We cannot apply 
here explanations appropriate only for the dualistic knowledge model, 
since part of this history was written at a time when such a model did 
not obtain. A similar thing happens in the case of attempts at separating 
nature, technology and the supernatural in the practices of early opticians. 
This results in absurd hierarchies and valuations of these practices and the 
devices used, similar to the aforementioned attempts to group Agrippa 
and Dee with sorcerers and Porta and Newton with scientists.
145 Ibidem, p. 203.
146 Ibidem, p. 201.
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Clifford Geertz observed that interpretations of phenomena conducted 
by culture scholars following the epistemic model lay bare the relative 
character of the categories they use and as a consequence the uncertainty 
of the conclusions they came up with. Because of that, the author of Avail-
able Light suggested a different methodology of research and construction 
of description. According to Geertz, a culture scholar should – without 
relinquishing his or her own knowledge yet being aware that it is “always 
someone’s” – should concentrate predominantly on the knowledge, which 
scholars use in their everyday life (“local knowledge”). He or she must re-
member at the same time that it is composed of complicated and variable 
sets of symbols, which acquire and express significance only as a result of 
actions taken by the individuals participating in a given culture. At the same 
time it is impossible to ultimately and unequivocally determine what a given 
symbol or action means since depending on the context, i.e. situations, ways 
of use, particular interests of specific groups and individuals, it may mean 
different things. Under this approach, the scholar’s underlying objective 
is to understand the meaning ascribed to their actions by participants of 
culture, rather than e.g. the evaluation of these actions with respect to their 
conformity to a particular knowledge model. We cannot lose sight of the 
fact, however, that a scientist cannot fully erase from memory his or her 
own knowledge, and therefore needs to reconcile with the thought that 
a full understanding of a culture different that his or hers is impossible. 
There is no establishing a convergent and indefinitely valid version of truth 
for those who study and the studied ones; it is only possible – according to 
Geertz – to reach a tentative, shaky, uncertain, and short-lived agreement 
between them. For these reasons the author of Negara proposed a project 
of “thick description” which would approximate as closely as possible the 
description of culture in the eyes of its participant. The aim of adopting 
a particular research methodology was to understand how the members of 
a given culture assign significance to events and establish their hierarchy 
and thus how they work on a knowledge system that imparts sense to their 
worldview. Therefore, the scholar should aspire to acquire the elementary 
“knowledge of knowledge” peculiar to a given culture. 
A “thick description,” whose author is not limited to classifying “facts” 
but tries to interpret their sense,147 must therefore take into account the 
147 C. Geertz, Opis gęsty. W poszukiwaniu interpretatywnej teorii kultury, in idem, In-
terpretacja kultur. Wybrane eseje, transl. Marta Piechaczek, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Jagielloń-
skiego, Cracow 2005, pp. 20–21. 
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cultural context, which is determined by the access to a given quantity of 
knowledge, concentrating on the significance of an action and its symbolic 
role assigned to it by the actors and, through them, society. A “thick de-
scription” perceives culture as a context where the action taken acquires 
significance and which changes under the influence of this action since it 
is always a dynamic process of re-formulation and re-interpretation, taking 
place via the actions of individuals. The author of Negara followed Victor 
Turner and observed that those symbols that play the role of a media of 
significance, have three principal features: condensation (one symbol may 
correspond to a variety of senses, actions and meanings), ambivalence 
(a combinations of contradictory and mutually exclusive meanings), and 
finally polarisation (with both a sensual component, i.e. form, and mental 
component, content). Because of the characteristic features of symbols seen 
as the media of meaning, the last always develops in a social and dynamic 
way, dependent on who uses given symbols, to what end, in what situation, 
and how. This perception of culture indicated an inseparable connection 
between the actions taken by members of a given community and their 
significance rooted in constantly updated quantities of knowledge. Each 
action of social actors transforms and updates the resources within whose 
context it takes place and which determine it. 
No action can thus be adequately interpreted without the knowledge 
of its cultural context which, under certain (aforementioned) conditions, 
may be seen as a certain quantity of knowledge. This principle applies 
also in the case of action with the use of technological tools. Taking up 
and understanding this action calls for a local knowledge about a given 
object, tool or material, how it is constructed or what it is composed of, 
how it works, what kind of practices it is usually used for and what other 
uses can it be put to. Because of this, technology discussed without the 
context of Geertz’s “local knowledge” must prove to be only a chaotic set 
of objects of unclear purpose and, perceived together with it, can no longer 
be interpreted as culturally, ethically and politically neutral, independent 
of the prevalent value system of a given culture, one that both does not 
impact this system and is free from its impact. 
The above indication is corroborated by texts written by technology 
historian Arnold Pacey, who proposed an interpretation of the notion of 
practice as a set of skills and body of knowledge on the use of technology, 
located in the context of a given culture. At the same time he suggested 
a distinction of such a practice from technology. The efficacy of technology, 
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as demonstrated by Jerzy Kmita, theoretically should not be determined 
by the impact of its symbolic culture, but nevertheless access to it may 
generate totally divergent practices in different cultures and historical 
contexts, which may also result in a decrease in this efficiency. Unlike for 
Kmita, the technological and application zone for Pacey is interactive. We 
can distinguish within it technical, organisational and cultural levels. It 
may be construed as a sum total of the forms of applications of scientifi-
cally, but also of culturally organised knowledge for practical purposes. As 
such, it is an element of historically ordered systems composed of people 
and organisations, living creatures and machines. It is wrong, then, for 
a historian to focus solely on the material aspects of practices: machines, 
technologies or a record of knowledge, and to leave out their cultural and 
ethical aspect (after all, technology furthers culturally determined values 
of the rational and efficient). This is a common mistake made by both 
historians and political decision-makers who often succumb to an illusion 
that individuals, once offered access to a given technology (e.g. computers), 
will immediately start to use it in a pre-determined and expected manner. 
However, in appropriate cultural and technological circumstances this 
is not what is going to happen. Pacey calls this groundless assumption 
the “technological imperative.” This is linked to a belief that as long as 
a technology capable of being used in a specific way is available in a given 
place at a given time, this use will inevitably be made. The technological 
imperative stems from determinist thinking and partly also from personal 
experience and beliefs (e.g. many engineers are certain that they work in 
the field of technology since this is joyful and pleasurable for them, which 
may be an end in itself).148 
Pacey decisively criticises the afore-discussed historiographic strategy 
of marking stages of the history of technology by successive inventions-in-
novations. They are used as markers of progress only because they are easy 
to capture. Their de-contextualising from practice leads, however, to the 
mistake of the technological imperative, which may end in the inevitably 
doomed use of their previous history to predict the future. Another nega-
tive effect is the disregard of the difference between innovation and change 
and the attendant impossibility of explaining the dynamics of Braudel’s 
“accelerations” and “slowdowns.” For instance, the Scientific Revolution was 
not propelled by the relatively small number of applications of scientific 
148 A. Pacey, The Culture of Technology, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 2000.
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discoveries to develop new technical solutions, as it is sometimes mistakenly 
believed. This change consisted rather in the promotion of a more efficient 
style of knowledge distribution, related first of all to ways of problem anal-
ysis (the most important of which was description, as indicated above) and 
to finding their solutions (preferentially through experiments, originating 
in magical practices). Because of this, technical concepts could finally be 
publicly formulated and their applicability started to be demonstrated on 
the basis of systematic measurements, classification and the comparison 
of available data. Only the amplification and legitimacy of this change 
facilitated the precise conceptualisation of the phenomena under scrutiny, 
facilitating the formulation of problems with the aid of precise and clear 
theoretical terms. It then allowed moving beyond the constraints of tech-
nical improvements achieved by craftsmen’s methods and, via successive 
acts of amplification and accumulation of collectively verifiable knowledge, 
contributed to the emergence of the mechanistic paradigm, which was the 
most influential worldview model of the Scientific Revolution.149 
To sum up, practice, according to Pacey, would be a kind of “technology 
culture” without references to which it is impossible to come up with a full 
(“thick”) description or to explain any of the stages of the development of 
technology, including that of optical devices. It must be seen similarly to 
Geertz’s local knowledge, which conditions and defines the ways in which 
the material products of technological processes exist and function. Such 
practice, which according to Polish etymology may be defined as technolo-
gy, is a zone of conceptual and communication activity mediating between 
technological practices and the worldview seen as a relatively permanent 
set of judgements, beliefs and stands, statements, evaluations and norms, 
concerning reality, the nature of the world, the meaning of life, and the re-
sultant valuation and assessment that determines the life’s stands of human 
beings and determining the directions of their actions. The principal nature 
of this practice-technology for Renaissance opticians was determined by 
the concept of natural magic, discussed earlier in the text.
7. The worldview
Krzysztof Moraczewski, who developed Jerzy Kmita’s social and regulatory 
concept of culture, indicated that anthropologists accepting a certain con-
149 A. Pacey, Technology in World Civilization, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1991.
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cept of cultural knowledge and the historians of mentality, who reconstruct 
the content of a given culture, are not limited to the analysis of its binding 
norms and directives, but also include into its interpretation sets of tasks 
which articulate cognitive judgements. This is so although they do not 
directly regulate human actions. It would be absurd, however, to eliminate 
them from the field of culture as it is easy to prove that expressions of any 
language not only have objective references but also possess a set of judge-
ments that make up their characteristic semantic assumptions. These 
assumptions express additional knowledge connected by a community 
with a given expression. Certain expressions may have the same objective 
referents for different communities but divergent semantic assumptions. 
All together they make up the cultural communications competence. 
Only by linking them together can a full account of the world of the life 
of a given community be articulated. The assumptions of semantics may 
have the character of worldview beliefs or value judgements – directly 
expressing valuations of particular states of affairs. 
Moraczewski observes that one of the ways of connecting descriptive 
judgements with sets of socially shared norms and directives lies in the 
fact that they exist as judgments that justify a norm (JJN, Polish SUN). 
For instance, the norm (N) “We should obey divine will” may be justified 
by the following syllogism: (P) we should do good, and (p) divine will is 
infinitely good, so (K) we should obey divine will. A judgment justifying 
a norm, both cognitive and valorising (“divine will is infinitely good”) 
is here a minor premise of a syllogism. A further justification of this 
reasoning should necessarily articulate such a fundamental ontological 
thesis: “God exists.” Of prime importance within the social and regulatory 
concept of culture is the assumption that individual sets of norms and 
directives bear directly on concrete human actions, since they determine 
them in the subjective and rational as well as in the functional and genetic 
mode.150 Judgments that justify norms impact them, too, but not directly. 
Culture scholars, anthropologists and historians are especially interested 
in the identification and recreation precisely of those sets of norms and 
directives. However, according to Geertz, comprehending their sense is 
possible only after they are located in the context of a worldview charac-
teristic of a given culture at a given moment in history. It is reflected in 
the relevant set of judgments justifying norms. Its recreation often calls 
150 K. Moraczewski, Cultural Theory and History: Theoretical Issues, Wyd. Naukowe 
WNS UAM, Poznan 2014.
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for painstaking and time-consuming interpretation efforts but individual 
cultures develop, however, forms of communication specifically dedi-
cated to its articulation. In Western culture this role is played by such 
text genres as catechisms, manifestoes, encyclopaedias, school essays, or 
finally philosophical treatises. This function was addressed in many texts 
by Renaissance magi-philosophers, as discussed above. The concept of 
natural magic arising from these texts, based on the fundamental de-
scriptive judgement justifying a norm claiming that nature is identical 
with the supernatural, was translated into their actions taken within the 
framework of technological practice. As indicated above, its especially 
problematic field was optics, at that time dealing with universal and at 
the same time mysterious phenomena. In the late Renaissance and early 
Scientific Revolution it was this that presented the area of key negotiations 
of the worldview concerning the binding cultural image of the world, 
a fundamental element of any worldview.
The notion of the worldview (Weltanschauung) originates in the philos-
ophy of classical German idealism. It derives from the notion of intelekuelle 
Anschauung, translated as “intellectual intuition,” of prime importance in 
the philosophy of Johann G. Fichte (1762–1814) and Friedrich W. J. Schell-
ing (1775–1854). This notion was reformulated to more or less its present 
definition by Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher (1768–1834) and Georg W. F. 
Hegel (1770–1831), and promoted, just like the Naturwissenchaften-Geiste-
swissenchaften antynomy indicated at the beginning of this text, by the 
founding father of contemporary culture studies, Wilhelm Ch. L. Dilthey 
(1833–1911). He used it to describe a quantum of beliefs based on the in-
dividual’s personal experience, formulated by the individual within systems 
of significance such as religion, art and philosophy.151 The contemporary 
term “worldview” is used in common parlance and in general denotes 
a holistic view of the world, with judgements about the operation of all 
kinds of objects and phenomena, with special emphasis on the position of 
humans within it, both as individuals and forming a community. The most 
crucial role of the worldview is to help its followers to move from thought 
to action fast, efficiently and successfully. Individual statements which are 
elements of the worldview are intertwined and make up a dynamic, not 
necessarily inconsistent, but at a certain level of generalisation coherent 
151 W. Dłubacz, Światopogląd, in Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii, vol. 9, Wyd. Pol-
skiego Towarzystwa św. Tomasza z Akwinu, Lublin 2008, p. 346.
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whole (the inconsistencies identified within a worldview are perceived as 
discomforting). A worldview is composed of the following:
– descriptive judgements, or a set of statements describing reality 
which facilitates interpretation, synthesis, assessment, and a hierarchy 
of phenomena; fundamental among them is the overriding organising 
hypothesis, 
– value judgements, or a set of evaluations based on a certain value 
system,
– normative judgements, or a set of rules, principles, directives, and 
norms. They are closely linked to the image of the world and the recognised 
value system as emerging from the sum total of descriptive judgements.
An especially important feature of a worldview is its being internalised. 
This means that it can be unconscious but must be internalised and each 
judgement taken within it must be treated by the individual as true. Like 
culture, a worldview is always “someone’s” as each and every human being 
has some worldview.152 It is also systematised. A structuration of beliefs 
takes place within it both thanks to individual reflection and the experience 
of enculturation. It results in a hierarchy of norms and directives, because 
of which an individual takes action. The justification of any worldview is 
determined not so much by objective principles but by the decision-mak-
ing process of an individual assessing its usefulness/inapplicability for 
the implementation of a particular action. Because of this, it cannot be 
considered in terms of truth and falsehood. A worldview seen in this way 
is the source of stands and justifications for particular actions taken by 
an individual. At the level of the interpersonal similarities of individual 
worldviews, communities may be established which will articulate the 
shared worldviews as ideology. A worldview determines, however, first 
of all an individual, the personal zone of life and is discussed most often 
in this aspect.153 Interestingly, because it also has a collective aspect, 
a worldview may be defined as a set of beliefs shared by a community and 
as being a zone of mediation where negotiations take place between the 
needs of an individual and the requirements of social life. 
To sum up, we may assume that of special importance for the cultural 
studies research of the history of technology is the consideration of the role 
of the type of local knowledge and at the same time the zone of culture and 
152 P. Kamela, O pojęciu światpoglądu, “Studia Iuridica” XXXIV/1997, pp. 25–32.
153 J. Jusiak, Światpoglądowe uwarunkowania sporu o racjonalność przekonań religij-
nych, “Przegląd Religioznawczy” 4 (238)/2010, pp. 81–97. 
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the element of a worldview, i.e. technological practice in the above sense. 
This allows a thick description and an avoidance of the consequences of 
making the mistake of accepting Pacey’s technological imperative. It is so 
because individual decision-making processes necessary for the realisation 
of practices and for suggesting and adopting innovation, which may legit-
imise change, engage not only purely technical knowledge (as long as we 
can say of any period that it offered this knowledge the pride of place with 
respect to other kinds of knowledge), but also sets of norms and directives 
with their attendant norm-justifying judgements. In this way technology 
would be a point of mediation between technological practice and culture, 
allowing at the same time to take into account the factor of an individual 
decision-making process, which involves the decision-making subject 
and the worldview, expressed in the case under scrutiny as judgements on 
the relations between nature, culture, the supernatural, and technology. 
An illustration of the above entanglements may be the fate of practices 
carried out by means of optical devices between the Renaissance and the 
Scientific Revolution. I will furnish two examples of such explanations.
Astronomy historian Jarosław Włodarczyk put forth a hypothesis that 
Copernicus made a mistake in his heliocentric theory by regarding orbits 
as circles rather than ellipsoids because of the characteristic distortion of 
projections from a camera obscura, by means of which he watched solar 
eclipses.154 Copernicus would under this approach make a mistake in the 
calculation of the eclipse stage because of the imperfection of technical ob-
servation tools – i.e. the optical device he used155 – and thus because of the 
insufficient technological knowledge on the subject. Włodarczyk opposed 
an earlier explanation of the error, i.e. that it was generated directly by 
Copernicus’ adoption of a descriptive judgement as an element of a specific 
worldview where the circle was seen as a perfect figure. Copernicus as its 
follower was to be culturally determined so as not to ascribe the features 
of imperfection to objects treated by planetary magic and natural magic 
as sources of the overriding order of the universe. Neither Włodarczyk 
nor the opponents of the explanation he put forward took into consider-
154 J. Włodarczyk, Solar Eclipse Observations in the Time of Copernicus: Tradition or 
Novelty?, “Journal for the History of Astronomy” vol. 38, 3/2007, pp. 351–364.
155 Interestingly, the widespread use by astronomers of the camera obscura is docu-
mented only for Kepler, a hundred years after Copernicus. This is connected with the fact 
indicated above in the text that the dominant style of knowledge distribution in the time of 
Copernicus did not require a detailed record of the conditions of the experiment.
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ation the fact that the above explanations are not mutually exclusive; on 
the contrary, they strengthen each other and as such may illustrate the 
role of double conditioning in the decision-making process. Włodarczyk’s 
interesting proposal, however, assumed a polemical nature as it was to 
present Copernicus as a (proto)scientist who perfectly well separated the 
practice of science and technology from the field of the worldview as it was 
construed in the 20th century. The only difference between his approach 
and the present-day one would be the lack of a “breakthrough” technical 
discovery used for offsetting the distortion generated by an optical device, 
in no way determined by the cultural context of the worldview beliefs 
about the relation between nature and the supernatural, which is based 
on a semiotic interpretation. Frequent similar attempts of adjusting the 
practices of the philosophers of nature are – better than the concept of 
natural magic rooted in the contemporary worldview – a model of a cul-
turally and intellectually isolated innovator who is too big for his time.
Another example of the historical contextualisation of practices with the 
use of optical devices are the discrepancies in the interpretation of the mag-
ical séance held by the legendary Polish sorcerer Twardowski in a chamber 
of the Warsaw castle for King Sigismund Augustus (1520–1572), known 
for his interest in the magic practices. This event, relatively well document-
ed in sources, offers a unique insight into the practice of a 16th-century 
charlatan-optician, an illusionist who deliberately manipulates technology 
but who keeps the client in a belief, strongly rooted in a worldview, that 
he contacts the supernatural. The first record of the sorcerer Twardowski 
and his ties with the Polish court come from his time and from the circles 
connected with this court: it is made by Łukasz Górnicki, Sigismund Au-
gustus’ secretary, in Dworzanin polski (1566). The earliest written source 
about the event is dated as 1573, and its author is the poet Jan Giza. The 
séance is said to have taken place in 1569 and was meant to conjure the 
spirit of Queen Barbara Radziwiłłówna, who had died in 1551.156 Con-
temporary accounts are few and far between, which as I indicated above 
are characteristic of the time. We only learn that Twardowski showed to 
the monarch such a realistic apparition of the late Barbara that the king, 
in shock, despite being forbidden by the magus, jerked forward in her 
direction. At this moment the apparition disappeared.
156 R. Bugaj, Nauki tajemne w dawnej Polsce..., p. 198. 
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The very first interpretations of the accounts of this event displayed 
differences in worldviews. As Roman Bugaj observes: “Some believed that 
the séance was conducted with the participation of magical forces and that 
the necromancer Twardowski had the capacities of a medium. Others tried 
to prove that Twardowski during the invocation used a magic lantern or 
a special mirror capable of projecting images. Still others maintained that 
during the séance the sorcerer took advantage of a woman in special dis-
guise, a resident of Warsaw, Barbara Giżanka, whoich then played the role 
of Barbara Radziwiłłówna’s »spirit«.”157 While accounts of the period do 
not mention the above mirror as a tool of illusion, it may have been used 
in two ways at that time: as a component of a typically 16th-century optical 
device, or as a magic mirror of an older, medieval type. This suspicion 
became popular in the 19th century when it was generally assumed that 
Twardowski owned the so-called Węgrów mirror. Until today the object 
is associated with Barbara’s séance and this conviction has been amply 
reflected in literature and the visual arts (e.g. a mirror is the focal point 
of a famous painting by Jan Matejko Twardowski Conjuring the Spirit of 
Barbara Before Sigismund Augustus of 1884). Roman Bugaj countered the 
latter hypothesis but concurred with the former, proving that the mirror 
actually came from that time. It is, moreover, clouded in a way implying 
the purposefulness of this measure and/or a failed manufacture of it by 
an amateur, which might really imply its magic purpose (e.g. Paracelsus 
gives a recipe for making such a matt mirror, which each magus should 
construct by himself for his sole use).158 During the Renaissance catoptric 
mirrors of this sort were ascribed incredible powers. E.g. it was believed 
that they can be used to project letters onto the face of the moon, which 
was to be a form of secret distance communication (later this unclear 
phenomenon was explicated as follows: mirror A projects an inscription 
on mirror B, mirror C reflects also the moon in mirror B, as a result of 
which the observers were able to see inscriptions on the reflection of the 
moon rather than on itself). Additional proof for the authenticity of the 
Węgrów mirror is provided by the inscription on its frame, from a later 
157 In addition, Giżanka met the king without disguise in some unclear circumstances 
and became the most important royal mistress of the last stage of the king’s life, allegedly 
gave birth to the king’s child and instigated a scandalous robbery of his property immedi-
ately upon his death. The king’s special treatment was allegedly justified by her extraordi-
nary similarity to the late Radziwiłłówna. 
158 R. Bugaj, Nauki tajemne w dawnej Polsce..., p. 261. 
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time, i.e. the first half of the 18th century. The inscription reads: “Luserat 
hoc speculo magicas Twardovius artes, lusus at iste Dei versus in obse-
quium est” – “The mirror used by Twardowski to show magic art, now 
a plaything dedicated to divine service.” This cannot be ascertained today, 
yet the inscription is a telling reflection of a 17th-century shift in attitudes 
to optical devices. As was indicated in the preceding sections of this text, 
it ceased to be portrayed as a dangerous tool of demonic magic and was 
converted into an object of entertainment (lusus).
Countering the hypothesis that this or another mirror was used in 
Barbara’s séance, Bugaj points out that it took place at night and in that 
period there were not powerful enough sources of light to facilitate an 
optical projection.159 This is debatable since it depended on the device used. 
This would really have been impossible with the application of a camera 
obscura, but very probable with the use of a projection from a magic 
lantern, for instance. The adoption of the latter hypothesis would mean, 
however, that the queen’s apparition was graphic in nature, which is hard 
to believe since even the first accounts of the event stressed the shocking 
realism of the effect. So far, no scholar has observed that Twardowski may 
have used at that time a relatively simple optical effect known today as 
Pepper’s ghost which, as indicated above, was first accounted for by Della 
Porta in Magia Naturalis published in 1584, i.e. only 15 years following 
the date of the alleged séance.
Key for an appropriate effect during a projection from this device is 
the adherence to appropriate angles of light reflection. Now it becomes 
clear why Twardowski, “on pain of a threat for the soul,” most probably 
justifying it by the need to preserve the integrity of the magic circle, for-
bade his royal client to move from his spot, and when the king did this all 
the same, nothing happened except that the apparition vanished. Another 
argument in favour of this hypothesis is that it is suggested that taking part 
in the séance was a live person in her own body, Barbara Giżanka, and 
among the optical devices known at that time only the Pepper’s ghost al-
lows a projection of a mirror reflection of live action. This effect resembles 
somewhat the present-day digital holograms, but by retaining warm and 
natural hues and an enhanced vividness of the image it offers a still more 
realistic impression. Since such a projection takes place in the dark, the 
details are not distinct enough to be able to positively identify the facial 
159 Ibidem, p. 272. 
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features of a person thus portrayed (she or her stays in an adjacent room). 
However, what with the similarity of dress, height and build of Giżanka 
and the late queen, this kind of reflection with an invisible proscenium, 
source of light and screen of the device must have appeared very credible, 
especially that such a figure, not changing their position, can still move 
and the impression of dealing with a live person is even greater.
Accounts from different periods rationalised the séance of Barbara, 
always however taking into account the cultural knowledge of the author. 
The introduction of a live woman into a dark room was by all means the 
simplest explanation and called for no technical expertise. Contrary to 
what it may seem, neither did it call for invoking a materialistic world-
view since the 16th century knew very well a figure of a false alchemist, 
discussed earlier in the text, and such a swindle was no doubt within this 
figure’s reach. Purely magical explanations were put forth relatively rarely, 
which demonstrates that the worldview including beliefs of the reality of 
necromantic practices was already petering out. In the 20th century, in 
turn, an era of triumphant audiovisual media, interpreters of the séance 
with substantial technological knowledge preferred to seek an explanation 
of this mysterious event in technology. As a result, the accounts of Bar-
bara’s séance are incontrovertibly mutually exclusive. Their authors had 
dissimilar resources of technological knowledge and followed colliding 
worldviews, as a result of which they divergently interpreted this event and 
edited different accounts about it. Therefore, the examples of the history 
of hypothesis on this event may be a perfect illustration of the application 
of a cultural-studies explanation of the relation between technology and 
a given worldview, the subject matter of this text.
The arrangement of a single practice may help make justifiable infer-
ences about the potential of a setting in motion under given circumstances 
(via decision-making processes) of a specific sets of norms, directives and 
judgements justifying norms, drawn from the worldview “pool.” If the oper-
ator – a 16th-century necromancer in the case of Barbara’s séance – prepares 
an illusion behind the scenes, asking for the participation of and making 
up a person to perform the role of the double, he thereby proves that, at 
least in this case, he does not believe in the possibility of a desired interfer-
ence of the supernatural; otherwise he would simply wait for a miracle. If, 
however, his client is inclined to be persuaded that he sees an actual spirit, 
he demonstrates that for one thing he has lesser technological knowledge 
(is unaware of the existence or capabilities of an innovative optical device, 
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i.e. is no different from most of his contemporaries), and for another thing 
that this very set of norms and directives with adequate judgements jus-
tifying norms, really operates in a given culture. In the case of Barbara’s 
séance it may be reconstructed as follows: the spirits of the dead A) exist 
and B) they may appear to the living (judgements justifying norms), but 
such an encounter may prove harmful for the Christian’s body and soul 
(a norm indicating a value such as salvation). In order to incline a spirit 
to appear safely, we need to employ an expert-necromancer (directive).
* * *
Authors of the pre-history of the audiovisual era face the choice of three 
historiographic strategies: a description of the history of people (history 
of inventors), of the history of devices (history of inventions) or the his-
tory of practices (history of knowledge). The choice of any of the above 
precludes, however, the realisation of the model of “thick description;” 
therefore, some texts, especially encyclopaedic compilations, endeavour 
to combine these strategies. However, a culture scholar should be inter-
ested here first of all in the ways of making alliances between the three 
objects of study, in particular in the role played by the decision-making 
process. The difference between an optician-charlatan, optician-magus, 
optician-prestidigitator, and optician-scientist does not consist, as in-
dicated above, in the technology they use, let alone in the innovations 
themselves (until the second half of the 19th century there were no radical 
changes in the construction and operation of optical devices). It consists 
in the divergence of cultural contexts and their attendant practices and 
in the related potential of setting in motion sets of norms, directives and 
judgements justifying norms by the subjects participating in the same 
culture (Barbara’s séance). 
To sum up, it can be observed that once initiated, an innovation may be 
amplified solely when a given culture identifies and articulates a problem 
which this innovation tried to solve. What is necessary to this end is the 
conviction that some directive has ceased to apply to the realisation of 
some norm. To solve this type of problems we may use familiar, perfect-
ed, transformed, or totally new technologies connected with culture via 
practices seen as technologies, which are components of a worldview. The 
zone of science and technology may be seen by a given culture as isolated, 
but the practices carried out within it may only be what this culture, which 
generates the worldview of individuals (thus avoiding the trap of Pacey’s 
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technological imperative), offers. Through technology it is later reflected 
also in technique, which should serve a given practice as best it can. In this 
way the cultural-studies interpretation of the history of technology may 
clarify the interplay of Braudel’s periods of “acceleration” and “stagnation.” 
Because of the practices they were used for, projection optical devices 
usually remained but prototypes, as the revelation of the pattern of their 
operation to the public would have had a negative impact on the practice 
and thus would have affected the efficacy of directives encouraging their 
use. Technological innovation, if it is supposed to generate a technological 
change on a large scale, must be amplified by a change, or at least a cor-
rection, of the worldview. Because of the collective aspect of a worldview, 
this requires, then, the adoption of a cultural-studies perspective also in 
reference to historical events.
Chapter II
The problem of human subjectivity  
as seen by selected disciplines  
of the humanities and social sciences
To be sure, human destinies are placed in the physical 
world and suffer the consequence thereof. Even where 
the intrusion of these external forces seems most brutal, 
however, their action is weakened or intensified by man 
and his mind.
Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, Knopf, 
New York 1959, p. 194.
Undoubtedly, subjectivity constitutes one of the most crucial notions 
concerning how humans function in their socio-cultural environment. 
Nevertheless, there are multiple and various problems related to this no-
tion, even if considered by one discipline only. This diversity of questions 
is followed by a diversity of solutions that are proposed regarding some 
specific issues.1 Some of these differences can be explained in terms of 
the various scientific interests of their authors, while others are due to the 
various epistemological perspectives2 they represent. An epistemological 
1 See O. Urban, Podmiotowość jednostki ludzkiej jako przedmiot badań nauk human-
istycznych, Bogucki Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Poznan 2008. 
2 Briefly speaking, according to Krystyna Zamiara an epistemological perspective re-
fers to an epistemological context of a given discipline, a general way of defining, what is 
worth studying, as well as the possibility and means of conducting the studies. K. Zamiara, 
Dwa typy myślenia w humanistyce o układzie jednostka kultura, in K. Łastowski, P. Zeidler 
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perspective means the general set of beliefs held by authors that limits 
their potential field of interest, indicates questions to be asked, validates 
some facts as crucial ones and (finally) points out the proper methods of 
examination. These beliefs may be held both knowingly and unknowingly.
The epistemological perspective presumed by the concepts concerning 
the notion of human subjectivity, above all, frames the way of describing 
the relations between a human being and his or her environment that is 
determined by social, cultural and historical factors.
This paper deals with the matter of human subjectivity by investigat-
ing various types of its conceptualization in selected disciplines of the 
humanities and social sciences and pointing out their modifications with 
regard to the presumed epistemological perspective. The analysis of the 
psychological, sociological, anthropological and historical concepts is, 
therefore, supposed to indicate the assumptions that create their episte-
mological context as well as their conceptual apparatus.3
What is important, the presented analysis of the scientific disciplines 
(together with the specific concepts deriving from them) is a highly ideal-
izational one – it refers to their most typical characteristics. This approach 
is aimed to present and emphasize the specificity of each discipline which 
renders it possible to conduct an interdisciplinary study. The final part 
of the paper scrutinizes some potential fields of cooperation between the 
disciplines mentioned above (in terms of so-called historical psychology 
as well as the concept of a historical coefficient in sociology). 
1. Subjectivity in a psychological sense –  
as a property of any human being
Subjectivity is commonly regarded as an exclusively human property that 
does not apply to animals or material objects. This view is broadly accepted 
(eds.), Filozofia wobec nauki, człowieka i społeczeństwa, Wyd. Naukowe UAM, Poznan 
2006. 
3 The theoretical background for the paper is constituted by the so-called theoretical 
history of science proposed by Jerzy Kmita. The theoretical history of science represents 
a part of his wider theory: the socio-regulative theory of culture. Science is defined here 
in relation to the other fields of culture and types of social praxis. In these confines the 
meta-theoretical analysis of science is identified with a culture-oriented study of specific 
disciplines.
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in the social consciousness (especially the western one) and constitutes 
the classic way of thinking about human beings. In these confines, the 
basic role is played by some special properties of the subject such as con-
sciousness, self-consciousness, rationality, freedom of choice connected 
to the responsibility for one’s actions as well as the capacity to introduce 
a change – both in the area of one’s personality and in the environment 
(perceived mostly as a socio-cultural one).
This perspective on the human being – depicting him or her as a con-
scious and self-conscious subject that acts in an intentional, rational, and 
creative way – derives from philosophical tradition and as such has been 
adapted by other disciplines (especially psychology). The philosophical 
tradition mentioned above refers in the first place to the indeterminis-
tic approaches to human life. Another source for the scientific idea of 
the subject lies in the Christian theology. The first approach perceives 
subjectivity – with all its properties altogether – as an immanent and 
indefeasible quality of being a human, which is in the state of opposition 
to the objectification of an individual. The second approach perceives 
the individual as a part of the world order established by God that is in 
some ways similar to Him. This similarity involves the questions of free 
will, human dignity and reason, the special position of humans among 
other creatures, etc.
The idea of subjectivity has derived from philosophical origins, which 
involved both a metaphysical and ontological context. When adapted to 
the scientific studies of individuals and their relations to the socio-cultural 
environment, it became a purely descriptive notion. It is such a descriptive 
notion of subjectivity that this paper refers to.
The study of the problems of human subjectivity lies undoubtedly 
within the field of psychology.4 In psychological terms subjectivity is 
depicted as a property of any human being – in the psychological sense, 
the “subject” means an individual human being and not a collective one. 
4 Not all of the psychological concepts provide for the problem of subjectivity, e.g. be-
haviourism in its ontological layer denies the existence of consciousness and other mental 
phenomena. The only field of study recognized here is observable behaviour – performed 
both by humans and animals. The behaviourists did not develop the concept of a human 
as a creative being. The human behaviour was regarded as a product of social condition-
ing. The human actions are to be imitative and determined by the reinforcements coming 
from the internal or external environment. These dependencies were explained in terms 
of stimulus and reaction.
72 Chapter II
When it comes to psychology, the individual is always crucial – there are 
various methods constructed in order to study his or her functioning on 
different levels (emotional, cognitive, socio-cultural).
Both the area and the methods of conducting studies in psychology 
can be described as an example of an epistemological perspective called 
by Krystyna Zamiara a naturalistic-psychologistic one. This perspective 
includes a set of epistemological assumptions: methodological psycholo-
gism, methodological naturalism and ontological naturalism. It underlies 
the concepts that emphasize the importance of so-called human nature as 
contradictory to the factors deriving from the socio-cultural environment. 
Individuals characterized by their morals, mind and personality, combined 
with their biological properties, are always a primary foundation of society. 
The characteristics of their personalities determine the organization of the 
society and shape the culture. Therefore, the specificity of the socio-cultural 
reality depends on the dominant characteristics of the individuals – the 
principles of their individual thinking and acting. Humans are subjects, 
and social reality is secondary for them.
To be more specific, psychologism entails a view on individuals as bear-
ers of some genetic properties and psychological potentials that are prima-
ry, while their participation in culture and social structure is secondary. 
Both the characteristics of individuals and the properties of socio-cultural 
institutions are here explained with reference to the psychological laws.
The ontological naturalism is manifested in the psychological concepts 
by emphasizing the existence of some universal tendencies, or innate dis-
positions in human nature, which originate from the biological organism. 
Psychologists tend to presume a nativist point of view, which describes 
the way in which humans function as a result of the biological evolution 
of a species. The properties of subjectivity are perceived as well as natu-
rally determined components of human nature, e.g. Abraham  H. Maslow 
wrote: “creativeness, spontaneity, selfhood, authenticity, caring for others, 
being able to love, yearning for truth are embryonic belonging to his 
species-membership just as much as are his arms and legs and brain and 
eyes.”5 Similarly, Erik H. Erikson sustains that all the stages of human 
development are connected to the processes that takes place on the level 
of the biological organism. According to him, each human organism 
contains the patterns of all future characteristics that are to be actualized 
5 A. H. Maslow, Towards a psychology of being, VNR, New York 1962, pp. 160–161.
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in a given time frame. An organism is construed here rather as an active 
source and base for personal development than just a passive part of the 
background. What is more, the proper development of the organism is 
necessary for the proper development of the human personality. All the 
phenomena that are of a socio-cultural nature are simultaneously deter-
mined (at least partly) by natural regularities. Culture is here a specific 
extension of the biological instruments for the human being adapting to 
their environment – it is a derivative of the world of nature. The prime 
example of the cultural extension of natural human properties is lan-
guage. The socio-cultural environment does not differ from the natural 
one in any crucial way – it is rather its component. The abovementioned 
concept of the socio-cultural institution by Erikson is constructed in this 
spirit. Erikson presents the ensuing stages of human development as well 
as the corresponding virtues gained by the individual after a successful 
completing of each stage. These stages are covered by specific institutions: 
“Each successive stage and crisis has a special relation to one of the basic 
elements of society, and this for the simple reason that the human life cycle 
and man’s institutions have evolved together.”6 The relation between an 
individual and social institutions works in such a way that the developing 
human feeds the institution with his or her energy, making them last. In 
return, he or she is getting reinforcement as well as confirmation of their 
consecutive achievements in development, e.g. a basic trust is institution-
ally established on the sphere of religion, while autonomy is founded on 
the principles of law and public order.7 Erikson calls this property of social 
institutions maintenance of the human world. In this framework, society 
tends to get its shape, which would respond to the consecutive nature of 
the stages of individual development.8 Further, Erikson expresses the idea 
of society being modelled by individual development in another way. Ac-
cording to him, each social environment should be construed as a chain of 
environments suitable for every stage of human development. This is such 
an environment as is expected by an individual as well as adapted to his 
or her perceptive capabilities. One may draw a conclusion that society is 
created by a set of components which depend on the cognitive capacities 
6 E. H. Erikson, Childhood and society, W.W. Norton & Company, New York 1963, 
p. 250.
7 Therefore, society can be described as a set of institutionalized forms of some indi-
vidual properties.
8 E. H. Erikson, Childhood..., p. 270.
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of the individual. A human does not adapt to the culture – society and 
culture are rather shaped to be friendly for individuals. Another quotation 
supporting this conclusion defines culture as the “persistent endeavor 
of the older and more adult egos to join in the organizational effort of 
providing an integrated series of average expectable environments for the 
young egos.”9 In this depiction, culture is identified with a set of persons 
that share a property of adapting to the individual capability to develop.
Methodological individualism considers socio-cultural phenomena as 
determined by individual phenomena and therefore explained in terms of 
the individual phenomena. Social reality is here construed as a result of in-
dividual actions. The characteristics of these acting individuals determine 
the characteristics of their culture and social structure – they shape the 
conditions they live in – and the opposite dependency is not taken into 
account. In extreme cases this view can be expressed as follows: “There are 
hardly any evidences of the existence of society, are there? I’m afraid that 
it’s only a hypostasis that makes it easier to ignore individual humans.”10
As an example of such a way of thinking one can indicate the concept 
by Gordon W. Allport, a father figure for humanistic psychology. His 
field of interest is constituted by the human individual combined with 
a specific organization of his or her personality as well as the consistency 
and coherence of his or her actions. Instead of a typical review of the 
properties of the human species, he conducts qualitative case studies that 
he calls morphogenic ones (it is his term for the idiographic approach to 
studying human behaviour). In his opinion, morphogenic analysis provides 
better results than the so-called dimensional studies (meaning nomothetic 
ones). Allport has worked out an epistemological approach called heu-
ristic realism. It presumes that every individual is characterized by a real 
neuro-psychical organization, which is to be recognized by a psychologist.
The morphogenic approach is implicated by the main assumption of 
his concepts, which states that each adult is a unique individual and that 
this fact should not be underestimated by improper research methods. 
The morphogenic approach renders it possible to account for such hu-
man properties as the complexity and uniqueness of the personality, the 
coherence of the tendencies marking one’s character, and the significance 
 9 E. H. Erikson, Identity and Life Cycle, W.W. Norton & Company, New York – Lon-
don 1979, p. 163.
10 K. Obuchowski, Od przedmiotu do podmiotu, Wyd. Uczelniane Akademii Bydgo-
skiej, Bydgoszcz 2000, p. 75.
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of aware indicators of behaviour and rational factors, such as the main 
motives of one’s actions. These assumptions construe a notion of human 
subjectivity described by individuality, consciousness and rationality.
There is a strong influence of methodological individualism in this 
concept. Allport does not recognize the need for describing the nature 
of the socio-cultural environment surrounding an individual. In fact, he 
rather takes into consideration the role of culture in the process of indi-
vidual development – he views it as its “major condition.”11 The notion 
of culture has, nevertheless, no wider representation in the concept, and 
is considered as a minor factor of human behaviour. Neither does he 
recognize characteristics of personality as the result of social interaction. 
Allport perceives them as biological potentialities imprinted in human 
nature and gradually developed due to one’s own activity. Social influence 
can be approved, or disapproved of by an individual, or be neutral for him 
or her. What an individual approves of is the only aspect relevant for a psy-
chologist, because it becomes part of one’s personality: “The personality 
theorist should be so well trained in social science that he can view the 
behavior of an individual as fitting any system of interaction; that is, he 
should be able to cast this behavior properly in culture where it occurs, 
in its situational context [...]. At the same time he should not lose sight 
of the fact that there is an internal and subjective patterning of all these 
contextual acts.”12
Psychological studies present a perspective on the human individual 
as completely independent of the socio-cultural and historical context. 
The relation between the individual and culture is here defined in terms 
of psychological and natural regularities and should not be reduced to 
macro-cultural dependencies.
The reconstruction of the notion of subjectivity in the psychological 
sense brings to the foreground such aspects of the subject as the active 
development of one’s (psycho-biological) potentialities, the reshaping of 
some elements of the external environment according to one’s system 
of values, self-improvement, the capacity to make a free choice or autono-
mous decision concerning one’s actions, setting of goals and pursuing them 
in a chosen way or satisfying the commitment to human relationships.
11 G. W. Allport, Becoming. Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality, Yale 
University Press, New Haven – London 1955, p. 82.
12 S. Hall, G. Lindzey, Theories of personality, Wiley, New York 1970, pp. 294–295.
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Psychologists do not usually define subjectivity in terms of the relation 
between an individual and socio-cultural conditions. This independence 
of the subject’s actions from the historical and cultural reality is perfectly 
expressed by the typical notion of self-actualization (especially within 
humanistic psychology). It implies that in the process of their development 
an individual is self-sufficient: the development is determined in an inter-
nal way and requires hardly any external stimuli. According to Maslow: 
“Man demonstrates in his own nature a pressure toward fuller and fuller 
Being, more and more perfect actualization of his humanness in exactly 
the same naturalistic sense that an acorn may be said to be “pressing 
toward” being an oak tree [...].”13 Normal development involves the actu-
alization of internal human nature, comes from one’s inside and should 
not be shaped by external factors or in relation to something external. 
Personality develops thus according to genetically programmed stages. 
The environment, at best, can only help to actualize the potentialities of 
biological human nature. It is neither a source of human properties nor 
a frame of reference for human actions.
No one could say that psychology does not account for the input of the 
external, socio-cultural environment in the process of forming an indi-
vidual at all. Nevertheless, it presents this input in a rather simple way, as 
a secondary background to psychobiological determinants. It lacks any 
specific activity and seems to be just a set of objects shaped or used by an 
individual with no special significance but to provide opportunities to an 
individual to take some actions.14
2. Subjectivity in a socio-cultural sense – as a derivative 
of the properties of social structure and culture
The concepts created by sociologists and anthropologists of culture present 
a different perspective. They bring to the foreground questions about social 
structure and culture, while the problems of human personality and its 
dependencies are here in the background. Clear concepts of personality 
are lacking and the notion of human subjectivity is therefore not usually 
13 A. H. Maslow, Towards a psychology..., p. 160.
14 K. Hurrelmann, Social structure and personality development. The individual as a pro-
ductive processor of reality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988.
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described expressis verbis – rather as a kind of implicit construction that 
can be reconstructed based on the statements concerning other issues.
The difference regarding the psychological and the socio-cultural 
approaches to subjectivity is connected to historical differences between 
psychology and culture studies. With regard to subjectivity, the psycholog-
ical approach emphasizes both organic and mental conditions and tends 
to construct an analysis that focuses on the relation between the internal 
reality and the development of personality. On the other hand, sociology 
and anthropology of culture make a focal point about the social condi-
tions concerning the development of personality and study the relations 
between the way humans function and external reality.
Since Émile Durkheim, sociologists have rather focused on the one-sid-
ed influence of social structure on the actions taken by individuals. Social 
facts that are both objective and external with regard to individuals are here 
perceived as solid, well organized model relations that operate between 
elements of the social structure and impose constraints on individual 
actions. In fact, individuals cannot think or act on their own, fleeing the 
social influence. 
The process of development equips individuals with knowledge con-
cerning social expectations. These expectations become internalized and 
reshaped into motives and goals of actions recognized as one’s own. Nor-
mative socio-cultural systems are so deeply embedded in the individual’s 
psyche that those who adapt to them are not conscious of this fact. Social 
facts are perceived by them as natural, not external, or even innate.
As Durkheim himself put it: “It is therefore in the nature of society 
itself that we must seek the explanation of social life. We can conceive that, 
since it transcends infinitely the individual both in time and space, it is 
capable of imposing upon him the ways of acting and thinking that it has 
consecrated by its authority.”15 The acquired social knowledge is common 
and solid, which makes it a proper guide for individual actions. If for some 
reasons the social order falls apart, what is called by Durkheim an anomy, 
individuals lose their orientation in the social space and their life becomes 
so disorganized that, in short, this state can result in rising suicide rates.
In fact, such a vision of socio-cultural reality does not take into consid-
eration human individuality or autonomy with regard to social pressure 
15 É. Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Methods, The Free Press, New York 1982, 
p. 128.
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or any type of influence on social processes. Therefore, it neglects all the 
properties that are traditionally recognized as belonging to subjectivity. 
Individual autonomy, which is expressed by the free realization of one’s 
needs, goals and aspirations, is here perceived as marginal in comparison 
to the impact of existing social structures. The matter of personality creates 
the background for the analysis of social structure, culture or historical 
determinants, typically understood as a set of norms, rules, principles 
and cultural patterns. 
According to Zamiara, this type of approach is to be described in terms 
of a so-called anti-individualistic – anti-psychologistic epistemological 
perspective, which constitutes a representation of the world significantly 
different from the naturalistic-psychologistic perspective. The difference 
refers to the human condition, the status of culture and society, and the 
relation between the individual and culture/society.16
This is constituted by the following epistemological assumptions: 
methodological anti-psychologism, methodological anti-individualism 
(collectivism), methodological anti-naturalism. In general, the studies 
founded on this perspective have developed within the humanities and 
social sciences after the so-called antipositivistic turning point that has 
rendered it possible to account for diverse socio-cultural phenomena 
without referring to psychological knowledge.
To be more specific, according to methodological individualism (at 
least some), properties of socio-cultural structures cannot be reduced 
to the properties of individuals and the relations between them. This 
approach is represented by Robert K. Merton’s concept, which is typi-
cally focused on the macro-social level. Individuals are here perceived as 
elements of the social system, whose properties derive from this system. 
Society produces individual personalities in the process of socialization 
by means of institutions such as family, education or the workplace. 
Socialization seems to be an extremely one-sided process – individuals 
passively conform to the social influence without reshaping it. They both 
16 Apart from these two epistemological perspectives Zamiara has distinguished 
a third one called the individualistic – anti-psychologistic perspective (K. Zamiara, Dwa 
typy myślenia w humanistyce..., p. 126). This perspective is underlain by the assumptions 
of methodological individualism and anti-psychologism. The concepts based on this per-
spective with regard to an individual neither account for psychobiological properties, nor 
refer to the idea of human nature. Instead, they focus on the description of external cir-
cumstances, which are typically represented by the socio-cultural environment.
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consciously learn and acquire patterns of social behaviour in an uncon-
scious way and internalize them as a part of personality. The institutional 
and normative social order defines not only individual properties but also 
the relations between individuals. These relations should be functional 
with regard to the whole society. Individual activity is here reduced to 
the choice between alternatives defined by social structure.17 Not even 
this choice is free to make – it is governed by social rewards in the form 
of reinforcements that give individuals a sense of fulfillment. Individuals 
are therefore goal-oriented, but not intentional in terms of their having 
a conscious choice of goal followed by pursuing it by means subjectively 
recognized as proper ones. 
With respect to social change, Merton does not account for the role 
of individuals in the process – changes are to be considered a domain 
of structure that is capable of a peculiar “self-transformation.”18 Instead, 
he considers the influence of actions that are organized and commonly 
taken by members of society. According to Merton, each new generation 
ofindividuals that enters the social structures finds new ways of modifying 
the existing structure – by responding adequately to the existing social 
conditions.19 Social change is introduced by linked and combined social 
choices made by groups of individuals, usually by means that are socially 
acceptable. A subject is therefore understood here rather as a collective 
one rather than as an individual, while at the same time collective actions 
are influenced by social determinants as well. 
The presumed anti-psychologistic approach results in a belief that 
social phenomena constitute a primary reality that determines all the 
other phenomena, including those of the individual. Society transfers, or 
more commonly – forces – given requirements concerning actions that 
respond to the existing order and contribute to the permanence of the 
social system, while the psychobiological properties of individuals are here 
neglected. Then a personality is a derivative of the socio-cultural norms. 
Merton takes into consideration merely the one-sided and coercive in-
fluence of social institutions on individuals that embrace all the levels of 
one’s existence. According to him: “the structure constrains individuals 
17 Author’s Preface to the Polish Edition of Social theory and social structure: R. K. Mer-
ton, Teoria socjologiczna i struktura społeczna, PWN, Warsaw 1982, p. 16.
18 Ibidem, p. 18.
19 Ibidem.
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variously situated within it to develop cultural emphases, social behavior 
patterns and psychological bents.”20 
Further, methodological anti-naturalism as a foundation of studies 
rejects not only the psychological but also the biological explanation of 
human behaviour. For example, Florian Znaniecki puts it this way: “The 
idea of innate nature understood as organically determined dispositions 
and capacities is of no significance within [the] sociology of personality, 
as there are no innate social dispositions or capacities at all.”21
Explaining human behaviour without referring to biological (genetic) 
determinism creates a view of subjectivity where it is defined by cultural 
or social patterns at the historically given time. Individuals are formed by 
culture and linked by various relations, which makes them a community. 
However, these bonds are not created in a random way. It is culture that at 
the historically and socially defined moment regulates the entire social life. 
The creating, lasting and breakdown of these bonds are ruled by culture, 
e.g. shaped as functional dependencies.
In sociological and anthropological concepts – contrary to the psy-
chological approach, which views personality as the property of an indi-
vidual – personality is determined by the relation between an individual 
and the external world.
Besides, the sociological and anthropological perspective on subjectiv-
ity is based on an assumption that subjectivity can be ascribed not only 
to a human individual, but also – or especially – to social groups. Then 
a subject is constituted by groups of individuals (construed in an anti-in-
dividualistic manner), whose organized actions can influence the shape 
of the social structure (which is represented e.g. by Merton’s concept).
These assumptions produce concepts that in the first place analyze the 
properties of social structure, and which define the properties of individ-
uals and the modes of their behaviour. Individuals are here deprived of 
autonomy or influence on society. The society is to be a crucial subject 
of all the human processes worth studying, as well as of evolution and 
history. The culture is here presumed to be primary with regard to na-
ture – while the sphere of the social is primary with regard to the sphere 
of the organic. In the relations between an individual and culture, it is 
20 R. K. Merton, Social theory and social structure, The Free Press, New York – Lon-
don 1968, p. 177.
21 F. Znaniecki, Ludzie teraźniejsi a cywilizacja przyszłości, Wyd. Naukowe PWN, War-
saw 2001, p. 102.
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the culture takes the role of the subject, demanding a certain behaviour 
responding to the culturally defined order and contributing to its dura-
bility. Both individually and collectively, people realize – usually uncon-
sciously – the social programme. Psychobiological aspects of individuals 
are here neglected, as well as their individuality and autonomy, in order 
to focus on the internal balance of the social system. The possibility of 
the development of an autonomous individual whose personality could 
differ from socially established patterns is not taken into account either. 
What is more, it seems that the existence of such systems of values that 
would render it possible for an individual to act in contradiction to those 
patterns is also precluded. In the psychological, existential and moral sense, 
individuals are here determined by the society.
All of this does not mean that socio-cultural thinking does not account 
for human subjectivity at all. There are numerous concepts that construe 
the relation between social structure and individuals not as a one-sided 
determination. Individuals are situated in the influential socio-cultural 
context and at the same time these concepts mark off some areas, within 
which, to some extent, individuals can exploit their independence of the 
social structure and culture as well as pursue their goals in compliance 
with their individual preferences or even, to some extent, have an impact 
on modifying the social structure and culture, or at least choose between 
socially determined alternative courses of action. Sociologists and anthro-
pologists describe systems that are restrictive with regard to individuals to 
varying degrees. The less restrictive ones render it possible to constitute 
individual subjectivity, at least to some extent. The subjectivity is then 
construed as enabled or produced by the culture and social structure.
When analyzing the notion of subjectivity as it is constructed by so-
ciology or the anthropology of culture, one could wonder, if individuals 
realizing all the tasks assigned by society and culture does not necessarily 
entail limiting their subjectivity or even its invalidation. In other words, 
can the individuals, who are permanently restricted by the socio-cultural 
impact, really make their own choices or are they in fact just realizing 
plans designed for them by society?
The response could be constructed as follows: the sociological concepts 
placing an individual in the influential socio-cultural context establish 
also such spheres within which individuals are able to realize goals in 
compliance with their own wishes. This depiction is founded by a less 
radical version of methodological individualism. On this supposition 
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individuals can act as subjects and at the same time fulfil socially or 
culturally designed patterns of behaviour. It is definitely noteworthy that 
sociologists and anthropologist describe systems that are restrictive to 
varying degrees. The less restrictive ones render it possible to constitute 
individual subjectivity. In this frame of reference, individuals are able, 
at least partly, to exercise control over their own actions and contribute 
to changing the socio-cultural reality. Societies are no longer seen as 
definitely formed with respect to merely one rule or principle, but rather 
seem to variably approve of the individual subjectivity of its members. 
Then these concepts can be construed as accounting for some peculiar 
determination-gaps in culture, e.g. in Merton’s concept the opportunity 
for individual subjectivity appears when the state of social disintegration 
called anomy or disequilibrium occurs. Then the subjective, individual 
factors, that normally remain unnoticed, are brought to the foreground. 
Some of the ways of dealing with such an unstable social structure may 
become the new alternatives with respect to the hitherto ruling patterns.
Subjectivity in sociology and the anthropology of culture can therefore 
be expressed by the relative independence of the individual behaviour 
of structural determinants as well as the possibility of taking individual 
actions, at least in some spheres of culture and social structure. It can also 
be expressed by allowing individuals influence on the shape of the social 
structure and culture. This type of perspective is represented by the concept 
of Anthony Giddens (the notion of social praxis that renders it possible for 
individuals not only to reproduce social structure, but also to produce it).
3. Subjectivity in historical studies.  
Is a human an object or a subject  
of the historical process?
The idea of human subjectivity in the frames of historical studies should 
be considered with respect to obvious differences between the fields of in-
terests of history and, above all, psychology. Psychological explanations 
are supposed to be universal and context-independent – valid regardless 
of historical circumstances, changing conditions, motivations or the ways 
of pursuing goals chosen by the individual participants of socio-cultural life.
On the other hand, the responsiveness to historical change of a study 
area that accounts for modifying cultural standards and determining 
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human actions by social context, which is neglected by psychology, con-
stitutes the crucial characteristics of history.
A psychologistic approach to historical studies was typical of so-called 
classical historiography. These authors attempted to describe various 
manifestations of individual socio-cultural activity as a limited set of 
psycho-biological factors that could be used to interpret such activity re-
gardless of the historical moment at which it takes place. This perspective 
was based on an unstated assumption that is typical of psychologists and 
postulates the existence of an invariable human nature.
This frame of reference was derived by classical historiographers from 
positivist philosophy, especially as represented by John Stuart Mill. Ac-
cording to him: “The actions and feelings of human beings in the social 
state, are, no doubt, entirely governed by psychological and ethological 
laws: whatever influence any cause exercises upon the social phenomena, 
it exercises through those laws.”22
In this depiction history, just like naturalistic psychology, was to be 
nomothetic science in search of laws, while these (historical) laws would 
refer to both the so-called invariables of human nature and natural laws 
that influence human actions in order to derive constant properties of 
the influence. History of Civilization in England by Henry Thomas Buckle 
sets an example of this approach. In short, the author explains the stages 
of social development by reference to psychological and natural causes. 
Buckle wrote: “Indeed, when we consider the incessant contact between 
man and the external world, it is certain that there must be an intimate 
connexion between human actions and physical laws.”23 The task of such 
historical studies was to search for facts that would unambiguously explain 
human life phenomena as well as to construct generalizations referring to 
the principles of the development of civilization. What is important, there 
is a lack of interest in the historically and culturally changing context of 
these phenomena. 
The so-called antipositivistic turning point in the humanities (that 
already has been mentioned in respect of the shift between the naturalis-
tic-psychologistic epistemological perspective and the anti-individualis-
tic – anti-psychologistic epistemological perspective) that had been taking 
22 J. S. Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of 
The Principles of Evidence, and the Methods of Scientific Investigation, Harper & Brothers, 
New York 1882, p. 620.
23 H. T. Buckle, History of civilization in England, vol. 1, Longman, Green, Longman, 
Roberts & Green, London 1864, pp. 31–32.
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place since the second half of the 19th century, had affected history as well. 
The humanities (along with history) and the social sciences have been 
separated from natural science and have left aside positivist methods. At 
the same time they became self-efficient disciplines. The crucial difference 
between natural and social science started to be connected with the notion 
of values that are to be insignificant for the first type of science and at the 
same time essential for the second one.
The specificity of the humanities and social sciences was described 
by Heinrich Rickert: “There is a science that is to describe its objects in 
terms of their individual uniqueness. They are not construed as an exem-
plum of some species or a case that falls within a law, but as a unique and 
unrepeatable object. This depiction is defined by cultural value ascribed 
to the object, which is not just a spatiotemporal being but rather a good, 
characterized by sense or meaning. Such objects carry values. Humanities 
and social science are designed to study it.”24
Therefore, for historically-oriented culture studies the matter of values 
was of crucial importance because it marked off their field of interest as 
well as rendered it possible to construe it. The past cannot be studied 
as any other observable object, but it can be understood on the basis of 
historical materials that are a vehicle for values. In other words, values 
constitute facts that should be studied by history.
The facts are individual, which means that the constituting values are 
unrepeatable. Therefore, they cannot be interpreted in a psychological or 
positivist manner. There are no general laws concerning their character-
istics.25
24 A. Przyłębski, W poszukiwaniu królestwa filozofii. Z dziejów neokantyzmu badeń-
skiego, IF UAM, Poznan 1993, p. 46.
25 According to Kmita, this property of historical fact was described by Max Weber 
in a more precise way. He described human actions as so-called cultural-historical facts. 
The actions, as well as their results, are determined in a subjective-rational way. This 
means that they can be explained by the following scheme of the ideal type: 1. The beliefs 
shared among a community in a given time span orientate individual actions to achieve 
certain values as well as point out the ways of achieving it; 2. Taking the action leads to 
creating an object. The Weberian scheme of ideal type actions is expressed by Kmita in 
terms of subjective-rational actions: 1. Orientating an action to the realization of a given 
value; 2. Knowledge concerning actions that result in realising the value. Both steps are 
combined together by the so-called rationality assumption that states that an acting sub-
ject takes his or her actions in respect of his or her knowledge. These actions, therefore, 
are not here perceived as the results of timeless psychologistic dependencies but rather as 
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The emergence of humanities out of natural science resulted in the 
dynamic development of knowledge concerning human beings and their 
world by developing numerous branches of the humanities, including 
history. This shift entailed a reorganization of the whole discipline. The 
notion of history had been widened and the general change resulted in 
the emergence of the Annales School – a group of French historiographers 
active from the end of the 19th century onward, represented by Marc Bloch 
or Lucien Febvre, and later on by, among others, Fernand Braudel.
These scholars shared a suspicious approach to that type of history that 
refers to psychological dependencies, and tends to focus on individual 
human or individual events.26 They replaced this event-oriented history 
with studying repeatable phenomena within the frames of the so-called 
longue durée – long-term processes.27 They attempted to identify some 
kind of lasting cultural or social elements within longer time spans, or 
historical entities that played a role of the determinants of individual 
worldviews as well as shaped the economy, influenced religious activities 
or produced customs.
The Annales School postulates a total history that is to refer to inter-
disciplinary studies of parts or entireties of social, economical, religious or 
customs’ systems. These studies are situated in the frames of longue durée, 
which results in referring to such phenomena taken from the systems 
that both undergo the slightest changes and determine human actions in 
the strongest way. In order to achieve this, the notion of structure is here 
involved. According to Braudel, the existence of the deep structures of 
socio-cultural reality had been familiar to former historians as well, but 
determined in a subjective-rational way. They are the results of beliefs respected by a sub-
ject that can be derived from the given socio-historical context. The knowledge about the 
reasons for actions requires knowledge about the values shared within groups of people 
that live in the historically defined time. In other words, proper explanations requires 
knowledge concerning the actions that were regarded as both acceptable and effective at 
a given time. E.g. G. Banaszak, J. Kmita, Społeczno-regulacyjna koncepcja kultury, Wyd. 
Instytutu Kultury, Warsaw 1991, pp. 23–28. 
26 This kind of event-oriented history focused on the influence exercised on histo-
ry by great men in respect of superficially adapted psychological statements. One might 
say that ascribing to men such extraordinary power of influencing reality and describing 
them as unconstrained subjects of historical processes resulted in a significant narrowing 
of the discipline. E.g. see M. Dymkowski, Wprowadzenie do psychologii historycznej, GWP, 
Gdansk 2003, p. 16.
27 E.g. F. Braudel, On history, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1982, p. 31.
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they had been treating it just as a kind of insignificant background for the 
individual leaders. The new history brought these background elements 
to the foreground and studies them in the first place.
For Braudel, the long-lasting economical and social processes that 
take place on the level of structure are crucial factors in the shaping and 
development of social reality. However, from the individual point of 
view, these processes are indeed not observable and seem to be invaria-
ble elements of reality. Individuals see them as lasting, coercive, or even 
obvious and natural (like Durkheim’s social facts). They resemble natural 
processes, which change so slowly that they are hardly noticeable. The 
structures constitute a stable foundation of human existence on all of its 
levels. They determine the socio-cultural range of possibilities concerning 
ways of thinking and acting – both for individuals and social groups. As 
Braudel puts it: “But all of them provide both support and hindrance. 
As hindrances they stand as limits (‘envelopes,’ in the mathematical sense) 
beyond which man and his experiences cannot go.”28 This statement can 
provide some guidelines useful for reconstructing the notion of human 
subjectivity that is presumed within this concept.
An important methodological postulate for Annales School recom-
mended taking into account the output of other social sciences and 
branches of the humanities. In this way Annales’ works had incorporated 
Durkheim’s sociologism, ideas of functionalism, elements of Lévi-Strauss’ 
structuralism, or Marxism. All of these inspirations can be characterized 
as emphasizing social dominance over individuals. Putting history in the 
wide perspective of numerous determinants and ways of interpretation 
resulted in reaching to (historical) geography, demography, religious stud-
ies, literary studies, etc. This kind of multi-level approach is represented 
by Feudal Society by Marc Bloch.
Being certain that the abovementioned postulates were right, Braudel 
projected a so-called global history, while focusing on the history of Eu-
rope and the world during the Modern Age – between the 15th and 18th 
centuries. A work La Méditerranée: l’espace et l’histoire29 written in coop-
eration with Filippo Coarelli and Maurice Aymard, presents the history of 
the Mediterranean region with many layers and aspects, and regards the 
28 Ibidem.
29 The book hasn’t been translated into English. Further reference to the Polish edi-
tion: F. Braudel, F. Coarelli, M. Aymard, Morze Śródziemne: region i jego dzieje, Wyd. Mor-
skie, Gdansk 1982 [translator’s note].
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relations between nature, the economy, politics, social institutions and in-
dividual lives. History, the aforementioned work postulated, is not divided 
into the histories of single nations or civilizations – it is rather constructed 
as a holistic perspective reaching far beyond these particular views. This 
perspective is to combine numerous facts, regions and time spans as well 
as to show the lasting identity (even for ages) of historical phenomena 
(determined by middle- and long-term processes), a common rhythm of 
social life, its structure as well as the dynamics of short-term, unstable 
change. The goal is to confront the past with the present by emphasizing 
how the present of the Mediterranean is embedded in its past through the 
lasting elements of its identity. According to Wrzosek, the lasting identity 
renders it possible for Braudel to state that the present Mediterranean 
civilization can be identified with the one from two thousand years ago.30
The authors account for climate conditions, terrain, soil fertility, natural 
resources as well as – or rather, above all – ponder upon linking these 
factors with cultural ones in order to determine human behaviour. Filippo 
Coarelli puts it this way: “Geographical factors, that are significant for 
historians, are meaningful only when juxtaposed with factors of different 
nature – economical, social, cultural ones.”31 A given combination of geo-
graphical and climate conditions could certainly limit some socio-cultural 
phenomena, or even make them impossible, by limiting the options of 
the revelation of some parts of the social consciousness. It is presumed 
here that the frames of development of following generations (including 
the present ones) are limited by the level of development of social reality 
represented by the preceding stages. The description of many aspects is 
to realize the presumed programme of combining various disciplines in 
one coherent attempt to represent human life and the world. This is the 
only way to embrace “a thousand things at a time” – which is the way of 
“being” of the Mediterranean region.32
What kind of depiction of human subjectivity could be derived from 
the Braudelian way of thinking? The response to the question requires 
reconstructing one’s view on the human individual as it is construed by 
a holistic history embracing huge spaces and very long time spans. Is 
30 W. Wrzosek, Historia – Kultura – Metafora. Powstanie nieklasycznej historiografii, 
FNP Leopoldinum, Wroclaw 1995, p. 92.
31 F. Braudel, F. Coarelli, M. Aymard, Morze Śródziemne..., p. 80.
32 Ibidem, p. 5.
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a person living in the Mediterranean region, at least to some extent, an 
active subject?
In principle, the idea of the individual created by Braudel seems to 
comply with the anti-individualistic – anti-psychologistic epistemologi-
cal perspective. In other words, Braudel’s concept interprets the relations 
between the individual and the external world in a collective way. The 
presumed anti-psychologism denies psychology as a foundation for his-
torical explanation and theory. In the ontological aspect it distinguishes 
the phenomena studied by the humanities and social sciences from the 
psychological phenomena. Therefore, it postulates different methods of 
conducting these studies, as the psychological ones are of no use for the 
humanities and social sciences. Methodological anti-individualism states 
that the properties of (socio-cultural) structures cannot be reduced to the 
properties of individuals and the relations between them.
The perspective on civilization created by Braudel entails a perspective 
on the individual that is mostly in compliance with these assumptions. 
He takes a stance of determinism (social, cultural, historical, natural) and 
refuses to grant an individual any significant role in determining the shape 
of historical processes. The individual is involved in global dependencies 
and functions within a system as a social and historical being. This being 
conforms to the historical, socio-cultural and natural reality.
The idea of longue durée is here of great significance. It stands for 
a temporary perspective that embraces the social, cultural, religious and 
civilization changes. In this framework individuals seem to be passive 
participants of a collective life, involved in the long-term processes, struc-
tures, systems and conditions that depend on the geographical properties 
of a region, the type of community, the economy, city, civilization and so 
forth. The whole complex system does not evolve in a way that would be 
recognizable for individuals, so their subjectivity could hardly be granted.
This vision of the world leaves no place for individual agents. Even if 
individuals create something noteworthy, it is rather an unconscious and 
random process that makes them influence but the co-determinants of 
history, and it goes only as far as designated by the coercive historical con-
ditions. Individuals can replicate these conditions, but they do not produce 
them. The sphere of the thinkable or the doable is limited by the long-term 
processes and the structural features of reality. They set boundaries that 
exclude numerous trains of thought or achievements. Whatever actions 
an individual takes, they are always limited by these historical constraints. 
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The same dependency concerns groups of individuals. The boundaries 
designate a given number of admissible forms of human behaviour and, 
at the same time, set the area of people’s freedom or subjugation. If any 
action exceeds the designated options, then its significance or effects are 
invalidated by the coercive social rules, structural processes and functional 
dependencies.33
The historical process is not here created by human individuals. It is 
rather realized by them. The role of individuals seems to be random – 
most of them conform to the historical conditions and contribute to its 
undisturbed development. It seems that Braudel does not refer to actual 
humans, but rather to typical categories of humans, who drain the soil, 
change uncultivated terrain into arable grounds, prepare food out of 
harvested crops, etc. as well as those who are negligent with regard to ir-
rigation or drainage, thin the forests out and turn ploughed grounds back 
into marshland and so on. These categories of people act collectively and 
influence long time spans, being at the same time unconscious of this or 
of the long-term meaning of their actions. According to Braudel: to get 
to know who they were means to get to know the global historical and 
natural system they were involved in.
At the same time the Braudelian individual remains a hostage – or as 
Braudel puts it: a prisoner – of the climate, type of vegetation, fauna and 
cultivation as well as of the ways of thinking, beliefs, and the economy. 
Humans depend on the balance between these two systems and between 
them and themselves. They are afraid of upsetting this balance, which 
could result in a serious disturbance of the system, on which their life is 
founded.34 Historians are aware of both the existence and significance of 
all these constraints. Does it allow them to neglect the role of an individual 
in history? According to Braudel the answer is “no”: “I would conclude 
with the paradox that the true man of action is he who can measure most 
nearly the constraints upon him, who chooses to remain within them and 
even to take advantage of the weight of the inevitable, exerting his own 
pressure in the same direction. All efforts against the prevailing tide of 
history which is not always obvious are doomed to failure.”35
33 Compare to the notion of functional-genetic determinacy by J. Kmita. E.g. G. Ba-
naszak, J. Kmita, Społeczno-regulacyjna koncepcja..., pp. 37–41.
34 F. Braudel, On history, p. 31.
35 F. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 
vol. II, University of California Press, London 1995, p. 1243.
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Subjectivity relates to activity, mobility and changeability, whereas 
Braudel’s project of history is focused on stability, durability and a constan-
cy of the world and humans. This depiction reveals the activity of collective 
subjects that combines actions and the choices of groups of individuals 
taken within given structural conditions and which influence long-term 
historical processes. Individual preferences hardly impact these processes 
at all. It seems that the crucial reason for this should not be recognized as 
the alleged “anti-subjective” attitude held by Braudel, but rather as a type of 
scientific goal he pursued, which was to grasp the nature of longue durée. 
His point of view on the Mediterranean world determined his concept 
in the first place.
Inspiration coming from the Annales School, connected to their way 
of understanding and creating history, led to the emerging of another 
branch of non-classical historiography – that is historical anthropology.36 
As the Annales School studies relation between history and geography, the 
economy, and structuralistic and functionalistic sociology, the historical 
anthropology has turned to the anthropology of culture, ethnology, his-
tory of art, and psychology. This new branch of history has disregarded 
collective, structuralistic or Marxist visions of the past. The change of 
perspective on history has been followed by the change of perspective 
on the individual.
According to Wojciech Wrzosek, between 1950 and 1970 the view of 
history had been dominated by modernism identified with the Annales 
School, represented above all by Fernand Braudel. After 1970 the anthro-
36 Another interesting concept deriving from the same source is the so-called micro-
history represented by, among others, Robert Darnton, Carlo Ginzburg, and Emmanuel 
Le Roy Ladurie. This thought has been inspired by symbolic anthropology by Clifford 
Geertz – especially by his depiction of culture, its studying and interpreting in terms of 
thick description (e.g. C. Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Cul-
ture, in The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, Basic Books, New York 1973). In 
general, a historian that involves this kind of depiction of culture resembles an anthropol-
ogist – his main task is to present culture “from an indigent point of view.” Microhistory 
presumes thorough studies of the past including its all minor aspects. It postulates describ-
ing relatively short, limited time spans referring to ordinary people’s perspective – people 
who had no actual opportunity to influence e.g. political history. The microhistorian gets 
to know their names, their words and stories. Apart from general knowledge concerning 
a certain time span, microhistory includes primary sources: original materials like e.g. the 
inquisition’s documents or the legal records of interrogation. A story based on these mate-
rials is to be as close to everyday life as possible.
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pological perspective on historiography had emerged, which entailed 
appreciation and reinterpreting of the thought of the classic authors from 
Annales: Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre.37
Historical anthropology accounts for historical material in an an-
thropological way, which means, in general, that studies of life focus on 
grasping some regularities, exposing significant elements and analyzing 
the relation between the elements (e.g. ways of thinking) and the entire 
human reality. Such reality is here perceived as a context created by hu-
mans that influences their actions. Historical anthropologists have been 
studying the Middle Ages and the early Modern Age. The studies are based 
on the assumption that these times are as distant for contemporary people 
as some non-European society, which constitutes the traditional field of 
interest for anthropology. 
Anthropological history refers to a crucial notion of mentalité. Studying 
mentalité as well as the whole of historical anthropology is supposed to 
be modifiable and interdisciplinary. These authors aim at a flexible, wide-
open approach to history. Various methods and theoretical inspirations 
are here not only possible but also desired.
Georges Duby and Robert Mandrou comprehend mentalité as a sys-
tem of perceptions, images and ideas that are combined in different ways 
among different social groups or social stratums that create a society. In 
each case this constitutes a foundation for human representations of the 
world and their place in it and, consequently, they define human actions. 
In this depiction, the social relations between people are determined both 
by economical or political factors and those connected to people’s ideas 
or perceptions of the world.38 The study of the interaction between the 
human mind and socio-cultural structures in historical aspects is here of 
the essence. The authors scrutinize the customs, shared values and morals 
of social groups in the past as elements that are determined both by society 
and a psychologically mediated basis of social life.
37 What’s important about Marc Bloch, he depicts the feudal society that he analyzes 
as an entity – as a complex system constructed from both material and spiritual phenom-
ena as well as those of an economical, social, religious, ritual or ideological nature. On the 
other hand, Lucien Febvre’s concept brings ideas that are interesting for historical anthro-
pology above all when he describes cultural or historical boundaries that determine the 
limits of social consciousness and points out the frames of human thought and behaviour.
38 W. Wrzosek, Historia – Kultura – Metafora..., p. 131.
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Studies of mentalité result in a synthesis of methods and objects belong-
ing to many various branches of knowledge, which leads to constituting 
a new field for history – culture. However, this idea of historiography keeps 
its distance from the traditional notion of culture, which is opposed to the 
psychological or anthropological approaches. Mentalité refers to the entire 
culture, with its material and spiritual parts. At the same time pre-logical 
and emotional aspects of culture are brought to the foreground.
According to Aaron Gurevich, this kind of mentalité and its role in the 
society of a given epoch could be compared to the air39 that is breathed in 
by all members of society – this is a globality, an invisible environment that 
involves everyone. Therefore, understanding human ways of thinking and 
acting means knowing the ingredients of the air. Nevertheless, these ingre-
dients depend somehow on the humans that live within their influence.
What is important for this paper, anthropological and historical studies 
of mentalité reject a dehumanized vision of history – the one that is situ-
ated outside or above the human world. They refuse describing historical 
epochs in terms of structuralism or functionalism and deny the holistic or 
collectivist approaches to society that deprive its description of elements 
of subjectivity. Instead, they focus on the psychological dimensions of 
humans as well as the spiritual level of social life – even if it is implicit 
or unconscious, it still plays a role of a rationale for the socio-cultural 
actions and events.
Although these studies put the collective level above the individual 
one, they presume that the objective determinants that shape the histor-
ical process can cause significant events as far as they influence humans, 
their emotions and consciousness – by becoming part of their life, they 
evoke actions and are followed by given consequences. The actors of the 
historical scene are alive and conscious, they share ideas and passions, 
pursue their goals – they cannot be described as “inert and inept – the 
playthings of forces larger than themselves”40 or passive individuals, com-
pletely involved in the long-term processes. It is not an individual that is 
enacting the historical process – it is a participant of culture as well as its 
author. This perspective seems to account for the subjects of history and 
not just its objects.
39 Ibidem, p. 135.
40 A. Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of the Interpreta-
tive Sociology, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1993, p. 5.
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Further analyses focus on the matter of subjectivity according to Gurev-
ich works, especially his Individual in the history of (medieval) Europe.41 At 
the beginning, Gurevich states as follows: “The problem of an individual 
is an important question for contemporary historical knowledge that is 
oriented towards anthropology and studies humans as social creatures 
– historically specific and changing. Historians have been successfully 
studying societies and its economical, social and political determinants. 
An individual – an atom of social structure – still remains a sealed book.”42
In these words Gurevich brings attention to some limitations that 
characterize the history of mentalité. These studies gather enormous ma-
terials concerning human activities, achievements, and everyday life in 
order to discover various aspects of the representation of the world, which 
was familiar and important to the people in the past. The historians of 
mentalité attempt to reconstruct the meanings of past trains of thought. 
Nevertheless, mentalité is to express a so-called collective psychology, 
that is, some elements common for members of small and big social 
groups – de facto the extra-individual level of individual consciousness. 
The historians cannot account for a specific individual consciousness – 
the structure of individualized and unique elements of people’s mental 
representation of the world.
At the same time, according to Gurevich, human individuality con-
stitutes a fundamental historical problem (especially significant as it re-
gards socio-cultural changes occurring in the Western world in the past 
decades43). Gurevich has been studying factors that have transformed 
fragmented singular societies of the European continent into the contem-
41 The book hasn’t been translated into English. Further reference to the Polish edi-
tion: A. Guriewicz, Jednostka w dziejach Europy (średniowiecze), Marabut – Volumen, 
Gdansk – Warszawa 2002.
42 Ibidem, p. 8.
43 According to Gurevich, the problem of the individuality of a human being does not 
concern the past ages only. As the author puts it: “I am a Russian historian and as the au-
thor of this book I need to say that the topic of an individual and individuality has become 
more and more up-to-date and meaningful in my country. The totalitarian regime has 
enslaved individuals as well as put their initiative down within all the fields of economical, 
political and cultural life. The word ‘individualist’ not only has stood for an insult – being 
accused of individualism, that is of a freedom of revealing human capabilities, skills and 
interests, could also entail repression – e.g. towards artists. The problem of the individual 
has become a crucial issue of current debate concerning rescuing our society, its rebirth 
and creating a new spiritual climate.” A. Guriewicz, Jednostka w dziejach Europy..., p. 8.
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porary European community. In the final analysis – the question is asked 
whether the achievements within material culture as well as shifts within 
social relations, the development of science and technology and so on, 
determined by a specific structure of individuals’ personality typical of 
this area? This relates especially to those individuals that having overcome 
their own limits due to e.g. birth or social stratum, started to perceive their 
own individuality, spread original beliefs, and develop unique skills. On 
this account, the question concerns subjectivity.
Gurevich’s answer is not a simple one. Examining the sources of these 
shifts does not take Gurevich back to “eventual history” or “the history 
of great men.” He is not interested in studying completely extraordinary 
personalities. His view raises a difficult question of presenting the people 
of the Middle Ages (artists, clergymen, intellectuals) in the context of their 
own universe of thought as well as the social relations of the epoch without 
losing sight of their individuality, their uniqueness. The method is based 
on the assumption that individuality is shaped by given socio-historical 
conditions – e.g. religion, the economy, morals, or laws that create the 
general climate, mark out boundaries, for the expressions of individuali-
ty. As Gurevich puts it: “Study of the perceptual and conceptual cultural 
inventory should help us to understand its nature and, consequently, to 
clarify the conditions under which the human personality has been shaped 
in this or that period.”44
Depending on the properties of the socio-cultural environment, the 
individuals acquire specific properties themselves. They are individuals 
that are involved in the socio-historical conditions.45 They can be original, 
but inevitably they are influenced by their culture and take the worldviews, 
systems of values and mindsets of their society, or social groups that they 
belong to, for their own. They can think in a creative way, but not in iso-
lation from the ideas they share with other individuals and groups. They 
44 A. J. Gurevich, Categories of Medieval Culture, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London – 
Boston – Melbourne – Henley 1985, p. 27.
45 Gurevich distinguishes the human individual from “individuum.” The individual 
concerns the process of getting conscious of one’s own worthiness, and confirmation of 
the self, while individuum is related to the process of getting conscious of one’s distinc-
tiveness. The processes of the emerging of an individual and his or her individualization 
are combined together. The first one – regarding European history – seems to precede the 
second one. Nevertheless, this distinction is rather purely analytical and the criteria are 
hardly clear.
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are persistently testing their own boundaries, they constitute civilizations, 
build cities, wage wars, and enter into alliances. They co-create reality, but 
only with regard to the building material they can use and the projects 
they can realize concerning the coercive historical conditions.
The closer we examine a social group one belongs to, the more visible 
the individualization. It is impossible to refer to the process of individu-
alization regardless of the context of given socio-cultural transformations. 
According to Gurevich, the context is defined by the abovementioned 
shifts within Western Europe in the Middle Ages.
For these reasons Gurevich’s concept is situated far away from the 
highly abstract category of the individual in the Middle Ages. Instead, his 
studies take into consideration various social figures, roles and characters 
like monks, knights, townsmen, artists, merchants, saints or outcasts. In 
compliance with Jacques Le Goff ’s views, he assumes that the abstract 
figure of the man of the Middle Ages could be in this manner filled up 
with more specific contents.
Gurevich’s studies come between global history and “great man histo-
ry” – they could be described in terms of an epistemological perspective 
called by Ireneusz Krzemiński a perspective of primary relations.46 This 
perspective reaches out from the dominance of a collective or individual 
way of thinking and renders it possible to present such a vision of human 
activity that both belongs to the socio-cultural world and – in the given 
circumstances – can be of a subjective nature.
Describing Gurevich’s ideas in terms of this perspective seems to be 
correct because of, among others, the methods he prefers. He aims at 
grasping the balance of individual and social factors. He is studying hu-
man beings: their language, customs, religion, moral principles and art as 
well as all the mental background that makes human action meaningful. 
Gurevich attempts to reconstruct an objective, historical context of human 
actions by means of its subjective (according to Wrzosek: socially subjective 
rather than individually subjective47) aspects. As Wrzosek puts it: “Getting 
to know an individual or an anonymous group of individuals renders it 
possible to get to know the universal, the extra-individual, as well as the 
coercive in the frames of a society or an epoch. It relates to all kinds of 
rules of cultural interpretation of the world, the rules of taking actions. 
46 I. Krzemiński, Co się dzieje między ludźmi?, UW, Warsaw 1992, pp. 10–13.
47 W. Wrzosek, Historia – Kultura – Metafora..., p. 139.
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On that account the goal is to get to know a human together with his or 
her knowledge about the world and system of values. This knowledge and 
this system of values accompanies all the actions that are taken by him 
or her.”48 In this perspective, an individual, society, culture, or historical 
process – constitute equivalent elements that constantly interact with each 
other, which results in mutual transformation. Individuals participate in 
culture by adapting their preferences to the general conditions. At the same 
time they contribute to transforming cultural phenomena in compliance 
with their own needs. In this depiction, individuals can function in the 
world only together with society and culture, whereas society and culture 
are unthinkable without independently thinking and acting individuals.
Firstly, the perspective is based on assumptions that construe society as 
a historically and culturally defined entity with properties different from 
the properties of its members – that cannot be reduced to the sum of its 
members. Secondly, this entity and its mechanisms influence individuals 
in significant and various ways. Thirdly, individual members of society 
influence at least some spheres of the socio-cultural life. Lastly, the social 
life of individuals is impacted by two types of factors: those connected 
with the social system and those independent of it.49
This view takes into consideration the influence of the socio-cultural 
environment on individuals, but the influence is not of a merely me-
chanical nature. Under these circumstances individuals could, at least in 
part, control their actions, which could cause noticeable changes in the 
surrounding world. 
4. Subjectivity as an interdisciplinary problem
Historical anthropology represents one of the many interesting examples 
of mutual inspirations between the disciplines analyzed in the paper. The 
disciplines tend to merge and create so-called blurred genres50 – studying 
the notion of individual’s subjectivity as well. 
48 Ibidem, p. 131.
49 K. Zamiara, Czy opozycja: indywidualizm – kolektywizm wymaga przezwyciężenia?, 
“Człowiek i Społeczeństwo” 1998, vol. XVI, p. 124.
50 Clifford Geertz, the author of the notion of the blurred genres, stated that contem-
porarily clear divisions and strict boundaries between disciplines among humanities and 
social sciences are not possible to sustain – unless on the institutional level. The situation 
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The first result of the blurring genres I am to discuss is so-called histor-
ical psychology, which could be derived from Wilhelm Dilthey’s thought. 
In the 19th century Dilthey had been studying the human involvement in 
historical processes – he postulated examining the relation between types 
of psychological processes and the historical transformation of cultures. 
The point was to not to explain human ways of thinking in a causal way, but 
to understand them in the context of changing socio-cultural conditions.51
Many researchers think of historical psychology as a kind of addition 
to the psychology of the contemporary man who considers the internal 
sources of behaviour as well as the external ones – when it comes to the 
people in the past.52 The static approach (to personality, identity, human 
activity) is no longer involved. Instead, the historical influence of vari-
ous socio-cultural conditions is taken into consideration. According to 
others, historical psychology does not comply with so-called traditional 
psychology, but is definitely opposed with regard to the latter. It argues 
against the naturalistically oriented concepts that situate the sources of 
both psychological and, consequently, social processes in the biological 
organism.53 As regards the methodology of historical psychology, ac-
cording to Piotr Pacewicz the discipline does not conform to the specific 
methodological requirements of modern psychology. Because of the nature 
of its materials, it is not possible to test its theses experimentally, so it is 
limited to posing hypotheses concerning various psychological processes 
and their course in the past.54
of merging disciplines that can have various inspirations and involve various legacies is, 
according to Geertz, an important stimulus of development. C. Geertz, Local Knowledge. 
Further Essays in Interpretative Anthropology, Basic Books, New York 2000, pp. 19–35.
51 See e.g. J. Szacki, History of Sociological Thought, Aldwych Press, London 1979, 
pp. 321–329.
52 I agree with Maciej Dymkowski, according to whom historians, while studying 
human history, regardless of their theoretical or methodological commitments, tend to 
show an attitude of a psychologist. This does not necessarily mean that they refer to sci-
entific psychology – rather they remain in the frame of reference of “common sense psy-
chology.” This attitude is typical of those historical attempts that reach beyond registering 
historical phenomena or processes and try to understand them. M. Dymkowski, Wpro-
wadzenie do psychologii..., p. 11.
53 See e.g. Z. Spendel, Podmiotowość człowieka a psychologia historyczna, Wyd. UŚ, 
Katowice 1994, p. 65.
54 P. Pacewicz, Podstawowe złudzenia psychologów historycznych, „Studia Psycholo-
giczne” 23/1985, pp. 29–40.
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Historical psychology’s task is to provide knowledge concerning 
psychological variables that – according to its proponents – significantly 
co-determined the behaviour of individuals within a given historical reality. 
Human behaviour is here determined by various external factors like social 
structure, culture, the economy, politics or even climate. At the same time 
there are psychological determinants that shape human behaviour from the 
inside – from the individual level. In other words, historical psychology 
examines the individual ways of the realization of the historical process or 
the individual influence on it. The individuals are here perceived as beings 
characterized by various psycho-biological and psycho-social properties.
Similar assumptions consider also the so-called psychology of cultural 
participation, postulated by Krystyna Zamiara.55 According to her, these 
assumptions render it possible to redefine the relation between psychol-
ogy and other disciplines: social science and the humanities are to study 
objective aspects of the cultural participation of individuals – study “the 
culture itself, its general forms and properties and mechanisms of devel-
opment,”56 whereas psychology would provide studies of the subjective 
aspects of the matter. Its task would be to investigate the psychological 
mechanisms that rule the process of the individual learning of participation 
in culture, establishing the course of participating in culture in an empirical 
reality – both under ordinary and extraordinary circumstances, as well 
as the psychological determinants of the participation. In other words, it 
would study the realizations of the process of participation in culture by 
individuals characterized by various psychobiological and psychosocial 
properties57 – under the important assumption that the fundamental 
environment for most or even all of the human actions is constituted by 
social, historical and cultural factors.58
55 The project is supposed to overcome the psychologistic epistemological perspec-
tive that is typical of the psychological approach to individual participation in culture. 
On the other hand, it aims at overcoming the dominance of the anti-psychologistic and 
anti-individualistic approaches among culture studies as well. See e.g. K. Zamiara, Czy 
istnieje szansa korzystania z teorii psychologicznej w badaniach nad kulturą?, in T. Ko-
styrko (ed.), Teoria kultury a badania nad zjawiskami artystycznymi, Centralny Ośrodek 
Metodyki Upowszechniania Kultury, Warsaw 1983, pp. 171–190.
56 K. Zamiara, Epistemologiczny kontekst psychologii partycypacji kulturowej, in 
K. Zamiara, M. Golka (eds.), Sztuka i estetyzacja. Studia teoretyczne, Wyd. Fundacji Hu-
maniora, Poznan 1999, p. 146.
57 Ibidem.
58 Both the answer to these and similar questions and the foundation of the developed 
depiction of participation in culture – according to Zamiara – are possible if and only if 
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What is important, historical psychology significantly differs from so-
called psychohistory – a specific discipline developed betwixt and between 
history and psychology, mostly in the 1960s in the USA. The authors 
like Lloyd deMause or Robert Jay Lifton referred to psychodynamically 
oriented psychology, especially to Freud’s psychoanalysis. They used his 
legacy to study historical reality, mostly with regard to the development 
of personality and great men’s activity – they created their so-called psy-
chodynamic biographies. Historical human actions and social processes 
were here depicted as the signs of motivation of a biological origin. The 
naturalistic-psychologistic motivation described on the level of individual 
personality was supposed to explain the course of historical processes. The 
individuals were perceived in a psychoanalytic way – as determined by 
biological and physiological drives of the id and social dictates of the super 
ego. The basic reasons for human actions were situated in the unconscious 
mind, beyond individual control.
These assumptions had generated concepts that presumed a model of 
human personality highly contradictive to the idea of the rational man 
who acts in compliance with his or her knowledge concerning goals and 
measures. As Jerzy Topolski puts it: “This position is a death threat for 
history since it treats humans as puppets moved by some fatalist powers 
lying in them [...] and thereby depriving them of examining (explaining) 
the significance of all of the branches of history that allow us to recon-
struct the shaping of knowledge, ideology, mentality, thus a history of 
consciousness (i.e. spiritual culture) as well as of the products of conscious 
actions.”59
This standpoint is therefore of an anti-subject nature. However, it is 
necessary to stipulate that Freud’s concept of the ego was a starting point 
for considering its role in the construction of personality. Over time its 
autonomy has been viewed as wider and wider, more and more inde-
pendent of the ego and super ego, and finally as one of the pillars of the 
subjective existence of an individual. For example, for E. H. Erikson the 
functions of the ego are above all creative and not defensive or adaptive. 
In Erikson’s concept of individual personality, the conscious component 
of the human psyche is brought to the foreground and located in the 
psychology can put aside the epistemic assumptions of ontological naturalism, methodo-
logical individualism and psychologism, especially in their radical versions.
59 J. Topolski, Świat bez historii, Wyd. Poznańskie, Poznan 1998, p. 126.
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context of specific historical and cultural influences (as distinct from the 
universalized influence depicted by radical psychoanalysis).60
Erikson’s project of psycho-historical studies is supposed to analyze 
one’s life story by means of the proper interpretation of its description 
and accessible materials. The proper interpretation requires not only the 
knowledge concerning an individual, but also historical knowledge con-
cerning his or her society, and the shape of the given historical and cultural 
processes. The psycho-historical method by Erikson combined historical 
case studies – typical of psychoanalysis – together with studying the cul-
tural and historical conditions of the life of the individuals – under the 
assumption that the relations between the individual and these conditions 
were mutual. These projects resulted in the so-called psychobiographies 
of Martin Luther and Gandhi.61
Psychohistory has been widely criticized, mostly among the historians 
themselves. The critique relates to its fundamental assumptions and argues 
that the reference to Freudian ideas groundlessly situates the determinants 
of human actions within the inaccessible physiological drives of their 
unconsciousness (which ascribes the most important role to the so-called 
libido, i.e. widely understood sexual drive). At the same time, reference to 
this kind of motivation is typically connected with the assumption of the 
existence of a historically invariable human nature. According to Topolski, 
founding historical explanations on psychoanalysis – considered by him 
a classic example of ahistorical thinking – which is typical of psychohis-
tory, is a fallacy.62
Let us get back to the historical psychology and its approach to the 
problem of subjectivity. Zbigniew Spendel is one of the authors who are 
interested in individual subjectivity in the historical perspective. His posi-
tion is noteworthy. He considers the historical psychology a collection of 
some theoretical and methodological assumptions that point out a specific 
60 In order to make the presentation of Erikson’ concept from the first part of the 
paper complete, one must add that he perceives culture as a source of common ideas of 
good and evil that contain some patterns of social moral values in form of so-called social 
models. They create a specified frame of reference for individuals.
61 E.g. E. H. Erikson, Young man Luther: a study in psychoanalysis and history, W.W. 
Norton & Company, New York – London 1993.
62 See M. Dymkowski, Wprowadzenie do psychologii..., p. 19. What is important, 
unconscious motivations – under certain conditions – can regulate human actions, e.g. 
those connected to emotions. On the other hand, the real consequences of these actions 
usually do not meet one’s expectations and their influence on history is also interesting.
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complex of problems and ways of perceiving them.63 Subjectivity is here 
regarded as a necessary condition of the historical development, as well 
as a property that is influenced by the development.
According to Spendel, there is a necessary connection between the 
historical thinking about humans and accepting a so-called subjective 
metatheoretical perspective.64 The perspective, despite the differences 
within specific theoretical ideas, refers to the notion of subjectivity in 
a way that makes it an explanatory category. As Spendel puts it: “In my 
opinion, each piece of history needs to depict human beings as, even 
if only potentially, of a subjective character or to assume this character 
implicitly.”65 
However, according to Spendel, it seems that historical psychology 
avoids studying human subjectivity. On the other hand, the so-called 
psychology of subjectivity disregards historical aspects of the matter. The 
ahistorism of the psychology of subjectivity cannot be surprising – why 
would this branch of psychology take into consideration history, whereas 
there is a general lack of historical perspective in the frames of traditional 
psychology. What is more, viewing the subjectivity in the context of its 
historical modifications could lead to an unwelcome conclusion – that 
being human can mean something different in relation to the historical 
and cultural conditions of life.66 Contemporarily (especially with respect 
to the Western world), while the subjectivity seems to be the most uni-
versal and primary property of each individual, the idea that this category 
can change depending on history and culture could be difficult to accept.
The lack of interest in subjectivity that is noticeable within historical 
psychology is, according to Spendel, worth looking into and explaining. 
In his opinion, this absence is rather apparent. The category of subjectivity 
is, in fact, included, but rather in an implicit way. Subjectivity is usually 
accounted for as a permanent, invariable and irreducible characteristic of 
the individual. In this way this depiction can be described as ahistorical. 
What is more, according to Spendel, this depiction is necessary so the 
historical psychology could study it as a relatively stable frame of reference 
and then account for any changes. As Spendel puts it: “It seems that the 
sense of the notion of variability needs to be in relation to some kind of 
63 Z. Spendel, Podmiotowość człowieka..., p. 7.
64 Ibidem, p. 9.
65 Ibidem.
66 Ibidem, p. 67.
102 Chapter II
permanence as a necessary addition. Probably no other way of concep-
tualizing the change is even imaginable.”67
According to Spendel, viewing subjectivity as the necessary charac-
teristic of the human individual is the most common idea within the 
historical psychology. Spendel himself admits to being an opponent of 
this depiction. In his opinion, in order to gain valuable results, one should 
understand subjectivity not as characteristic of the individual, but rather as 
characteristic of the relation between the individual and the external world, 
especially in its socio-cultural aspects.68 Only then could the subjectivity 
be part of the historical category in the very sense of being historical – 
this approach accounts for variability and the diachronic perspective. This 
depiction situates the subjectivity – as a capacity to establish relations with 
the external world in a conscious, creative and active way – in historically 
and socio-culturally defined conditions or at certain stage of the historical 
development of the forms of the individual’s participation in culture.69
In this manner Spendel puts some constraints upon naming a human 
being a subject. The human being becomes a subject only then, when be-
tween him or her and the world a specific relation of subjectivity has been 
established. Therefore, contrary to the traditional psychology, belonging 
to the human species does not make anyone automatically a subject. This 
opportunity appears on some historically described levels of the relation 
with one’s environment.70 This idea seems to be close to the sociological 
approach to subjectivity (as characterized above).
Contrary to the traditional psychology, classical sociology did not 
avoid investigating the historical aspects of its field, even though various 
sociological branches and schools have accounted for these aspects to 
different extents.71
The relation between sociology and history has been described in an 
interesting way by Piotr Sztompka. He does not recognize so-called his-
torical sociology as a return to the sociological roots (as it is commonly 
believed sociology has derived from history). On the contrary, he treats 
contemporary sociology as a critical reaction to traditional ways of using 
history present in the works of sociologists in the 19th century. The history 
67 Ibidem, p. 63.
68 Ibidem, p. 38.
69 Ibidem.
70 Ibidem, p. 39.
71 Ibidem, p. 49.
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of Europe, according to Sztompka, had provided a natural field of study for 
a young discipline of sociology. The authors like August Comte, Herbert 
Spencer, Ferdinand Tönnies or Émile Durkheim in his early works, have 
explained the processes of the transformation of the traditional society into 
a modern one (industrialization, urbanization, capital accumulation, etc.). 
However, in these studies they did not involve truly historical methods, 
which offer the reconstruction of specific events and their generalization 
in order to formulate historical laws. In fact, their methods were contrary 
to the historical ones – they constructed the universal historical laws (cov-
ering and explaining as many historical facts as possible) a priori – adding 
to it at most a few pieces of random historical evidence to support it. So 
the laws were not derived from history, but rather put upon it. The other 
assumption was that history can be perceived mechanically – as a field 
with a determined direction, independent of human actions. As Sztompka 
puts it: “instead of bringing sociology closer to history, it represented in 
fact the early form of ahistorism. We may call it, a little paradoxically, 
a ‘historiosophical ahistorism’. ”72
Besides the dominant ahistorical tendency, there were also a few exam-
ples of truly historical sociology in the 19th century. They were typically 
focused on the selected time span and did not formulate too wide gener-
alizations. They were based on well-documented historical events and – 
what is here more important – they accounted for individual actions with 
regard to the change in the society. This approach had denied fatalism and 
established the individuals or the groups of individuals as a real subject 
of history. According to Sztompka, this actual early historism was repre-
sented above all by Max Weber’s works.73 In short, involving the historical 
perspective had resulted in putting the mechanical historical laws aside. 
Instead, Weber had pondered on the kind of historical interpretation that 
recognizes the strategic role of subjects in reproducing social structure. It 
is especially Weber’s legacy, according to Sztompka, that has contributed 
to the recent rebirth of historical sociology.
The sociology at the end of the 19th century was in need of brand new 
concepts concerning the process of social and historical change. This need 
had been met by two new theoretical options – the so-called historical 
sociology and the so-called theory of subjectivity. Based on different prem-
72 P. Sztompka, The sociology of social change, Blackwell, Oxford 1994, p. 204.
73 Apart from this, Sztompka points out in this context the early works of Karl Marx 
and Alexis de Tocqueville. Ibidem.
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ises and referring to different traditions, these two branches of sociology 
met in creating the new vision of society as a dynamic process, through 
which the individuals create and reproduce the social context of their lives.
Historical sociology is usually depicted as a branch of sociology 
(separate theoretical and methodological orientation) that is interested 
mainly in the cultural aspects of (Western) society in the past.74 Accord-
ing to Sztompka, historical sociology “takes the opposition of continuity 
and change as its core problem but by solving it arrives sooner or later at 
a quite sophisticated notion of agency.”75
The proponents were represented by Norbert Elias, Phillip Abrams, 
Charles Tilly or Christopher Loyd. All of them accept a certain set of 
ontological assumptions that are fundamental for historical sociology 
and could be described as the “historical coefficient of social reality.”76 
The most important premises of this coefficient include the following 
beliefs: the social world is a dynamic process, with a liquid network of 
relations that contains conflicts and contradictions as well as order and 
cooperation – the society happens rather than exists; it consists of events 
rather than objects; time is an internal, necessary dimension of the society, 
and its immanent factor – the cause, results and course of action depend 
on the specific point in time; social change is an outcome of numerous 
processes (parallel and crossing, convergent and divergent, concordant 
and conflicted) – each phase of the process is a cumulated result of the 
former’s phases and the beginning of future change; the causative factor 
of social change is constituted by subjects – the individuals or groups and 
their actions; they create society not in a random way but according to 
the given structural conditions that are inherited from the past and that 
are set or changed for the future generations; therefore there is a dialectic 
of action and structure, within which the actions are partly determined 
by the former structures, whereas the later structures are created by the 
former actions. According to Sztompka: “in the image of social reality 
as endowed with the ‘historical coefficient’, the old dichotomies of con-
tinuity and change, statics and dynamics, synchrony and diachrony are 
finally overcome.”77 By making the historical coefficient a foundation of 
74 As it was mentioned above, sociology and history were merging in the Annales 
School as well.
75 P. Sztompka, The sociology..., p. 217.
76 E.g. P. Sztompka, Socjologia. Analiza społeczeństwa, Znak, Cracow 2002, p. 527.
77 P. Sztompka, The sociology..., p. 211.
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the study of social reality, the historical process can be perceived as the 
result of the actions taken by active subjects, the result of both creative 
and reproductive procedures realized by means of structural resources 
shaped by former generations.
The dependency between historical thinking and subject-oriented 
thinking is noticeable e.g. in the concept by N. Elias. The author maintains 
that all the contemporary forms of society derive directly from the former 
ones. At the same time the contemporary forms constitute a specific base 
for the future social forms. These processes of social development are 
started by the individuals, who are variously related to each other. As Elias 
puts it: “It is simple enough: plans and actions the emotional and rational 
impulses of individual people, constantly interweave in a friendly or hostile 
way. This basic tissue resulting from many single plans and actions of men 
can give rise to changes and patterns that no individual person has planned 
or created. From this interdependence of people arises an order sui generis, 
an order more compelling and stronger than the will and reason of the 
individual people composing it. It is this order of interweaving human 
impulses and strivings, this social order, which determines the course of 
historical change; it underlies the civilizing process.”78 The humans that 
form groups are therefore seen here as a subject of historical change. Even 
though the shape and scope of the change process is simultaneously com-
pletely dependent on specific socio-cultural conditions, still – an infinite 
diversity among humans and their divergent plans, unexpected moves and 
differentiated knowledge or individual emotions do not leave a place for 
automatism or inevitability.
The so-called theory of subjectivity in sociology is represented by, 
among others, Alain Touraine, Anthony Giddens, Margaret Archer and 
Piotr Sztompka. The image of the society they depict is called the agential 
coefficient of social reality. The most important assumptions of the theory 
postulate the following: society as an invariable entity is unthinkable, the 
society is established by the processes, a continuous sequence of chang-
es, and the variability consists in self-transformation and derives from 
intra-social sources; the final trigger of change is the causative force of 
individuals and social collectives reflected by their actions; nothing hap-
pens automatically or out of historical necessity in the society; everything 
78 N. Elias, The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations, Black-
well, Oxford 2000, p. 365.
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is a product made by humans; the countless number and variety of sub-
jects makes the direction, goals and speed of change a controversy that is 
debated about and fought for; the result is the outcome of multiple forces; 
each action happens in the context of the existing structures that at the 
same time are shaped by this action; both structures and subjects are here 
twofold – the structures because of determining and being determined, 
and the subjects because of shaping and being shaped; the permanent 
harmonizing of structures and subjects takes place in time, which makes 
the social process a sequence of the processes of individual creativity and 
structural determinism. 
Quoting Sztompka: “The historical coefficient and the agential coeffi-
cient prove to be two complementary or even coextensive characteriza-
tions of social reality. The legacy of the theory of the agency converges 
with the inheritance of historical sociology in outlining the contours of 
the new vision of the social world.”79 The attempt of synthesis that would 
combine together the historical coefficient and the agential coefficient in 
one coherent entity has been taken within contemporary sociology by 
introducing the notion of social becoming.
The theory of social becoming is founded on the two ontological theses 
mentioned above.80 According to the first one, social life is not constituted 
by a single individual or extra-individual systems, but by a specific third 
level: a field merging the individual and the structural. This thesis entails 
the fact that the individual is unthinkable outside some kind of social 
context. Similarly, it is impossible to imagine a structure that would func-
tion without active, creative and reproducing human beings. In fact, the 
society is the individuals in their mutual relations. Each sociological fact 
is constituted by the inseparable combination of individual and structural 
factors. The other ontological thesis states that the common field of the 
individual and the structural is dynamic and could not be grasped in 
a static or invariable form. However, the movement means partly some 
kind of continuity, at least as regards the confines of the changes, since 
keeping identity of the society requires continuity of some of its dimen-
sions or aspects. Then each sociological fact seems to combine historical 
continuity and instability, permanence and variability – at the same time. 
Society understood as the field of the individual and the structural is char-
79 P. Sztompka, The sociology..., p. 212.
80 P. Sztompka, Socjologia..., p. 530.
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acterized by the subjectivity as seen as an eventual capacity of the society 
to self-transform. This capacity does not belong to the individuals, social 
groups or even wider communities. It is not a property of the structures 
either. The subjectivity is an outcome of the dispositions, capacities, mo-
tivations, knowledge, and ambitions of the members of the society and 
the structural conditions they live within. Moreover, it is gradable – it 
can occur more or less intensified within the societies that are passive 
or stagnant or the societies that take up the effort of self-transformation 
and self-creation.81
In this depiction, historical processes consist in the permanent repro-
ducing and creating subjectivity of society through its actualization during 
the every-day socio-historical praxis.82 There is a mutual dependency – the 
praxis at its actual stage is shaping the future form of subjectivity (is repro-
ducing, modifying or even creating its characteristics as well as reshaping 
and enriching individual personalities), whereas the shaped subjectivity 
becomes a source for the future praxis. The process operates on the mu-
tual interaction between the actually realised elements – the real social 
praxis – and the potentially possible (future scope of subjectivity). This 
distinction of two stages of the historical process is often purely analytical. 
In reality, the processes of shaping subjectivity by the actual praxis and its 
feedback are simultaneous.
The so-called theory of structuration by A. Giddens provides an example 
of such an approach. Especially the idea of the duality of structure is here 
important.83 A dual structure is a structure that cannot be conceptualized as 
having a coercive impact upon individuals. It is rather depicted as a back-
ground of actions (especially the creative ones), that later on becomes 
a result. This structure is studied in terms of its structuration. Studying 
structuration, according to Giddens, means searching for an explanation of 
the fact that the structure is constituted by human actions and vice versa, 
or how the actions are shaped and influenced by the structure. The theory 
of structuration is one of the attempts aiming at a coherent depiction of 
human action and structure. Giddens’ approach focuses on the subjective 
actions of individuals.
81 Ibidem, p. 530.
82 The socio-historical praxis is here understood (following K. Marx, among others) as 
a collective praxis located at the point of contact of individual actions taken by the mem-
bers of society and structural conditions that accompany them.
83 E.g. A. Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method..., p. 165.
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The concept accounts for the subjects that are reflexive and rational 
and act towards their goals. They reshape their social world and create 
history in this way. All this does not necessarily mean that acting individ-
uals are absolutely conscious of their skills and capabilities. At the same 
time, not all of the forms of social life can be construed as the intended 
results of their actions. Like other proponents of the sociological theory 
of subjectivity (and historical sociology), Giddens believes that the scope 
of subjectivity of individuals is limited. Undoubtedly, individuals create 
society, but they do so as situated in socio-historical conditions they did 
not choose.84
5. Attempt of conclusion
The author of this paper believes that the shape of theoretic concepts – in 
this case the concepts of human subjectivity – belonging to various dis-
ciplines – depends on the images of reality (initially highly intuitive or 
common) that are taken for granted in the concepts. So the concepts are 
always founded on some preceding judgements – more or less conscious, 
verbalized – concerning the nature of the world and the humans. These 
judgements influence the contours of the field of interest, the questions 
asked, the areas of searching for meaningful facts or ways of gathering data.
This image of the world that precedes the scientific investigation is 
called by Ireneusz Krzemiński an inaccurate draft of the area,85 that during 
the studies is gradually filled with detailed content. The draft depends on 
the viewpoint of scholars converging with their scientific interests. The 
frame of reference could be directed towards individuals – then the so-
ciety seems to be an insignificant background as well as the result of the 
ways of thinking and acting performed by the individuals. It can also be 
directed towards the society, the culture, the historical process – it may be 
so that the individual is situated partly or totally out of the scholar’s sight.
These images of the world or drafts of the area can be described in 
terms of some general ways of thinking about the socio-cultural reality 
(e.g. the individualistic or collectivistic approach). More specifically, they 
can be presented in the form of epistemological perspectives.86
84 Ibidem, p. 165.
85 I. Krzemiński, Co się dzieje..., pp. 197–199.
86 See e.g. ibidem; K. Zamiara, Dwa typy myślenia w humanistyce...
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When it comes to the subjectivity in the psychological sense, these de-
pictions, in general, comply with the naturalistic-psychologistic epistemo-
logical perspective. In this framework, subjectivity is seen as a character-
istic of any human individual. It consists, among others, of the capacity of 
the active development of some psychobiological dispositions like talents 
or preferences, the reshaping of the elements of the external environment 
according to one’s own system of values, the capacity of making free choices 
and autonomous decisions or a satisfactory commitment to relationships 
with others, etc. This type of subjectivity is independent of the historical 
moment or cultural conditions – the individuals are absolutely entitled 
to it. The notion of human nature is crucial here and constitutes a source 
of subjective characteristics.
When it comes to the concepts formulated within socio-cultural 
thought that are in compliance with the anti-individualistic – anti-psy-
chologistic epistemological perspective, the human subjectivity (if at 
all considered) is expressed by the relative individual independence of 
structural determinism; or the possibility to take individualized actions 
(at least within some spheres of culture and social structure) and the 
potential significance of these actions for the shape of the social struc-
ture and culture. This depiction is founded on the less radical version of 
methodological anti-individualism. Constituting subjectivity, understood 
as the individual’s influence on the shape of the socio-cultural structure, is 
possible, provided that there is a specific subjectivity of the structure – i.e. 
its sensitivity to the individual’s actions. The idea of human nature is here 
hardly present; it is merely granted that possible subjectivity is situated 
within the scope that is determined by the culture and social structure at 
the given moment of historical development.
Historical concepts concerning subjectivity are significantly more dif-
ficult to classify as belonging to one of the epistemological perspectives. 
In general, historians tend to emphasize that human beings usually do 
not play a role of subject or agent that can exercise control over their own 
fate. The possible human subjectivity is always mediated by the shape of 
the historical process. The historical process, in turn, is considered as 
dependent on the image of the world accepted by the authors from the 
very beginning.
One could argue that, when it comes to history, the epistemological 
perspective of scholars is even more arbitrary with respect to the studied 
world than within other considered disciplines (psychology or sociology). 
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The historian’s field of studies does not influence him directly, simply 
because it is not accessible for observation. In this situation, he can ex-
trapolate his own image of the world and human beings on the studied 
time spans as long as they are in compliance with his tasks and the ques-
tions he intends to answer. So the epistemological perspective steers the 
process of studying towards a coherent interpretation of the dependencies 
that link various phenomena. On the other hand, this can be perceived 
as an obstacle for taking into account some aspects of the studied objects 
that simply reach beyond their limits. To account for them, a different 
perspective is required.87
Therefore, the main idea presented in the paper is that the difference 
between the Braudelian man from the Mediterranean seaside and Gurev-
ich’s man of the Western Middle Ages is due to different images of the 
world and of humans that had been accepted by these two authors – they 
were proponents of various concepts of historical order. In other words, 
Braudel’s point of view on the Mediterranean world differs from Gurevich’s 
point of view on the Middle Ages, which significantly influences the shape 
of the results of their studies.
As mentioned above, Braudel strongly believes that the individuals 
living within the social (or natural) structure are to play roles that already 
had been defined – all the elements of the roles are formerly present in 
the structure. This standpoint stays in compliance with the collectivistic 
way of analyzing the socio-cultural world. What is typical of Gurevich, 
he perceives the historical world in the light of mutual dependencies 
between the society and the individuals. The individuals are situated in 
the necessary context of social relations characteristic for the European 
Middle Ages. Nevertheless, these conditions are not only coercive but also 
create opportunities to reveal individuality or subjectivity.
The conceptualizations of human subjectivity deriving from historical 
psychology and historical sociology or the sociological theory of person-
ality seem to be some kind of compromise. Historical psychology denies 
such a vision of history that is absolutely deterministic and leaves no place 
for individual activity. Yet individuals are capable of thinking and acting 
independently – at least to some extent. The deterministic perspective is 
impossible to prove with regard to the results of psychological research. 
87 In this manner (as consecutive sequences of the epistemological perspectives) one 
can describe the process of the development of any scientific discipline or group of disci-
plines. See e.g. K. Zamiara, Dwa typy myślenia w humanistyce..., p. 129. 
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On the other hand, historical sociology and the theory of personality un-
derstand subjectivity above all as a specific characteristic of society – its 
capability of self-transformation. They postulate a vision of the individuals 
as having significant influence on the course of action, provided that they 
are not absolutely autonomous. They contribute to creating society, but 
under structural conditions that are inherited from the former genera-
tions, also conforming to some limiting (and stimulating) properties of 
the social structure. However, instead of the limiting and deterministic 
tendencies, these concepts account both for the collective and individual 
activity performed by people who actively construct their social world. 
The idea of a fatalistic history is here replaced by the openness and multi-
directionality of the historical process.
Let me summarize by referring to the apt words of Phillip Abrams, rep-
resenting historical sociology: “human agency encounters social possibility 
and can be seen clearly as simultaneously determined and determining.”88
88 P. Sztompka, The sociology of social change, Blackwell, Oxford 2005, p. 207.

Bibliography
Allport G. W., Becoming. Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality, Yale 
University Press, New Haven – London 1955.
Ankarloo B., Clark S., Monter W. (eds.), Witchcraft and Magic in Europe, vol. 4: The 
Period of the Witch Trials, Bloomsbury, London 2002.
Anstey P. R., Schuster J. A., Introduction, in idem (eds.), The Science of Nature in the 
Seventeenth Century. Patterns of Change in Early Modern Natural Philosophy, 
Springer, Dordrecht 2005.
Banaszak G., Kmita J., Społeczno-regulacyjna koncepcja kultury, Wyd. Instytutu Kul-
tury, Warsaw 1991.
Barth F., An Anthropology of Knowledge, “Current Anthropology” vol. 43, Number 1, 
February 2002.
Belting H., An Anthropology of Images: Picture, Medium, Body, transl. Thomas Dunlap, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton 2014.
Cellini B., Benvenuta Celliniego żywot własny spisany przez niego samego, transl. Le-
opold Staff, PIW, Warsaw 1984.
Betz H. D. (ed.), The Greek Magical Papyri in Translation, Including the Demotic Spells, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1996.
Bloch M., The Historian’s Craft, Knopf, New York 1959.
Braudel F., Kultura materialna, gospodarka i kapitalizm XV–XVIII wiek, vol. I: Struktury 
codzienności, transl. Maria Ochab and Piotr Graff, PIW, Warsaw 1992.
Braudel F., On history, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1982.
Braudel F., The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 
vol. II, University of California Press, London 1995.
Braudel F., Coarelli F., Aymard M., Morze Śródziemne: region i jego dzieje, Wyd. 
Morskie, Gdansk 1982.
Buchowski M., Magia i rytuał, Instytut Kultury, Warsaw 1993.
Buchowski M., Magia, jej funkcja i struktura, Wyd. Naukowe UAM, Poznan 1986.
Buchowski M., Racjonalność, translacja, interpretacja. O badaniu myślenia magicznego 
w antropologii i filozofii brytyjskiej, Wyd. Naukowe UAM, Poznan 1990.
Buchowski M., W obronie racjonalności a przeciw schizofrenii umysłu, “Kultura Współ-
czesna” 1/1993.
114 Bibliography
Buckle H. T., History of civilization in England, vol. 1, Longman, Green, Longman, 
Roberts & Green, London 1864.
Bugaj R., Nauki tajemne w dawnej Polsce – Mistrz Twardowski, Ossolineum, Wroclaw 
1986.
Chartier R., Forms and Meanings. Texts, Performances, and Audiences from Codex to 
Computer, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1995.
Chartier R., Inscription and Erasure Literature and Written Culture from the Eleventh 
to the Eighteenth Century, transl. Arthur Goldhammer, University of Pennsylvania 
Press, Philadelphia 2007.
Chartier R., Introduction, in idem, On the Edge of the Cliff. History, Language and 
Practices, transl. Lydia G. Cochrane, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Balti-
more – London 1997.
Chartier R., The Order of Books: Readers, Authors, and Libraries in Europe Between the 
Fourteenth and Eighteenth Centuries, transl. Lydia G. Cochrane, Stanford University 
Press, Stanford 1994.
Clulee N. H., Astronomia Inferior. Legacies of Johannes Trithemius and John Dee, in 
W. R. Newman, A. Grafton (ed.), Secrets of Nature. Astrology and Alchemy in 
Early Modern Europe, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. – London 2001, p. 173.
Dłubacz W., Światopogląd, in Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii, vol. 9, Wyd. Polskiego 
Towarzystwa św. Tomasza z Akwinu, Lublin 2008.
Dobrowolski J. A., Droga przez labirynty magii. Giambattista Della Porta (1535–1615), 
PWN, Warsaw 1990.
Dupré S., Images in the Air: Optical Games, Magic and Imagination, in Ch. Göttler, 
W.  Neuber (eds.), Spirits Unseen. The Representation of Subtle Bodies in Early 
Modern European Culture, Brill, Leiden – Boston 2008.
Durkheim É., The Rules of Sociological Methods, The Free Press, New York 1982.
Durrant J., Bailey M. D., Introduction, in eidem, Historical Dictionary of Witchcraft, 
Scarecrow, Lanham 2003.
Dymkowski M., Wprowadzenie do psychologii historycznej, GWP, Gdansk 2003.
Elias N., The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations, Black-
well, Oxford 2000.
Encyclopedia of the Scientific Revolution. From Copernicus to Newton, ed. by W. Ap-
pelbaum, Taylor & Francis Group, New York – London 2000.
Eriskon E. H., Childhood and society, W.W. Norton & Company, New York 1963.
Erikson E. H., Identity and Life Cycle, W.W. Norton & Company, New York – London 
1979. 
Erikson E. H., Young man Luther: a study in psychoanalysis and history, W.W. Norton 
& Company, New York – London 1993.
Fernandez-Armesto F., Historia prawdy, transl. Janusz Ruszkowski, Zysk i S-ka, 
Poznan 1999.
Furman R., Wicca i wiccanie. Od tradycji do wirtualnej wspólnoty, Nomos, Cracow 2006.
Garfinkel H., Racjonalne cechy działalności naukowej i potocznej, transl. Danuta La-
chowska, in E. Mokrzycki (ed.), Kryzys i schizma. Antyscjentystyczne tendencje 
w socjologii współczesnej, vol. 1, PIW, Warsaw 1984.
 Bibliography 115
Garin E., Filozof i mag, in idem (ed.), Człowiek renesansu, transl. Anna Osmóls-
ka-Mętrak, Volumen, Warsaw 2001.
Garin E., Zodiak życia. Astrologia w okresie Renesansu, transl. Wojciech Jekiel, Wyd. 
IFIS PAN, Warsaw 1997.
Geertz C., Local Knowledge. Further Essays in Interpretative Anthropology, Basic 
Books, New York 2000.
Geertz C., Opis gęsty. W poszukiwaniu interpretatywnej teorii kultury, in idem, In-
terpretacja kultur. Wybrane eseje, transl. Marta Piechaczek, Wyd. Uniwersytetu 
Jagiellońskiego, Cracow 2005.
Geertz C., Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in The Inter-
pretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, Basic Books, New York 1973.
Giddens A., New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of the Interpretative 
Sociology, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1993.
Gregory R. L., Eye and Brain: The Psychology of Seeing, Michigan University Press, 
Ann Arbor 1968.
Gurevich A. J., Categories of Medieval Culture, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London – 
Boston – Melbourne – Henley 1985.
Guriewicz A., Jednostka w dziejach Europy (średniowiecze), Marabut – Volumen, 
Gdańsk – Warszawa 2002. 
Hall S., Lindzey G., Theories of personality, Wiley, New York 1970.
Heiser D., Prisci Theologi and the Hermetic Reformation in the Fifteenth Century, 
Repristination Press, Bynum 2011.
Hurrelmann K., Social structure and personality development. The individual as 
a productive processor of reality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988.
Jodkowski K., Wspólnoty uczonych, paradygmaty, rewolucje naukowe, vol. 22, series 
“Realizm. Racjonalność. Relatywizm,” Wyd. Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodow-
skiej, Lublin 1990.
Jusiak J., Światpoglądowe uwarunkowania sporu o racjonalność przekonań religijnych, 
“Przegląd Religioznawczy” 4 (238)/2010.
Kamela P., O pojęciu światpoglądu, “Studia Iuridica” XXXIV/1997.
Kamińska M., Kategoria kontekstu w naukach społecznych a fenomen zapisu wiedzy 
potocznej w Internecie, in A. Dytman-Stasieńko, J. Stasieńko (eds.), Język@multime-
dia3. Dialog – konflikt, Wyd. Naukowe Dolnośląskiej Szkoły Wyższej, Wroclaw 2012.
Kieckhefer R., Magia w średniowieczu, transl. Ireneusz Kania, Universitas, Cracow 2001.
Kieckhefer R., Magic in the Middle Ages, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000.
Kijko M., Status wiedzy historycznej w świetle koncepcji interpretacji Donalda David-
sona, UAM w Poznaniu, Poznań 2000 (unpublished doctoral thesis).
Kmita J., Późny wnuk filozofii. Wprowadzenie do kulturoznawstwa, Bogucki Wydaw-
nictwo Naukowe, Poznan 2007.
Kmita J., Kostyrko T., Elementy teorii kultury, Wyd. Naukowe UAM, Poznan 1983.
Krzemiński I., Co się dzieje między ludźmi?, UW, Warsaw 1999.
Lister M., Dovey J., Giddings S., Grant I., Kelly K., Nowe media. Wprowadzenie, transl. 
Marta Lorek, Agata Sadza, Katarzyna Sawicka, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 
Cracow 2009.
116 Bibliography
MacMullen R., Christianizing The Roman Empire A.D. 100–400, Yale University Press, 
New Haven 1984.
Maslow A. H., Towards a psychology of being, VNR, New York 1962.
Maśnicki J., Niemy kraj. Polskie motywy w europejskim kinie niemym (1896–1930), 
słowo/obraz terytoria, Gdansk 2006.
Merton R. K., Social theory and social structure, The Free Press, New York – London 
1968.
Merton R. K., Teoria socjologiczna i struktura społeczna, transl. Ewa Morawska, Jerzy 
Wertenstein-Żuławski, Wyd. Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2002.
Merton R. K., Teoria socjologiczna i struktura społeczna, PWN, Warsaw 1982.
Mill J. S., A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of 
The Principles of Evidence, and the Methods of Scientific Investigation, Harper 
& Brothers, New York 1882. 
Moraczewski K., Cultural Theory and History: Theoretical Issues, Wyd. Naukowe WNS 
UAM, Poznan 2014.
Nummedal T., Alchemy and Authority in the Holy Roman Empire, The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago 2007.
Obuchowski K., Od przedmiotu do podmiotu, Wyd. Uczelniane Akademii Bydgoskiej, 
Bydgoszcz 2000.
Ogden D., Greek and Roman Necromancy, Princeton University Press, Princeton – 
Oxford 2001.
Ogilvie B. W., The Science of Describing. Natural History in Renaissance Europe, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago – London 2006.
Olechnicki K., Załęcki P., Słownik socjologiczny, Graffitti BC, Torun 1997.
Pacewicz P., Podstawowe złudzenia psychologów historycznych, “Studia Psychologicz-
ne” 23/1985.
Pacey A., The Culture of Technology, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 2000.
Pacey A., Technology in World Civilization, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1991.
Przyłębski A., W poszukiwaniu królestwa filozofii. Z dziejów neokantyzmu badeńskiego, 
IF UAM, Poznan 1993.
Roochnik D., Of Art and Wisdom: Plato’s Understanding of Techne, Pennsylvania State 
University Press, University Park 1996.
Sady W., Spór o racjonalność naukową. Od Poincarégo do Laudana, Fundacja na Rzecz 
Nauki Polskiej, Wroclaw 2000.
Spendel Z., Podmiotowość człowieka a psychologia historyczna, Wyd. UŚ, Katowice 
1994.
Sprenger J., Kraemer H., The Hammer of Witches, transl. Christopher S. Mackay, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009.
Szacki J., History of Sociological Thought, Aldwych Press, London 1979.
Szafrański A. A., Nowa antropologia wobec dawniejszych koncepcji religii i magii, No-
mos, Cracow 2000.
Sztompka P., Socjologia. Analiza społeczeństwa, Znak, Cracow 2002.
Sztompka P., Socjologia zmian społecznych, Znak, Cracow 2005.
 Bibliography 117
Sztompka P., The sociology of social change, Blackwell, Oxford 1994.
Tatarkiewicz W., Dzieje sześciu pojęć, PWN, Warsaw 1975.
Topolski J., Świat bez historii, Wyd. Poznańskie, Poznan 1998.
Toynbee A. J., A Study of History, vol. 1–12, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1934– 
1961.
Urban O., Podmiotowość jednostki ludzkiej jako przedmiot badań nauk humanistycz-
nych, Bogucki Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Poznan 2008.
Wade N. J., Finger S., The Eye as an Optical Instrument: from Camera Obscura to Helm-
holtz’s Perspective, “Perception” 30 (10)/2001.
Williams S. F., ‘Singe the Enchantment for Sleepe’: Music and Bewitched Sleep in Early 
Modern English Drama, in Ch. Göttler, W. Neuber (eds.), Spirits Unseen. The 
Representation of Subtle Bodies in Early Modern European Culture, Brill, Leiden – 
Boston 2008.
Włodarczyk J., Solar Eclipse Observations in the Time of Copernicus: Tradition or 
Novelty?, “Journal for the History of Astronomy” vol. 38, 3/2007.
Wrzosek W., Historia – Kultura – Metafora. Powstanie nieklasycznej historiografii, 
Leopoldinum FNP, Wroclaw 1995.
Wypustek A., Magia antyczna, Ossolineum, Wroclaw 2001.
Yates F. A., Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, Routledge and Kegan, Lon-
don 1964.
Zambelli P., White Magic, Black Magic in the European Renaissance, Brill, Leiden – 
Boston 2007.
Zamiara K., Czy istnieje szansa korzystania z teorii psychologicznej w badaniach nad 
kulturą?, in T. Kostyrko (ed.), Teoria kultury a badania nad zjawiskami arty-
stycznymi, Centralny Ośrodek Metodyki Upowszechniania Kultury, Warsaw 1983.
Zamiara K., Czy opozycja: indywidualizm – kolektywizm wymaga przezwyciężenia?, 
“Człowiek i Społeczeństwo” 1998, vol. XVI.
Zamiara K., Dwa typy myślenia w humanistyce o układzie jednostka kultura, in K. Ła-
stowski, P. Zeidler (eds.), Filozofia wobec nauki, człowieka i społeczeństwa, Wyd. 
Naukowe UAM, Poznan 2006.
Zamiara K., Epistemologiczny kontekst psychologii partycypacji kulturowej, in K. Za-
miara, M. Golka (eds.), Sztuka i estetyzacja. Studia teoretyczne, Wyd. Fundacji 
Humaniora, Poznan 1999.
Zielinski S., Deep Time of the Media. Toward an Archaeology of Hearing and Seeing 
by Technical Means, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 2006.
Znaniecki F., Badania nad twórcami kultury, in K. Łukasiewicz (ed.), Wokół koncepcji 
kultury Floriana Znanieckiego, Oficyna Wydawnicza Arboretum, Wroclaw 2008.
Znaniecki F., Ludzie teraźniejsi a cywilizacja przyszłości, Wyd. Naukowe PWN, 
Warszawa 2001.
Znaniecki F., Nauki o kulturze. Narodziny i rozwój, Wyd. Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 1992.
118 Bibliography
Internet sources
Encyklopedia PWN, http://encyklopedia.pwn.pl/haslo/3985964/technologia.html and 
http://encyklopedia.pwn.pl/haslo/3985955/technika.html [19.04.2014].
Porta G. Della, Magia naturalna, vol. XVII: O Niezwykłych Zwierciadłach, chapter XII: 
Jak ujrzeć w Komnacie rzeczy, które nie istnieją [transl. of titles – M. K.], http://www.
mindserpent.com/American_History/books/Porta/jportac17.html [19.04.2014].
Słownik wyrazów obcych i zwrotów obcojęzycznych Władysława Kopalińskiego, http://
www.slownik-online.pl/kopalinski/D4A541E44CEBB6E1C125659D000AB1C5.
php [19.04.2014].
